


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# World-wide Perspectives



## KEY DATES

April 9	Czechoslovakia	1968 - Dubcek government announced fuller civil rights to be granted under new Action Program.
April 12-21	Kuala Lumpur	World Fellowship of Buddhists, 9th General Assembly.
May 11-17	Mexico City	International Meeting of Women Journalists, sponsored by Mexican Association of Writers and Journalists.
May 22	Moscow	1943 - End of Third International (Comintern) announced; the statement declared the autonomy of Communist parties outside USSR.
May 23		Meeting of Preparatory Commission for conference of world Communist parties.
June 5 (maybe)		World Communist Conference
June 14-17	Helsinki	6th Congress of Women's International Democratic Federation (Communist).
June 21-24	East Berlin	World Peace Assembly, sponsored by WCP, with strong participation expected by other Communist fronts. Also, WCP Council meeting.

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Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs

(21 February -- 21 March 1969)

1. Active Month for the Communist World

The month has been an especially active one for the Communist world. World attention inevitably focused on such events as the Sino-Soviet border clash, the Yugoslav Communist Congress, the abortive meeting of the Warsaw Pact powers in Budapest, and the meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the World Communist Conference in Moscow. Less spectacular, but also of considerable importance, were the quiet and continuing pressure toward domestic freedom in Czechoslovakia, and the unobtrusive Soviet recognition of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the infamous Comintern. Briefly characterized, the month has been a virtually unbroken series of defeats for Soviet diplomacy in the Communist world. It is difficult to see how the Soviets can go on suffering defeat after defeat without some radical change in policy or in the leadership.

2. Yugoslav CP Congress and International Communism

Out of courtesy and a need to preserve appearances of Communist unity, the Soviets last month were obliged to attend the Italian Communist Party (PCI) Congress and listen to condemnations of their invasion of Czechoslovakia and other criticisms. This month the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) held its Ninth Congress, from 10 - 15 March, and again the Soviets were subjected to public criticism, this time by Tito, for violating the integrity of Czechoslovakia and for promulgating the Brezhnev Doctrine. Anticipating the worst, the Soviets boycotted the Yugoslav Congress and pressured their Warsaw Pact allies to stay away. The pressure succeeded, except in the case of Rumania, which again asserted her independence and sent veteran Communist leader Emil Bodnarus to the Congress to reiterate Rumania's insistence on the primacy of national independence and sovereignty over the demands of loyalty to Soviet requirements. While the Soviet Union and each of her more subservient Satellites sent the LCY a brief, cool, but correct message of greeting, Czechoslovak students demonstrated at home, praising Tito and denouncing Brezhnev for requiring Czechoslovakia to stay from the LCY Congress.

Thus Yugoslavia once again became the dramatic symbol of the powerful trend toward independent Communism undermining Soviet control of the Communist world. It is an example which most, if not all, members of the Soviet Bloc would want to emulate, if only they dared.

3. Czechoslovakia

Before Czech students shouted "Tito Yes! Brezhnev No!" in the streets of Prague, another young Czech took his life deliberately



following the example of young Jan Palach a month before. This latest tragedy is an awesome measure of the depth to which youthful Czechoslovaks have felt the grotesque injustice of the Soviet military invasion and occupation of their country, which, essentially, had tried merely to humanize and democratize Communism.

Doggedness in trying to realize pre-invasion goals of a genuinely free Communism in which various social groups are given a means of influencing policy was evident also in an initiative displayed by the Czechoslovak trade union council through its Chairman Karel Polacek. He forthrightly declared at the opening of its 7th Congress on 4 March:

"The principled relationship of the trade unions to the party cannot, however, in any way impair their independent approach, restrict their own attitudes, or push them into a second class position of mere executors of party decisions. We shall also in the future put forward frank and our own standpoints in our work, with a view to preventing the emergence of a policy behind closed doors.... I consider it necessary to repeat once again that by this relationship to the Communist Party we do not intend to and will never be an opposition force against the Party, against socialism. On the contrary, we understand this relationship as an active share in the formation and practical implementation of the policy of the party."

There are evidences in other areas of Czechoslovak life as well that groups of citizens, bound by common interests, will insist on being heard in matters of national policy. This trend is dangerously close to genuine democracy, which has always been anathema to the Soviets. Even more dangerous, it is just such manifestations of a taste for democracy which frightened the Soviets into invading Czechoslovakia on that infamous day of 21 August 1968.

#### 4. New Level for Sino-Soviet Conflict

Given the fundamentally propagandistic function of Communist "news" media, it is impossible to determine how the fighting along the Soviet-Chinese border in Manchuria started, or who fired the first shot. Indeed, one can be reasonably sure only of the fact that an exchange of fire took place beginning on 2 March and continuing on subsequent days; that is about all Soviet and Chinese news reports agree on.

There is also little question but what these incidents have raised the long-standing conflict between the two Communist states to a new level of intensity. It would be hazardous to predict where this succession of armed clashes will lead, but it is clear each side is trying to reap the greatest possible propaganda advantage from the event. The Soviets are trying to use it to rally tightly around the CPSU the Communist parties which are more or less loyal to it. This kind of unity

is all the more important to the Soviets before the forthcoming June conference of the world's Communist parties. The Chinese are using the incident to whip their population into a highly emotional state of nationalistic loyalty to the Mao leadership, thereby taking their minds off the chaos and deprivations of the Cultural Revolution, and focusing their attention on the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party to be held sometime sooner or later this year.

#### 5. Warsaw Pact Fiasco

Elaborate but quiet preparations had been under way for weeks for a two-day summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders which included from the Soviet Union the most prestigious delegation possible: Brezhnev, Kosygin, Defense Minister Grechko, and Warsaw Pact Commander Yakubovsky. The meeting, which was to take place 17-18 March, was the first since the invasion of Czechoslovakia and was intended to put on a display of unity after the disruption of the invasion, particularly as far as Rumania was concerned. Without explanation the meeting was delayed for several hours, then met for two hours (rather than two days), issued a non-committal communiqué, and abruptly adjourned. It seems self-evident that the meeting was a thoroughgoing failure. Most observers believe that Rumania refused to go along with the other members on one or both of two major items presumed to have been on the agenda: a reorganization of the Warsaw Pact to give it supra-national powers, and a condemnation of the alleged armed incursion on the Soviet Far Eastern border by the Chinese Communists.

Issued simultaneously with the communiqué from the Warsaw Pact meeting was what appears to be a warming over of an old appeal of the Soviets for an "all-European security conference." Whether this appeal and the propaganda accompanying it is an attempt to cover up failures of the Warsaw Pact meeting or the beginning of a new campaign to drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies may soon become more clear.

#### 6. The Comintern and the WCC

As far as can be ascertained, the celebration this March of the 50th anniversary of the first Congress of the Third (Communist) International, better known as the Comintern, was marked in the Soviet Union only by a small number of commemorative articles in the press. This seems a minimal way to celebrate such a momentous birthday. Soviet reluctance to make more of the Comintern anniversary probably stems from their fear of revealing their actual desire to return the world movement to something resembling the discipline and control exercised over it by the Comintern, when Stalin manipulated Communist parties to the exclusive service of his foreign policy aims and without regard for the welfare and success of any given party. This Soviet desire lurks behind the frequent repetition in propaganda of the crucial need for "unity" in international Communism, for a restoration of the primacy of the spirit of

"proletarian internationalism" (i.e., loyalty to the Soviet Union taking precedence over pursuit of mere national interest). The Soviet Union must advance cautiously and delicately toward this goal in view of the known sensibilities of many important parties which are apprehensive about this very goal of the Soviets.

Attached are statements by Tito at the LCY Congress characterizing the Soviet proclivity from the days of the Comintern to the present day to try to impose a general line on the world Communist movement. Similar criticism of the Comintern appeared in the Czech and Rumanian party press. An interesting contrast is presented by the idealized account of the founding of the Comintern in current Soviet propaganda on the one hand, and an account of what really transpired given by the first secretary the Comintern ever had, veteran socialist and collaborator of Lenin, Angelica Balabanoff. These are also attached.

NEW YORK TIMES  
23 March 1969

## CPYRIGHT *Crossroads for World Communism*

Future historians may well conclude that this present month, March 1969, was the point of no return in the history of world Communism, the time when it became evident beyond argument that the old monolithic international movement of Stalin's day could never be put together again.

Three events above all these past few weeks have shown how irreversibly far modern Communist "polycentrism"—to use the word introduced by the late Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti—has come, and how little Moscow has retained of its once complete authority over world Communism.

The month began with the public announcement of the Soviet-Chinese mini-war in the Far East. The lives that have been lost in these battles on the frozen Ussuri River have transformed what began seemingly as an ideological struggle into a conflict that the Russians see as a reprise of their war with the Mongols almost a millenium ago. Moscow's fury that it does not enjoy the automatic support of all Communists in this territorial battle was underlined by the Soviet weekly, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, which publicly attacked a Czechoslovak newspaper for taking a neutralist stance on the dispute.

### Right Wing

Almost simultaneously, Soviet relations with the right wing of world Communism reached their lowest point in years. This was evidenced at the Yugoslav Communist Congress in Belgrade which the Soviet Union boycotted and forced its Eastern European satellites—including Czechoslovakia—to boycott.

The Soviet action turned the Belgrade meeting into a kind of referendum on Communist inde-

pendence. In that "referendum" more than a dozen Communist parties voted against Moscow by sending their delegates. Among those who chose this means of demonstrating their independence were such important Communist parties as those of Italy, France, Rumania, Finland, and Chile as well as the Communist parties of Austria, Belgium, Norway, Britain, Venezuela, Spain and several others. Moreover a number of Communist parties that stayed away sent warm messages of greetings to the Yugoslav conclave.

### Warsaw Pact

Then last week, at the Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Pact, came a development that Moscow may have considered the most galling event of the month. At this gathering with what were once servile Eastern European satellites, the Soviet Union was unable to incorporate into the communique a single word of support for its position in the Chinese struggle. The Rumanians, in addition, blocked all of Moscow's far-reaching plans for turning the Warsaw Pact and its associated institutions into a far more integrated military, political and economic force.

But even the recital above does not exhaust the disorder, confusion and internal bickering that are now the dominant feature of Communist politics.

For example, by no means all the countries that failed to show up at the Yugoslav Congress support Moscow. Thus the Albanian, New Zealand, Thai, Malaysian, and some other parties are pro-Chinese. Others, like the Japanese, the North Koreans, and the Cubans have tense and far from fully smooth relations with both Moscow and Peking. And in some countries, such as India

and Israel, there are several Communist parties, each claiming to be the only legitimate Marxist-Leninist group and each enjoying varying degrees of recognition from foreign Communist parties.

### Party Line Split

The most fundamental point is that there is now no agreed party line to which all or almost all Communist parties subscribe. Two decades ago, in Stalin's heyday, all Communist parties automatically accepted whatever position the Soviet Union took, with only Yugoslavia dissenting. In 1957 and again in 1960 fragile compromises were patched up in international Communist party meetings in Moscow and these served temporarily as unifying doctrines. Now, except for opposition to the United States in Vietnam and verbal denunciation of capitalism, there is nothing approaching a Communist consensus on a wide range of world political and ideological issues.

Moscow continues to hope it can repair the disarray. It looks forward to the scheduled international Communist meeting in May as the occasion on which it can win support for a common position from at least a numerical majority of the world's Communist parties. But already it is evident that to persuade enough parties to attend Moscow is having to accept to compromises. The possibility looms therefore that if and when that May meeting takes place, its final result may be fairly platitudinous and the great Soviet efforts of recent years to arrange such a get-together may prove to have borne little valuable organizational or ideological fruit.

—HARRY SCHWARTZ

# 'Wanton' Soviet Acts Condemned by Tito

By Anatole Shub

Washington Post Foreign Service

BELGRADE, March 11—Marshal Tito defiantly rebuked Moscow today by summarizing 50 years of Yugoslav Communist history as an unceasing struggle against Kremlin domination.

Opening Yugoslavia's 9th Party Congress, Tito sharply condemned the late Josef Stalin, his associates and his heirs for:

- Persistent, harmful interference in Yugoslav affairs by the prewar Communist International.
- The murder of "dozens" of Yugoslav Communist leaders in Stalin's purges. "Their tragedy was all the greater," Tito said, "for their having been tortured under the false accusation that they were spies and traitors, for their having been sent to their death, monstrously accused of crimes they never committed."
- "Misunderstanding" and "conflict" during World War II, when Stalin "underestimated the strength of our movement and its ability to pass its own decisions."
- The Cominform campaign against Yugoslavia from 1948 to 1953, accompanied in Eastern Europe by "methods of violence and violation of the rule of law, by the stifling of the elementary rights of citizens, distortion of the truth, the monstrous misuse of propaganda and other wanton acts." "The Cominform campaign," Tito said, "provoked political, economic and ethnic conflicts in various socialist countries" and "helped to spread the cold war."
- Post-Stalinist pressures on Yugoslavia to abandon its independent position, including the 1960 Moscow declaration of 81 Communist Parties which once again attacked Yugoslavia "arbitrarily and brutally."
- Current Soviet attempts to unify the Communist movement around some "general line" which, Tito said, must represent "either a dictated or an unprincipled compromise between the very divergent

views and interests of some parties at the expense of others."

• Moscow's continuing efforts to justify the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia, which Tito again condemned as an "outright violation of the sovereignty of a socialist country."

The 76-year-old Yugoslav President emphasized that his struggle with the Soviet leaders was neither personal nor national.

Stalin's attack on Yugoslavia, he said, was "the first open conflict between the bureaucratic concepts of a socialist state and the paths to socialist development in the world, evolved in the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership—which, incidentally, cannot at all be treated merely as some sort of 'personality cult'—and the anti-dogmatic approach, the democratic, humane concept of socialist society . . ."

"The dilemma faced by the Yugoslav Communists after the war," Tito said, "were no coincidence nor were they only ours . . . They were actually the dilemma of the further development of socialism generally, both here and elsewhere."

The Yugoslav leader spoke several times with obvious contempt of "what is known as the socialist camp," for in both Yugoslav and Russian the word for camp is derived directly from the German "lager," used by Hitler and Goebbels for their concentration and death camps.

Tito declared that "the policy of subordination to the temporary state interests and

the tactics of Soviet foreign policy did tremendous damage to various Communist Parties before the war . . . as well as after it. This kind of policy created bureaucratic relationships in the leaderships of the Party . . . cutting them off from their own working class and the people of their country."

In attacking Yugoslavia in 1948, Tito said, "the Stalinists saw a threat to existing relationships between the socialist countries and to relationships within these countries . . . Those who supported the view that the USSR was the center of revolution and a model of socialism could not reconcile themselves to the tendencies towards independence demonstrated by various parties and movements."

Tito said that, in recalling the Stalinist campaign against Yugoslavia, "we do not do so in order to stir up old passions and hatred against anyone."

He recalled Yugoslav support of the 20th Soviet Party Congress in 1956, at which Nikita Khrushchev launched "de-Stalinization," and reaffirmed Yugoslav adherence to the principles of equality and independence formulated by Khrushchev and himself in the Belgrade declaration of 1955 and the Moscow declaration of 1956.

"However," Tito continued, "we continue to see that in relations between socialist countries and Communist Parties the principle of internationalism is sometimes abused so as to impose, in its name, certain one-sided obligations on various parties . . ."

After condemning Soviet attempts to enforce a new "gen-

eral line" and Kremlin conduct toward Czechoslovakia, Tito concluded his prepared address in this fashion:

"We, the Communists of Yugoslavia, do not think we have found the answers to all the contemporary dilemmas of socialism and we are aware of the problems, difficulties and shortcomings in the implementation of our own policy. Let the results achieved in development of new Socialist relations, the degree of humanization and the freedom of our society, the attainments in improving the living conditions of the working people and satisfying their material and spiritual needs, be the yardstick of the correctness and success of our policies and practices . . ."

In a passage obviously added to his original text, Tito finished by greeting the more than 60 delegations from foreign Communist, Socialist, Social Democratic and third-world nationalist parties. The Rumanian, Italian and most other West European Communist Parties are represented despite a Soviet-bloc boycott.

"We very much regret," Tito said, "that certain Communist Parties from the socialist countries, including the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, canceled their attendance . . ."

He concluded that he was accustomed to such behavior "when temporary political motives are involved, but this only heightens the prestige of the Yugoslav League of Communists and its historic consistency in the eyes of the progressive world."

# Yugoslavs Pressing For 'Real' Freedom

By Anatole Shub

Washington Post Foreign Service

BELGRADE, March 16—

"We are tired," a young Yugoslav journalist remarked, "of having democracy doled out to us from above, sometimes with an eyedropper, sometimes more generously, but always under control. Now the time has come to stop this constant waiting for the leadership and to begin pushing for real democracy ourselves."

This sentiment, relatively new in Yugoslavia, is broadly shared today. Although farsighted individuals like Milovan Djilas recognized the problem 15 years ago, they were isolated. Djilas spent nine years in prison for having expressed "prematurely" thoughts which are probably shared today by a majority of Yugoslav Communists, particularly among the younger, better-educated generation.

The process of self-liberation from inherited Soviet dogma has been continuous and gradual. But it was decisively accelerated by two major events in 1968: the massive student uprising here last June, and the drama of Czechoslovakia from renaissance to military occupation.

The student uprising, which witnessed remarkable solidarity between students and young professors, and among different sections of the country, has had several powerful effects.

First, a sorting out: "Everyone got to know each other very well, and now we all know exactly who stands where." Although there were small Maoist, Castroite and other utopian groupings, by far the overwhelming tendency of the movement—in which hundreds of thousands participated—was toward democratic socialism.

At the same time, most if not all Party leaders—but Marshal Tito among them—realized that the younger generation was politically engaged, critical, dissatisfied, impatient—but not subversive. They had to return to the broad socialist ideals which the Party has preached if not consistently

practiced.

Although there have been no further riots or demonstrations, the pressure of the young has continued. The weekly Student has become the liveliest and most widely discussed paper in Belgrade.

The demands of students and intellectuals generally were reflected at the just-ended 9th Party Congress in numerous appeals for a greater role for scientists, specialists, economists, sociologists, intellectuals and young people generally in framing basic Yugoslav policies.

There will be an interesting test of Party readiness to grant such a role in the coming weeks. Belgrade University students are attempting to elect three of their most distinguished—and heretical—professors as deputies to the Federal Assembly in next month's parliamentary elections. They would doubtless be elected if permitted to run. The question is whether the Party machine in Serbia will intervene to prevent their candidacies.

Czechoslovakia has had an equally deep effect, and not merely in destroying illusions about the Kremlin. What was most impressive in the "Prague spring" was its spontaneous character, the unceasing and many-sided pressures from below—expressed in meetings, demonstrations, resolutions, letters and, above all, in the freedom of the Czechoslovak press, radio and television.

In a few weeks last March and April, the Czechoslovak news media attained a degree of freedom which Yugoslavia (although years ahead of other East European press) has yet to attain.

Czech press freedom was widely reported and commented on here. Thus a growing number of Yugoslavs, Communists and non-Communists, journalists and non-journalists, have been following the swiftest, most direct path toward solving this country's

truly complex economic, social and ethnic problems lies in freeing the press from all remaining inhibitions—in opening the way for direct, open confrontation of views on even the most sensitive and taboo issues.

The debate can no longer be restricted, many Yugoslavs feel, to Communist leaders both liberal and conservative, but must be opened to thinkers and experts of all persuasions.

Marshal Tito, while visiting several editorial offices last month, urged the journalists to take greater initiatives, and the resolutions of the 9th Congress also call for greater press freedom. But similar promises have been made in the past, and considerably circumscribed in daily practice. The months ahead should show how real the new promises are.

Here again, there will be an early test case of the Party's intentions. For this spring, a new book by Djilas, "The Imperfect Society," will be published in the West. It is not an emotional attack on any person, country or party, but a contemplative political-philosophical essay.

A friend of the author sums up its possible consequences here as follows:

"If Djilas is arrested or even harassed again, it will show that we have not made much real progress these last dozen years. If the book is completely ignored, or brushed off with snide attacks and no fair explanation of its contents, it will show that we are still stuck somewhere halfway between Stalinism and genuine democracy.

"But if the book is published here or even extracted at length, if its ideas are openly discussed and debated, with any serious Yugoslav political thinker free to agree or disagree publicly and in print, then—no matter how sharp the debate—we will know that we have crossed the Rubicon at last. After the discussion, the freer we shall be."

# Kremlin's Long-Sought Communist Summit Faces

By Anatole Shub  
Washington Post Foreign Service  
MOSCOW, March 22—The

American Communist Party) have only a few thousand members and many are underground, exiled or split.

## a New Delay

Kremlin's elusive goal of a world unity summit conference of Communist Parties faded still farther into the future as the latest preparatory meeting, involving 67 Parties, ended quietly and inconclusively this afternoon.

The summit—originally scheduled for last November, later postponed to this coming May—was provisionally set for June 5, which Soviet propaganda will doubtless hail for domestic consumption as a great victory. However, the participants at this week's meeting, which opened formally last Wednesday, scheduled yet another preparatory session for May 23. Within the next two months, each of the Central Committees of the 67 Parties is to review the basic draft document worked out here, as well as numerous amendments which have already been submitted.

Observers believe that the heretical and independent Communist Parties, notably the Rumanians, Italians and most other West Europeans, have thus won yet another opportunity for indefinite delay—while the Russians must remain on their best behavior in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere.

This week's preparatory meeting, as well as previous sessions and subcommittee parleys in a series dating back to February, 1968, was boycotted by six of the 14 ruling Communist Parties (China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, Cuba and Yugoslavia), plus most other Asian Parties, which are pro-Chinese. Moreover, the Japanese, Swiss, Belgian and Norwegian Parties, which attended previous preparatory meetings, stayed home this time.

Of the 67 participating Parties, only the eight ruling Parties, plus perhaps another dozen, are considered significant political movements. Most of the others (like the

The basic draft document, which will be sent to the absentees as well as the participating parties, is entitled "The tasks of the present stage of the struggle against imperialism, and of the unity of action of Communist and Workers' Parties and of all anti-imperialist forces."

According to informed Communist sources, the document makes absolutely no mention, direct or indirect, of China. This would appear to be a remarkable development, considering that the Soviet drive for a world conference was originally launched by former Party chief Khrushchev in 1964, and relaunched by his successor Brezhnev in 1967, to draw a firm doctrinal line between Soviet orthodoxy and Chinese and other heresies.

In view of this month's bloody clashes between Soviet and Chinese soldiers on the Ussuri River, Soviet assent to what is being described as a very bland and vague document is not being taken as a sign of strength or self-confidence in the Kremlin.

Sources report that the draft document refers to Vietnam, the Middle East, disarmament and peace—but in terms sufficiently non-controversial to permit at least conditional approval by the Rumanians, Italians and other Independents.

Thus, the draft presumably follows what some local cynics term "the UNESCO style" of the Budapest appeal on European security, issued by the seven Warsaw Pact nations last Monday. That appeal, which pleaded for cooperation in such matters as "hygiene," as well as a European security conference, managed to earn some approval even from the conservative Axel Springer newspaper chain in West Germany.

The Budapest appeal was apparently so tepid, from the

viewpoint of Kremlin anti-Bonn crusaders, that the Soviet leaders felt compelled tonight to reinterpret it. A curiously anonymous statement, issued by the official news agency Tass, declared in the name of the Soviet Party Politburo and government

Council of Ministers that the Budapest appeal had "great importance in view of the fact that the aggressive imperialist NATO bloc is being activated."

The Budapest appeal said no such thing, for the Rumanians would not have signed if it had.

According to Tass, the Politburo and Council of Ministers "fully approved the activity of the Soviet delegation" at Budapest after discussing "a report of the Soviet delegation" on that meeting.

While the Tass announcement referred only to the Politburo and Council of Ministers, its headline declared that the Party Central Committee was approving the Budapest results. Presumably, the Soviet Central Committee—which has not met since last November, and then only

briefly—must be convened before May 23 to discuss the basic draft on "the struggle against imperialism."

Several of the independent Parties represented here, as well as outsiders and the captive Czechoslovaks, have apparently been playing for time in the hope that such a Central Committee meeting might bring changes in Soviet policy, leadership or both.

NEW YORK TIMES  
23 March 1969

# WORLD RED TALKS PLANNED TO OPEN IN MOSCOW JUNE 5

At Least 6 of 67 Parties Are  
Said to Have Called for  
Further Delay

## ANOTHER PARLEY ADDED

Preliminary Session May 23  
Will Allow Revisions in  
the Final Document

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, March 22—The

conference of the world Communist parties is scheduled to open here on June 5, informed Communist sources said today.

The sources said that the Chinese-Soviet border in the Far East dispute was the reason for a renewed delay in the conference, which had been officially announced for May.

In order to avoid the need of adopting a major document of the world Communist movement while the two principal Communist powers were in a state of open hostility, at least six parties were reported to have moved for a delay.

The means they chose, according to the sources, to demand another meeting—set for May 23—by the preparatory commission, which has been meeting here since last Wednesday, to put the final touches to the document and set the conference date.

The purpose of the additional preliminary meeting, in the argument put by the dissenting parties, is to allow the conference to revise the document in the light of suggestions made by the parties between now and May 23.

## Long Delay Sought

The principal advocates of that tactic, according to the sources, were the Italian and British parties. Both parties are in open opposition to the Soviet Union over last year's invasion of Czechoslovakia and are believed to favor an indefinite postponement of the world conference.

With the Soviet Union clearly determined to have a conference, however, its opponents in the movement were thought to be concentrating their efforts on putting it off as far as possible.

The 67-party preparatory commission yielded to the demands and scheduled the May 23 meeting, according to the sources. At the same time, it provided a major gain for the Soviet-led majority by setting the date for the world conference.

The draft document will be circulated to all Communist parties. It is entitled "The Tasks at the Present Stage of the Struggle Against Imperial-

ism and the Unity of Action of Communists and Workers Parties and All Anti-Imperialist Forces."

A communique on the meeting that completed its work today is expected to be issued tomorrow. According to the sources, it will reconfirm that all Communist parties, including those that boycotted the preparatory meeting, would be invited to the conference.

Those boycotting the talks include six of the 14 Communist parties that rule in their own countries. They are China, Albania, Yugoslavia, North Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba. None is expected to attend.

## Reports to Be Vague

The document adopted today was reported to be vague enough to make it possible for those parties that are neutral in the Soviet-Chinese dispute, such as Rumania, to sign it. Nonetheless, Bucharest was reported to have suggested a number of revisions during the current meeting.

The world conference is expected to issue three additional declarations: an appeal to all nations for peace, a statement

of solidarity with North Vietnam and the Vietcong and a declaration on the centennial of Lenin's birth, next year.

While the Soviet Union contends that the purpose of the conference is to unify the movement rather than excommunicate any members, the general belief among Communist observers is that Moscow intends to use the conference to widen the rift between Communist China and the bulk of the Communist movement, including the Soviet Union.

The idea of a world conference of the Communist movement originated with Nikita S. Khrushchev before his fall from power in October, 1964. Mr. Khrushchev's aim was a declaration putting the heretical Chinese beyond the Communist pale.

Mr. Khrushchev's successors put off the project for two years. The idea was revived in November, 1966, and received with considerable coolness by a

number of important parties.

The principal objection was and remains that reading Communist China out of the movement would restore the Soviet Union as the single principal center of world Communism.

The series of preparatory meetings that began in Budapest in February, 1968, set an Oct. 15, 1968, date for the conference. That was indefinitely postponed by the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Last November, a new meeting in Budapest called for the conference in May, and set the preliminary meeting that ended today to make the final arrangements.

## Ulbricht Reports Solid Front

Special to The New York Times

BERLIN, March 22—Walter

Ulbricht, the East German leader, asserted today that all Warsaw Pact countries were unanimous in condemning "Chinese Aggression" at the East-bloc conference in Budapest earlier this week.

His remarks at a congress in East Berlin appeared to contradict reports from Budapest saying that Rumania had refused to agree to a condemnation of China.

"We were unanimous in Budapest in our assessment of those aggressive acts, all the more since the Chinese actions were provocations of a clear-cut aggressive and military nature," Mr. Ulbricht told the congress of the National Front, the Communist-led popular front organization.



Excerpts from Tito's report, 11 March 1969, at the Ninth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia entitled: "Fifty Years of Revolutionary Struggle of the Communists of Yugoslavia"

....The theoretical discussions on the national question which took place during 1923 and 1924 represented a significant step forward in the efforts of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to adopt correct attitudes and carry out an efficient policy. But there was still a long way to go to a clear program and principled attitudes on this particularly important and delicate question.

It is known that the Comintern, and Stalin personally, intervened in the discussion on the national question in our country. Although it supported a positive stand as regards recognition of Yugoslavia's multinational structure, the Comintern with its intervention increased the groping in the dark as regards the practical activity of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This was particularly the case with the adoption of the stand on the need to break up Yugoslavia, which, according to that stand, was only some kind of artificial structure created by the Versailles Treaty. The Comintern also participated in the adoption of other political attitudes which were not always based on an analysis of reality and the specific situation in Yugoslavia but on various assessments of the Comintern's top leaders -- which in addition kept changing often -- on the situation in our country and in the world in general....

The decision to shift the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from abroad into the country and to make the party independent in every respect, including financially, was of particular significance in the formation of its correct policy and successful activity. This made it possible for the party to become an independent force of the Yugoslav workers movement, to assess correctly the real situation in the country, to work out an action program, and to apply forms of work which linked the Communist Party of Yugoslavia with the broadest working masses and all its progressive forces. The party, together with the state leadership, which was well acquainted with the circumstances there, was in a position to oppose all dogmatic forces in the Comintern which, by referring to former factionalist struggle, proposed the dissolution of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It became evident, however, that it was the Communist Party of Yugoslavia -- which many in the Comintern in 1938 had already written off -- was in the position to lead the people of Yugoslavia into the liberation war and the revolution in 1941. It was our party -- in which the leadership of the Comintern had no confidence whatever -- that in the fateful days of World War II honorably fulfilled its obligations to its peoples and the entire international workers movement. It achieved this under the most difficult conditions by facing the difficulties which came from those who should have helped us most....

Socialist Yugoslavia itself had to wage a difficult struggle for its independence and equal position in the world, despite the threats, pressure, and blackmail of international reaction, both during the war and the early postwar years. The new Yugoslavia was subject to fierce political, economic, and psychological pressure, including pressure by countries of the so-called socialist camp which followed Stalin's criticism and attacks on the Yugoslav Communist Party and in the aftermath of the resolution of the Cominform.

Today it is known to the entire world that the reasons behind Stalin's attack on Yugoslavia were actually of an entirely different nature from those which were chosen to provide the ostensible occasion for the critique of our party and which, in fact, then foreshadowed a historically inevitable conflict in the international workers movement. The attack on the Yugoslav Communist Party represented the first open conflict between a bureaucratic concept concerning a socialist country and the paths of socialist development in the world, such as was built in the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership, which, by the way, cannot be treated merely as a "personality cult," and an antidogmatic approach to and a democratic concept of socialist society, which had come to the fore in the activity of the Yugoslav Communist Party earlier, and especially so after the war. Of course, we did not invent this concept so as to become the inventors of the new "model of socialism," because it had been engendered and molded as a result of specific conditions of revolutionary struggle in our country and deep-rooted changes in the modern world. Events have proved that the dilemmas which faced Yugoslav communists were not something particularly our own. It was demonstrated that they were the dilemmas of the further development of socialism in general, both in our country and in the world, and that they are encountered by many other parties and individual socialist countries.

It is known that the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership even earlier, and especially during the national liberation war, occasionally experienced poor understanding and even came into conflict with Stalin's policy. Stalin's policy obviously also reflected belittlement of the strength of our movement and its ability to decide by itself the fateful questions of our development.

Such an attitude toward revolution in our country was also an expression of the situation prevailing for many years in the Comintern. This international organization, toward the end of its existence, increasingly became the instrument of USSR policy, or rather Stalin's policy, and respected less and less the independence of individual parties. It is understandable that, after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, all truly revolutionary movements, ours included, considered as their international debt to give unconditional support to the Soviet Union, the first socialist country. However, the policy of subordination to the momentary state interests of Soviet foreign policy caused on the eve of war and later, not to mention after the war, enormous damage to individual

communist parties. Such a policy created bureaucratic relations in the party leaderships, hampered self-initiative, and, what was even worse, led them to isolation from their own working class and people.

After World War II, the question of relations with the Soviet Union and relations in the international workers movement in general became even more topical, because in many countries communist parties came to power and were faced with the need to find the most suitable way for developing socialist social relations. Stalin did not recognize the specific conditions of the sociopolitical development in our country. In our independence, in the independence of the party, in the democratization and humane relations in socialism, the Stalinist saw a danger for the existing relations between socialist countries and also for the relations inside these countries. The popularity of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the interest in our experience in other countries and communist parties was obviously in Stalin's way, although we never tried to impose it either then or later. The champions of the idea that the USSR is the center of revolution and an example of socialism could not, it seems, reconcile themselves with the trend of making individual parties and movements independent. This is why it was necessary to compromise the League of Communists of Yugoslavia before the international workers movement, denounce it for all alleged betrayal of socialism and transformation into "a counterrevolutionary agency of imperialism," and thus check it in its further independent socialist development, which was the basic meaning of the Cominform action.

If we recall today this period, which was certainly the most difficult in the postwar development of Yugoslavia, and for many of us communists the most difficult in the long revolutionary work, we do not do this because we would like to fan old things and hatred against anybody. We have always consistently striven for better and equal relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, emphasizing that the differences in the ways of building socialism should not be a barrier for cooperation but, on the contrary, an impetus to sincere exchange of opinion and experience. In this sense we supported the attitudes of the 20th CPSU Congress that each country should find its own way to socialism, that the richness of forms in building socialism no longer mattered and, on the contrary, was strengthening the international workers movement, and that the relations between communist and workers parties and progressive movements must be based on equality and actual mutual respect.

The campaign against socialist Yugoslavia and everything which followed it had serious repercussions for many parties and for the development of individual socialist countries. Particularly serious harm was done by methods of oppression and infringement of legality, suppression of the citizens' elementary rights, distortion of the truth and monstrous misuse of propaganda, as well as many other actions. This caused

political, economic, and ethical conflicts in individual socialist countries, contributed to fomenting the cold war, and seriously undermined the confidence in socialism among many people in the world.

In 1948 we were advised by some people, allegedly in the interest of unity in the international workers movement, to accept these iniquitous accusations, and, for the same reason, to submit to the resolution of the Informburo. The evolution of events confirmed that we were right when we refused to accept this advice because such a capitulation would have amounted to opportunism and betrayal, not only of our revolution and our working people whose unbounded confidence we enjoyed, but also the interests of the international workers movement and socialism in general.

We can freely assert that in defending the independence of socialist Yugoslavia and the right of each party to its own development, we acted with full responsibility before our peoples and before the international workers and socialist movement. I am stressing because the Yugoslav League of Communists on several subsequent occasions found itself in situations in which it was asked, for the sake of alleged higher interests of the international workers movement, to renounce its ideas and viewpoints, to support an international policy which ran counter to its assessments and to the objective interests of the broad socialist and anti-imperialist movement in the world.

One document of this policy is in the declaration of the 1960 conference of communist parties in Moscow, in which the League of Communists was again attacked in an arbitrary, crude manner. However, the development of events has itself eloquently refuted this unprincipled attitude toward Yugoslavia and many other attitudes contained in that resolution, justifying at the same time our doubts about the value of such documents....

However, we continue to witness the practice whereby, in the relations between socialist countries and communist parties, the principles of internationalism are at times misused for the purpose of imposing, in its name, various unilateral obligations on individual parties, as if internationalism were not, before everything else, a reflection of every party's conscience and awareness of the connection between its interests and the international struggle against reaction and imperialism. Attempts are made in the name of internationalism to justify the compulsoriness of some "general line" which, judging from experience thus far, represents either a diktat or an unprincipled compromise between very different concepts and interests of one group of parties at the expense of other parties and movements, which objectively prevent individual parties and movements from seeking their own forms of struggle and solutions in realizing their revolutionary goals. In the name of the alleged higher interests of socialism, attempts are made to justify even the open violation of the sovereignty of a socialist country and the adoption of military force as a means of preventing independent socialist development.

This interpretation of socialism has a grave effect on the policy of the communist parties and other progressive forces, as well as on the international anti-imperialist front in general....

"In Honor of the 50th Anniversary of the Creation of the Third Communist International: the Great School Of Internationalism," by Candidate of Historical Sciences, A. Shpynov, Selskaya Zhizn (Rural Life), 2 March 1969.

The First (constituent) Congress of the Communist International, convened at the initiative of V.I. Lenin, was held exactly half a century ago in Moscow. The creation of the Third Communist International is an outstanding event in the history of the freedom struggle of the world proletariat and its vanguard, the communist movement.

The activity of the Comintern continued until 1943. Although a quarter of a century has elapsed since then, interest in its history has not decreased but rather, increased in recent years. A study of documents, and especially of documents worked out with the participation of V.I. Lenin, and an analysis of the theoretical and practical activity of the Comintern help one gain a better understanding of the sources of the present growth in the political influence of the world communist movement and facilitate deeper clarification of the natural laws of its development and consideration for everything positive in the accumulated experience of the communist and workers parties.

It must be noted that the history of the Comintern is being studied very attentively by the enemies of communism and the revisionists striving to defame its revolutionary traditions, falsify its ideas, and undermine the unity of the world communist movement. Therefore, it is the most important duty of national groups and of the entire world communist movement to adopt a correct approach to evaluating the historical significance of the Comintern and its heritage, principles, and traditions.

The Communist International arose as a historical necessity because of the development of scientific socialism and the international worker movement.

Two circumstances played a decisive role in preparing and creating the Comintern. First, the revolutionary struggle of the Bolsheviks led by V.I. Lenin against reformism and "centralism" of members of the Second International for uniting leftist elements in all countries. Second, the powerful revolutionary influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution on all countries throughout the world, the stormy revolutionary upsurge of the working masses in most of the countries of Western Europe and America, and the upsurge of the national freedom struggle in colonial and dependent countries. As Clara Zetkin, an outstanding figure in the international proletarian movement, noted, the Communist International was "not only the creation of a revolutionary time, but also the true child of the revolution itself--the Russian Revolution, the first gigantic forerunner of the proletarian world revolution." In fact, the real grounds for creating the new Communist International appeared after the victory of the October Revolution when the communist parties began to appear.

The appearance of the first communist parties and communist groups created the need for an international communist organization. The CPSU took charge of practical work for forming and uniting these communist organizations and groups into a new Communist International. V.I. Lenin wrote that "Bolshevism had created the ideological and tactical foundations of the Third International, which was really proletarian and communist and included both the achievements of the peaceful epoch and the experience of the revolutionary period that had begun." (Complete Collected Works, Vol. 37, page 304)

The Comintern can be called a creation of Lenin's genius in the true sense of the word. The very idea and plan for creating the Comintern as a counterweight to the Second International, which had suffered ideological and political collapse, belonged to V.I. Lenin. Lenin performed an enormous amount of truly titanic work, gradually preparing the nucleus of internationalists in the worker movement which then laid the first stones in the building of the Communist International.

generalized all the international and Russian experience of the revolutionary struggle, created the ideological and theoretical platform of the Comintern, formulated the vital questions of the political strategy and tactics of the international communist movement, and developed its organizational principles. V.I. Lenin was the acknowledged leader of the world communist movement.

A central place in the work of the congress was occupied by V.I. Lenin's report "On Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." The report gave a scientific generalization of the experience of the international worker movement and established the main tasks, strategy, and tactics of the international communist movement in the new historical epoch that had begun--the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism. V.I. Lenin unmasked the bourgeois and social-reformist efforts to defend bourgeois democracy under the banner of "democracy in general" or "pure democracy," deeply revealed its class essence, and showed that bourgeois democracy is a form of bourgeois dictatorship. Lenin urged the communist parties to unmask the false nature of bourgeois democracy and lead the struggle of the proletariat and all exploited masses for the victory of the socialist revolution and for a Soviet-style proletarian dictatorship as a truly people's democracy.

The Comintern determined that protecting the world's first proletarian state was its most important international task, considering the Soviet Union as the center of the world revolution.

The theories of V.I. Lenin and the resolution proposed by him were unanimously approved and adopted by the first congress as basic programmatic documents and as militant leadership in action.

The first clear example of the collective, creative cooperation between representatives of various communist parties, as represented by the first congress which elaborated the ideological and political platform of the Comintern under V.I. Lenin's leadership, appears particularly significant when one looks back over the last 50 years. This platform analyzed imperialism from a Marxist position, revealed the nature of the new epoch, incarnated Lenin's ideas about the conditions for the victory of the socialist revolution and the political and class allies of the proletariat in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and so on. The adoption of the platform and the approval of Lenin's resolution on bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat was evidence of the fact that the international communist unity was founded on the firm ideological and theoretical base of Leninism.

Lenin wrote: "The world historical significance of the Third Communist International lies in the fact that it included new communist parties." The Comintern was a practical school of Leninism and a school of the masses' political leadership in the young communist parties, and it helped them seek and find ways to combine dialectical principles and flexibility in their policy and to build that policy on the basis of the profound scientific analysis of social development. V.I. Lenin showed extreme concern for the establishment and development of communist parties, educated their leading cadres, and taught them to always proceed in their actions from a sober and strictly objective consideration of all the world economic and political factors and a consideration of the distribution of the class forces in their own country and in the world arena. From its first steps the Comintern, guided by Lenin's ideas, helped the young communist parties in a practical manner to master all forms of struggle--legal and illegal, peaceful and nonpeaceful, parliamentary and nonparliamentary--to be ready for a very rapid, unexpected change from one form of struggle to another, and to consider not only the possibility for changing to the attack, but also for withdrawal. V.I. Lenin advised the Comintern and the communist parties always to obtain the support of the masses and the working class in their tactical moves, to show constant concern for the masses, to be in close contact with them, to work wherever the masses were, and to learn the art of bringing the masses into revolutionary combat against the bourgeoisie, instructing them on the basis of their own experience.

interests with Leninist consistency and resolution at all stages of its existence. It is enough to remember the proletarian solidarity movement with Soviet Russia, the Chinese revolution, republican Spain, and the people's national liberation struggle in various countries. This tradition is being continued by the present international communist movement. An example of this is the resolute censure of imperialist aggression in Vietnam, the Arab east, and other places in the world.

The Comintern's most important principle and legacy is to fight against open revisionism of every hue within the ranks of the communist movement and also against opportunists, sectarians, and dogmatists; to protect the purity of Marxism-Leninism from being distorted and debased by its opportunists and sectarians; and to creatively develop and propagandize the Marxist Leninist science under the new conditions of the class struggle during the general capitalist crisis.

From the first day of its formation the Comintern displayed a Leninist impatience toward any manifestations of national egoism in the communist environment and fought resolutely against efforts to counterpose national tasks against general international tasks.

Proletarian internationalism, which permeates the entire activity of the Comintern, demands the correct combination of the interests of the proletarian struggle in one country with the interests of this struggle on a world scale.

The Comintern considered its primary, most important task the struggle against opportunist, nationalist, and petit-bourgeois distortions of the concept and tactics of internationalism. The restoration and strengthening of the international links of the working class in all countries that had been broken by the leaders of the Second International, and the education of the communists and workers of all countries in a spirit of proletarian internationalism.

Continuing and developing the traditions of the Comintern, the communist and workers parties have, in the process of collective creative cooperation, elaborated a general political line of conduct and new practical forms for coordinating their activities in the struggle for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism: bilateral and multilateral meetings of the representatives of communist parties and international conferences.

The conferences are a natural form by which independent parties having equal rights can agree on common positions concerning urgent present-day questions.

It is completely understandable that the goals of every communist party conference must correspond to the concrete tasks of the historical time, the urgent demands of the struggle, and the interests of the entire communist movement.

An important role in developing the common positions of the communist movement at the present stage and the new forms of international communist relations was played by the conferences held in Moscow in 1957 and 1960. The main ideas set out in the documents of these conferences passed the practical tests of the revolutionary struggle with honor.

The present complex and dangerous world situation demands that communists throughout the world increase their responsibility for the fate of peace, socialism, and democracy, and that they closely unite and strengthen international party unity.

In this connection, it is very important to note that the preparatory work for the new international conference of communist and workers parties, planned for May 1969, has entered its concluding stage.

The new conference will be devoted to examining a very urgent problem: the tasks



of the struggle against imperialism, the determination of the role and place of the communists in this struggle, and the search for ways to achieve unity of action of communist and workers parties and of all anti-imperialist forces. The CPSU considers the preparation and holding of the conference as the main link in the struggle to unite the world communist movement at the present stage.

The Leninist traditions embodied in the Comintern and the very rich experience accumulated by it during its quarter of a century of struggle against imperialism, fascism, and opportunism are of unsurpassed importance and serve as the golden base of the world communist movement.

SELSKAYA ZHIZN

2 March 1969

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*К 50-летию создания Третьего, Коммунистического Интернационала*

# ВЕЛИКАЯ ШКОЛА ИНТЕРНАЦИОНАЛИЗМА

Ровно полвека назад в Москве состоялся первый (учредительный) конгресс Коммунистического Интернационала, созданный по инициативе В. И. Ленина. Создание Третьего, Коммунистического Интернационала — выдающееся событие в истории освободительной борьбы мирового пролетариата и его авангарда — коммунистического движения.

Деятельность Коминтерна продолжалась до 1943 года. И хотя с тех пор прошло четверть века, интерес к истории его в последние годы не уменьшается, а возрастает. Изучение документов, особенно выработанных с участием В. И. Ленина, анализ теоретической и практической деятельности Коминтерна помогают лучше понять источники роста политического влияния мирового коммунистического движения на современном этапе, способствует более глубокому выяснению закономерностей его развития, учету всего положительного из накопленного опыта борьбы коммунистических и рабочих партий.

Надо заметить, что весьма пристально изучают историю Коминтерна и враги коммунизма, ревизионисты, стремясь опорочить его революционные традиции, фальсифицировать идеи и подорвать единство мирового коммунистического движения. Поэтому правильный подход к оценке исторического значения Коминтерна, его наследия, принципов и традиций — важнейший долг национальных отрядов и всего мирового коммунистического движения.

Коммунистический Интернационал возник как историческая необходимость в результате развития научного социализма и международного рабочего движения. Решающую роль в подготовке к созданию Коминтерна сыграли два обстоятельства. Первое — революционная борьба большевиков во главе с В. И. Лениным против реформизма и «центризма» деятелей Второго Интернационала, за сплочение левых элементов во всех странах. Второе — все более усиливающееся воздействие Великой Октябрьской социалистической рево-

люции на все страны мира, бурный революционный подъем трудящихся масс в большинстве стран Западной Европы и Америки, подъем национально-освободительной борьбы в колониальных и зависимых странах. Коммунистический Интернационал, как отмечала выдающаяся деятельница международного пролетарского движения Клара Цеткин, «не только дала революционному времени, он подлинное дитя самой революции — русской революции, первого гигантского провозвестника пролетарской мировой революции». Действительно, реальная основа для создания нового Коммунистического Интернационала появилась после победы Октябрьской революции, когда стали возникать коммунистические партии.

Появление первых коммунистических партий в коммунистических группах вызвало потребность в международной организации коммунистов. Коммунистическая партия Советской России возглавила практическую работу по образованию и объединению всех этих коммунистических организаций и групп в новый, Коммунистический Интернационал. В. И. Ленин писал, что «большевизм создал идейные и тактические основы III Интернационала, действительно пролетарского и коммунистического, учитывающего в завоевании мирной эпохи и опыт начавшейся эпохи революций» (Полн. собр. Соч., т. 37, стр. 304).

Коминтерн в полном смысле слова может быть назван творением ленинского гения. В. И. Ленину принадлежит сама идея и план создания его в противовес потерпевшему идейно-политический крах II Интернационалу. Ленин проделал огромную, поистине titanicкую работу, подготовив постепенно то ядро интернационалистов в рабочем движении, которое затем заложило первые камни здания Коминтерна. Вождь нашей партии обобщил весь международный и

борьбы, создал идейно-теоретическую платформу Коминтерна, сформулировал коренные вопросы политической стратегии и тактики международного коммунистического движения, разработал его организационные принципы. В. И. Ленин был признанным вождем мирового коммунистического движения.

Центральное место в работе Конгресса занял доклад В. И. Ленина «О буржуазной демократии и диктатуре пролетариата». В нем дано научное обобщение опыта международного рабочего движения, обобщены главные задачи, стратегия и тактика международного коммунистического движения в условиях начавшейся новой исторической эпохи — эпохи перехода от капитализма к социализму.

В. И. Ленин разоблачил попытки буржуазии и социал-реформистов под флагом «демократии вообще» или «чистой демократии» защитить буржуазную демократию, глубоко раскрыл ее классовую сущность, показал, что буржуазная демократия есть форма диктатуры буржуазии. Ленин призвал коммунистические партии разоблачать ложный характер буржуазной демократии, возглавить борьбу пролетариата и всех эксплуатируемых масс за победу социалистической революции, за диктатуру пролетариата типа Советов как подлинно пародную демократию.

Коминтерн определил в качестве своей важнейшей международной задачи защиту первого в мире пролетарского государства, рассматривая Советскую Россию как центр мировой революции. Тезисы В. И. Ленина и предложенная им резолюция единодушно были одобрены и приняты I Конгрессом как основные программные документы, как боевое руководство к действию.

Высотой прошедших пяти десятилетий является первый и столь яркий пример коллективного творческого

сотрудничества представителей ряда компартий, каким оказался I Конгресс, выработавший под руководством В. И. Ленина идейно-политическую платформу Коминтерна. В ней с марксистских позиций дан анализ империализма, раскрыт характер наступившей новой эпохи, воплощены ленинские идеи об условиях победы социалистической революции, о политических и классовых союзниках пролетариата в борьбе за диктатуру пролетариата и т. д. Принятие платформы и одобрение ленинской резолюции о буржуазной демократии и диктатуре пролетариата свидетельствовало о том, что международное единение коммунистов складывалось на прочной идейно-теоретической базе ленинизма.

«Всемирно-историческое значение III. Коммунистического Интернационала, — писал В. И. Ленин, — состоит в том, что он начал претворять в жизнь величайший лозунг Маркса, лозунг, подведший итог вековому развитию социализма в рабочего движения, лозунг, который выражается понятием: диктатура пролетариата» (Полн. собр. Соч. т. 38, стр. 303).

Коммунистический Интернационал, объединив в своих рядах лучших представителей мирового рабочего движения, не только сплотил существовавшие коммунистические партии, но и способствовал созданию новых компартий. Для молодых компартий Коминтерн был практической школой ленинизма и политического руководства массами, помогал им искать и находить пути к адекватному сочетанию принципиальности и гибкости в своей политике, строить ее на основе глубокого научного анализа общественного развития.

В. И. Ленин проявлял исключительную заботу о становлении и развитии коммунистических партий, воспитывал их руководящие кадры, учил их исходить в своей деятельности всегда из трезвого, строго объективного учета всех факторов мирового хозяйства и мировой политики, учета расстановки классовых сил в своей стране и на мировой арене. Руководствуясь ленинскими идеями, Коминтерн с самых первых шагов практически помогал молодым компартиям овладевать всеми формами борьбы, легальными и нелегальными, мирными и немирными, парламентскими и внепарламентскими, быть готовыми к самой быстрой и неожиданной смене одной формы борьбы другой, учитывать не только возможность перехода в наступление, но и

возможность отступления. В. И. Ленин советовал Коминтерну и компартиям в тактических установках всегда опираться на массы, на рабочий класс, постоянно заботиться о массах и быть с ними в тесной связи, работать всюду и везде, где есть массы, научиться искусству позволять массы к революционным битвам с буржуазией, обучая их на их собственном опыте.

Выражая коренные интересы трудящихся масс, Коминтерн с ленинским последовательностью и решительностью защищал их интересы на всех этапах своего существования. Достаточно вспомнить движение пролетарской солидарности с Советской Россией с китайской революцией, с республиканской Испанией, с национально-освободительной борьбой народов ряда стран. Эту традицию продолжает в современное международное коммунистическое движение. Пример тому — решительное осуждение империалистической агрессии во Вьетнаме, на Арабском Востоке и в ряде других пунктов земного шара.

Важнейший принцип и завет Коминтерна — борьба против открытого ревизионизма, всех мастей в рядах мирового коммунистического движения, а также против оппортунистов, сектантов и догматиков; защита чистоты марксизма-ленинизма от извращения и опущения его оппортунистами и сектантами; творческое развитие и пропаганда марксистско-ленинской науки в новых условиях классовой борьбы в период общего кризиса капитализма.

С первого дня образования Коминтерна по-ленински проявлял терпимость к любым проявлениям национального эгоизма в коммунистической среде, решительно боролся против попыток противопоставления национальных задач общим интернациональным задачам.

Пролетарский интернационализм, пронизывающий всю деятельность Коминтерна, требует правильного сочетания интересов пролетарской борьбы в одной стране с интересами этой борьбы во всемирном масштабе.

Борьбу с оппортунистическими, националистическими и мешанинскими извращениями понятия в тактике интернационализма, восстановление и укрепление интернациональных связей рабочего класса всех стран, разорванных лидерами II Интернационала, воспитание коммунистов в рабочих всех стран в духе пролетарского интернационализма Коминтерн рассматривал первоочередной и важнейшей своей задачей.

Продолжая и развивая традиции

Коминтерна, коммунистические и рабочие партии в процессе коллективного творческого сотрудничества выработали общую политическую линию поведения и новые практические формы координации своих действий в борьбе за мир, за национальную независимость, за демократию и социализм — двусторонние и многосторонние встречи представителей компартий, международные Совещания, При этом совещания выступают как естественная форма согласования общих позиций между равноправными и самостоятельными партиями по актуальным вопросам современности.

Вполне понятно, что цели каждого совещания компартий должны отвечать конкретным задачам исторического момента, актуальным потребностям борьбы, интересам всего коммунистического движения. Важную роль в разработке общих позиций коммунистического движения на современном этапе и новых форм интернациональных связей коммунистов сыграла Совещания, состоявшиеся в 1957 и в 1960 годах в Москве. Основные идеи, изложенные в документах этих Совещаний, с честью выдержали испытания практики революционной борьбы.

Ныне сложная, опасная обстановка в мире требует от коммунистов всего мира повышения ответственности за судьбы мира, социализма и демократии, тесного сплочения и укрепления интернационального единства партий. В связи с этим очень важно отметить, что подготовительная работа к пятому международному Совещанию коммунистических и рабочих партий, намеченному на май 1969 года, вступила в завершающую стадию. Новое совещание посвящается рассмотрению очень актуальной проблемы — задач борьбы с империализмом, определению роли и места в этой борьбе коммунистов, поискам путей достижения единства действий коммунистических и рабочих партий, всех антиимпериалистических сил. КПСС рассматривает подготовку и проведение Совещания как центральное звено борьбы за сплоченность мирового коммунистического движения на современном этапе.

Ленинские традиции, сложившиеся в Коминтерне, и богатейший опыт, накопленный им за четверть века своей борьбы против империализма, фашизма, оппортунизма, имеют непреходящее значение, являются золотым фондом мирового коммунистического движения.

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Chapter VI from Impressions of Lenin, by Angelica Balabanoff, Ambassador Books, Ltd., Canada, 1964. (Angelica Balabanoff was deeply and idealistically involved in the international workers' movement around the time of World War I, at which time she became associated with Lenin. She acceded to his urging that she become Secretary of the Comintern at its founding. She broke with Lenin and the Comintern when she became convinced there was no hope of the Comintern's becoming anything more than a tool for the cynical purposes of Lenin and his cohorts.)

## VI

CPYRGHT

### *Secretary of the International*

Although Lenin's aim, from the very beginning of World War I, was the foundation of a new International, and all his overt and hidden strategy was guided by this desire, the foundation of the third International came to him, as well as to his closest collaborators, almost as a surprise.

Speaking to me about it, Lenin had already a priori excluded the possibility of getting a sufficient number of delegates to Russia to establish there the coveted Third International. In the meantime, however, some members of the Executive Council of the Russian Communist Party (Zinoviev, Radek, and Bukharin, with the consent and aid of Trotsky and Lenin) tried to obtain by fraud and deception what they had not been able to obtain by normal and honest means.

Since only one delegate, the German Eberlin, had answered Chicherin's call, the Bolsheviks put on a farce: they assembled members of parties in countries already belonging to Russia, such as Latvia and Lithuania, who were, in fact, members of the Russian Communist Party and did not enjoy, therefore, any autonomy. They called in prisoners who for years had not had any contact with their countries and a few emigrants who had left their countries for one reason or another and had lived in Russia for a long time. Among the thirty-five assembly members only one had the political right to represent his country and to vote as its delegate. This was the Spartacist<sup>1</sup> Eberlin; he was in possession of a regular mandate. As soon as he realized how contrived the situation was, he publicly declared that in such an assembly no deliberation could be taken since this gathering could not be considered a constituent assembly for a new International. Thus, it was decided that the meeting was to serve merely as an exchange of ideas.

The next day, however, members of the Russian Communist Party, with the usual shrewdness, proposed that the deci-

<sup>1</sup>The Spartacist League, to which the German left-wing Socialists belonged, was founded in 1918 in Berlin by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Later, it was replaced by the Communist Party. The two founders were murdered by the Germans in 1919.

sions of the day before be annulled. They announced that an event had taken place which would change the situation completely: the whole of Europe was in revolutionary ferment. As it turned out, it was a Bolshevik bluff. A prisoner of German extraction, who, during and after the Revolution had been living in Russia, where he had become a fervent Bolshevik,<sup>2</sup> had been sent by Radek to Germany for propaganda action. After the maturation of the deceitful plan, whose aim was the creation of a new International, the Bolsheviks called him back. The enormous difficulties of illegal travel at that time caused him to arrive one day late in Moscow, when the voting had already taken place. He was asked to address the assembly. Partly out of naiveté and partly because of the instructions received from Radek, he gave a glowing account of what he had seen and heard: everywhere enormous enthusiasm for the Bolshevik revolution, the workers ready to follow its example, the new International in the hearts and hopes of all.

The voting—shrewdly engineered by the Russian delegates, Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, and a few others—was this time in favor of an immediate constitution of the new International, in spite of the German delegate's opposition (he was the only one in possession of a mandate) and to the surprise of the others.

Since I had declared I would abstain from the vote, there was an exchange of written messages between Lenin and myself containing some severe criticism of my action. "Why don't you vote? You have so many mandates from the Italian Socialist party, you are more than authorized to vote for it; and then, you read *Avanti!*, you are informed." I wrote my reply on the same note: "No! My mandates are not sufficient to commit the Italian Party in such a decisive action."

"You are making a mistake; in your capacity of secretary of the Zimmerwald Movement you have the right, even the duty, to vote for the Italian Socialist Party."

"I cannot agree with you," I countered. "I have no direct contacts in this moment with the Italian Party. . . . Here we can decide, protected by the Red army, we are in power. But there, in the capitalist countries, the situation is quite different. I cannot make others assume such grave responsibilities without their being able to discuss them first."

I was not aware at the time of what was hidden behind the unexpected and illegal proclamation of the new International, and I was impatient to return to the Ukraine to work among the masses far from officials and Moscow officialdom.

When I met Trotsky in a corridor of the Kremlin, I said good-bye to him. "What, you are going to leave?" he burst out. "You know you have been nominated secretary of the International!"

"If? Not in the least! Let me do my work among the masses . . ."

<sup>2</sup> Not long after his return to Russia, he left the Bolsheviks, disgusted with their methods and returned to his native Germany.

Come with me to Comrade Lenin, he is around here. He will tell you what the Central Committee has decided."

From the manner in which Lenin received me, I understood that he had not forgiven my insubordination. I decided to come right out with it: "Comrade Trotsky tells me you want me to take the post of secretary of the International, but I ask you to be excused. As long as the work was very difficult and taxing, especially in war time, I have never refused. Now the secretariat is in a Socialist country, the procedures are normal again; you can find replacement for me." Lenin gave me one of his characteristic looks. "Comrade Balabanoff, discipline must exist for you also . . ."

"What does this mean? It was you who advised me to transfer to the Ukraine! I have not even started work there, and you make me return here already. And my commitments toward Comrade Rakovsky? And then, all my books and the things I need are already in Kharkov!"

"I shall inform Comrade Rakovsky that you are more necessary here than in the Ukraine, and I shall have your things sent back here immediately," Lenin said firmly. While I was still remonstrating, Lenin added in an even firmer tone: "The decision, by the way, was taken by the Central Committee, not by me personally." This way of his of attributing to the Central Committee decisions that had been suggested by him was known to me. It meant the decision was final.

No sooner had I returned to my hotel room than the phone rang: "The Party's Central Committee informs you of your appointment as secretary of the International. Vladimir Ilyich has informed Comrade Rakovsky that your presence is urgently needed here and that you cannot return to the Ukraine. At the same time, Comrade Lenin has sent word that your things are to be shipped back here."

The evening of the day after the proclamation of the Third International a meeting was held in one of the largest Moscow theaters with the participation of the foreign "delegates." One can hardly imagine the state of mind of the masses streaming to that convocation. Isolated from the world for so long, they thought they could finally see that promised ray of light, finally hear that long-awaited voice of solidarity that would bring them the liberation promised by their leaders.

This joyful anticipation was in the air, one sensed it in the people's eagerness to get seats in the hall, in the outcries of joy over the possibility of seeing the representatives of the hoped-for world revolution. I admit, this euphoria was transmitted to me to the extent that I identified myself with some of the speakers in translating their addresses. I felt that my words struck the listeners' conscience, creating a response that transformed the hall. I too was transformed. I seemed to see before me the protagonist of that epic revolution that was destined to create a new world. I was almost grateful to Lenin and Trotsky for having obliged me to accept the assignment.

This major ill-humor, came to me in the form of the speakers' addresses I perceived a strident, demagogic note, something that had a false ring. I could not and would not identify myself with the speaker, and I gave a lifeless, limp translation of his speech, instinctively omitting all that had rung false to me. As soon as the translation was finished, Trotsky came up to me: "Anything the matter, Comrade Angelica? This last translation did not seem to come from you . . ."

I said nothing, but I decided not to translate any more official speeches in Russia. I kept my resolution. Never have I consciously been an accomplice to a fraud. The speaker who had caused me so much revulsion was one of the most unconscionable accomplices of Bolshevism. This man, Fritz Platten, a Swiss living in Russia, was shot, according to press reports, some time later.

I was just going to take up again my activity as secretary of the Zimmerwald Movement when I received news that the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party had appointed Zinoviev president of the International. In selecting him for the office of president, Lenin was guided by one principle: to put at the head of the International a man who would lend himself to being a tool in the hands of the Central Committee.

My appointment as secretary was designed to attract to the new International Socialists of other countries for whom my name warranted integrity and impartiality.

Lenin, who counted Zinoviev among the most faithful executors of his orders, knew well every aspect of his character. Lenin asked Zinoviev to do for him things he would not have done himself. True, Lenin treated him with that camaraderie, that trust, which many years of underground work amid serious difficulties had established between them, but he never had, nor could have had, any esteem for him. This was borne out by the fact that in 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution, Zinoviev, for the first time in a position of direct responsibility, left Lenin's side and opposed the seizure of power. Lenin disowned him, denouncing his vileness and his cowardice—a particularly grave accusation against a revolutionist of that time.

I soon realized, not without surprise, that our sessions began and ended with the dispatch of administrative matters. One day I brought this matter up with Vorovsky, who had been assigned to me as collaborator—as I found out later—so that he might influence me and mitigate my intransigence, given our friendship and the esteem in which I held him. "Is it possible," I said to him, "that everything ends up as a bureaucratic institution? To tell you the truth, Vaclav Vaclavich, I feel ill at ease. Why have they insisted so much on my taking this job? . . . I do nothing useful here."

"Dear Angelica," Vorovsky said, looking at me with his wistful eyes, a subtle smile on his face, "you have only one fault, which is a quality, perhaps: you know the Interna-

tional too well, and if you disapprove of someone, if you consider him dishonest, you refuse to collaborate with him.

At one of the meetings of the Executive Committee of the International Zinoviev announced radiantly: "I have good news. Our situation is so good that we have decided to establish a branch of the Communist International in the Ukraine, a very important location for future relations with comrades abroad. Comrade Balabanoff will be in charge of this office. She will be aided by highly qualified collaborators."

"Comrade Balabanoff?" I cut in. "But why do you send me elsewhere again? I have hardly started my new job . . ."

"Of course, Comrade Balabanoff," countered the president of the International. "We need a great name for a position of such responsibility, do you want us to send there just any comrade?"

"These are not arguments to be taken seriously," I replied, determined not to consider the invitation extended to me.

But Zinoviev went on to ask me when I was going to leave. To put an end to this situation I went to Lenin, confident of his support, in the belief that he considered my stay in Moscow of greater usefulness than the activity in the Ukraine.

Instead, Lenin said to me: "In the Ukraine, it will be easier for you to establish contacts with foreign countries; and then, why should we keep in Moscow our best propaganda forces, our best speakers?" Since I persisted in my refusal, I was called to confer with the secretary of the Party. "We have found a most interesting assignment for you," he told me. "You shall be the leader of a propaganda train leaving for Turkestan."<sup>1</sup>

"Why Turkestan?" I burst out. "Is that a joke? I know neither the country nor the psychology of the people, who, no doubt, are very primitive; my propaganda work would be wasted there. Besides, very few understand Russian."

"But we need a famous name, like yours," he countered. "I am not a prima donna," I said, turning to the door, "and I don't want to be treated like one!" I soon realized that everything was already arranged for my travel. The members of the Turkestan expedition called on me to read their report, asking for my approval. I let them go on, partly out of politeness and partly because I liked the kind of work which gave me an opportunity to learn many things.

One day, a Communist woman who had shown great friendship for me, put me on the alert. "Watch out! This is a trap that Zinoviev has set. He wants to get rid of you." Much later I learned from the wife of Vorovsky, the first Russian Soviet ambassador to Italy, that her husband—a

<sup>1</sup>At that time in Russia there were trains built and used exclusively for propaganda purposes. These trains were ultra-modern and consisted not only of cars for the accommodation of the Moscow emissaries (two members of each commissariat, whose task it was to supervise and instruct the local commissariat leaders), but also of a printing car for the publication of daily bulletins and of a movie car. I was to direct the collective work at each stop of the train in important towns and to deliver the introductory and closing speech.

Bolshevik of the old guard with whom I had worked in Stockholm during the most tragic and decisive months for the young Soviet Republic had written to Lenin: "Shall we really let this woman die in Turkestan?" The typhus epidemic that raged there at the time and the poor sanitary conditions of the towns in which our propaganda train was to stop made the probability of contagion extremely high.

I wanted to see clearly in all this. At the first meeting of the Executive Council of the Communist International in Petrograd, I asked Zinoviev: "I should like to know," I said, "why I am supposed to leave Moscow at a time when foreign Socialists are likely to arrive. I do not understand, and I shall not move." Zinoviev, not used to being told the truth, could not hide his embarrassment. "I know nothing, it is Moscow that decides," he replied lamely. Then he began writing the usual memos asking for help from those members of the Executive Council who were beholden to him and who lent themselves to such services. Indeed, they took the floor to insist on my departure.

Turning to Zinoviev, I asked again: "Could you explain to me why I should be thousands of kilometers away from Moscow when, after so many years, we finally succeed in making contact with the Western Socialists?" Without looking me in the face, he replied: "Because our politics is directed now toward the East, which is of the greatest importance to us."

"But what plans are there for me? What is the special assignment in which I cannot be replaced?"

"You will be told in Moscow."

"Moscow indeed! It is the International that has to decide." Zinoviev had become deadly pale. His lips trembled.

During the afternoon session of the same day an urgent telephone call arrived from Kronstadt. "The comrades in Kronstadt want you to give a talk tomorrow," Zinoviev said turning to me. "Tomorrow?" I asked in surprise. "How can I be there tomorrow if our work here is not yet finished? And then, there is that session that concerns me personally."

"But you will be back by then," Zinoviev said.

"Can you assure me of that? I do not like to say no to the comrades, but neither should I want to be absent from my work here."

"You can do both," Zinoviev assured me.

Having never missed an appointment (not even now after fifty-five years of party activity), I decided to call Kronstadt again to make sure of the connections, especially in view of the fact that I was going by boat. I insisted to the man in Kronstadt on a clear and binding answer. He ended by saying that he could not guarantee my return in time. I decided not to leave Petrograd. The meeting of the Executive Council was scheduled for the afternoon, and I accepted an invitation in the morning to give a talk to the women convened in special assembly on the occasion of the youth mobilization.

This was one of the most memorable speeches I gave in Soviet Russia. I was to persuade the mothers—mostly non-proletarians—to make the supreme sacrifice of letting their



sons go to the front. I do not remember what I said on that occasion, I only recall that the listeners' faces grew less diffident, less hostile. I shall never forget the handwritten notes which were brought to me at the speaker's stand (this was a customary feature of Russian meetings of the time). One note said: "When my daughter volunteered for the Red front, I cursed her; now, after having heard Angelica Balabanoff, I give her my blessing." And another: "If it is this that our sons are fighting for, our sacrifice cannot be in vain." This was the tone of the many notes that came to me on that occasion. A man in his forties came forward: "I move that these notes be all preserved in the Museum of the Revolution!"

Completely exhausted—I had not yet eaten anything—I met on my way to the room where the Executive Council was to meet a group of members on their way out. "How do you happen to be here so early?" I said jocularly. "We have just finished," replied one of Zinoviev's disciples.

"What have you finished? Was the session not scheduled to continue in the afternoon?"

"Yes," he replied, "but then we decided otherwise."

Zinoviev's baseness and cowardice was revealed to me in all its ugly nakedness. Assuming that I was in Kronstadt, he had called a meeting of the Executive Council and rammed through the order of my departure. I waited for him to come out of the meeting, and I faced him squarely. "So, you have met and decided in my absence a question that concerns me personally, after you had assured me you would discuss it this afternoon when I would be present."

He grew pale, fiddled with his briefcase, made a step forward, as if he wanted to break away; then he said in a low voice: "Yes, the Executive Council has decided for your departure." He said this in the tone of a mere witness who has had no influence whatever on the decision. And he added: "It is not I who decides, but the Central Committee of the Party."

"I am not going," I replied firmly.

"And the Party discipline . . . ?"

"I am second to none in the observance of discipline, but this is no longer discipline, this is absurdity, idiocy! You will regret your actions. You want me out of the way exactly when my presence might be useful, when the comrades from abroad finally arrive. And you want me to miss the encounter with the Italian Socialists. I will not stand for that!"

I had returned to Moscow the same day, and I heard nothing further about that matter until one day the American poet John Reed, one of the most disinterested and courageous supporters of the Russian Revolution, came to me greatly perturbed. "Are you, Angelica, the secretary of the Communist International?"

"Yes, I am."

"And why, then, are you not at the meeting?"

"Which meeting?"

"The meeting of the Executive Council which is taking

shamed and the employee, as cowardly as his employer, muttered some excuse: he had forgotten to invite me . . . forgotten to invite the secretary! At my appearance they felt uncomfortable because of their complicity in the vulgar fraud.

"Well," I asked Zinoviev, "what have you decided about the train to Turkestan?"

"What? Has Trotsky not told you?" (Zinoviev used to leave it to some friend of the victim of his plottings to break the news to him; thus he avoided questions and confrontations.) "Strange, we have asked him to do so."

"But what has Trotsky to do with it? I ask you."

"The Central Committee has decided," said the omnipotent president of the Third International, "that you may not go to Turkestan, but at the same time you are relieved of the office of secretary of the International. Trotsky will explain to you."

Such was my revulsion at this act of baseness that I could not say a word. I returned to the hotel with a load off my mind—relieved of an office which had become intolerable to me with its atmosphere of intrigues, maneuvers, and slavishness.

Naturally, I did not go to Turkestan. Around that event something like a legend was growing, since this had been the first attempt at relegating an embarrassing rebel to outlying regions of the country. Since Turkestan was a peach-growing region, someone at a congress of the Russian Communist Party asked the leaders if they had intended to have me "eat peaches." And when the same method was applied later to other opponents, the wry saying circulated: "They wanted him to eat peaches as they had tried with Comrade Angelica."

A few weeks later, a mellifluous voice came over the phone: "How are you, dear comrade? I should like to visit you with Comrade Olga." "Who is speaking?"

"It is I, Zinoviev. I should like to come and see you with my wife." In the ten years we had known each other we had never exchanged a single word that was not strictly connected with our work. When we met on the stairs, we merely greeted each other, without the customary polite exchanges. And now, after having acted toward me in that base manner, he wanted to visit me. "But I am very well. You would not find me at home."

"I wanted to tell you that the Central Committee has unanimously decided to reinstate you as secretary."

"I am reinstated? I have yet to get an explanation for my removal. Besides, you know well how often I resigned from the post, and now, I should accept it again after that foul play of yours in Petrograd?"

I felt revulsion rather than indignation at the sight of such cowardice. What could have induced that individual to assume such an apologetic attitude? The riddle was solved soon enough. Radek, returning from Western Europe, re-

ported to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. The removal from the International had caused great dissatisfaction among the Socialists of many countries. They had asked him to bring me their greetings and to beg me to resume my activity. This invitation was extended to me personally by Trotsky, on behalf of the Central Committee. "Dear Comrade Angelica," Trotsky said, "as you know, we have annulled the absurd decision of the other day; I have always been against your removal, and I voted against Zinoviev's proposal. Now . . ."

"Listen, Lev Davidovich, it is not a matter of revocation or of how you voted on that occasion, but rather of the whole system of lies and intrigues which you should not tolerate."

"What do you want me to do, dear comrade? I know you are right . . . But you must come back to the International."

Meeting with firm refusal on my part, Trotsky suggested a compromise. "You do not want the office of secretary? Accept another one then: Comintern correspondent for Italy, as Marx was for Germany."

"Thank you very much, but it is no use insisting. You know how often I handed in my resignation, and it was always ignored. You know what gulf separates me from the leaders, just think of Zinoviev and the vile methods with which he has degraded the International . . ."

"But he has apologized to you . . ."

"This has only heightened my disgust. Like a schoolboy reprimanded by his teachers! . . . This is the exponent of a revolutionary International!"

DAILY TELEGRAPH MAGAZINE  
20 February 1969

# WHOSE HANDS OFF VIETNAM?

"AMERICAN aggression in Vietnam". For years this stock phrase has been ejected from the propaganda machines of China and the Soviet Union. Strangely enough, it is a phrase which has fallen just as easily from the lips of Western intellectuals. With a masochistic additive, the American intelligentsia, both resident and expatriate, has been in some respects most vocal of all.

"I don't think one needs to go to Vietnam to have an opinion about Vietnam," Mary McCarthy declared during a BBC interview last January. "I thought it was a good idea to say that I was prejudiced to begin with." She certainly was.

Now that the Paris talks are proceeding, it is useful to stand back for a moment and to observe how grossly the real issues of this war have been misrepresented. Grotesque comparisons have been made (e.g., in *The Observer* for February 4, 1968) with French experience in both Indo-China and Algeria; but in these conflicts the French were trying to re-establish themselves, whereas America would like nothing better than to quit Vietnam (and Korea, for that matter) for good and all.

Professor D.W. Brogan's statement in *Encounter* for May 1968 that "every charge against French policy in Indo-China is a charge against its imitation by the Americans" is thus a downright misreading of history.

The people most articulate in their alarm at recent events in Vietnam are precisely those who have recently become their own masters. Why, then, is it legitimate for Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia and others to express fears that what has happened in Vietnam might happen to them, while it is apparently illegitimate for the South Vietnamese to fear for their own safety and independence?

"The crude moral justifications advanced for the American presence

in Vietnam," wrote Professor Alasdair MacIntyre in *New Society* for October 10, 1968, "are in fact an attempt to justify a series of mindless improvisations". Tell that to the beleaguered South-east Asian peoples, who are currently expressing fears that the presence may be removed!

The difficulties besetting American policy in Vietnam have been due not simply to a Chinese and Soviet-supported invasion, but to a war of propaganda which, for sustained distortion and malevolence, has few parallels even in these days of manipulated mass-media.

Let us look at the facts. On the withdrawal of the Japanese in August, 1945, the Communist Vietminh seized power in Hanoi. The attempt by France to regain a foothold ended with the Geneva Agreement of 1954, which brought into being the successor states of North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Elections were to be held before July 20, 1956, to decide the terms on which North and South Vietnam could be united. On May 8, 1956, Britain and the Soviet Union, as co-chairmen of the Geneva Agreement, decided to postpone these elections. (This important fact was omitted from *The Observer's* summary of events on November 3.) Meanwhile, Communist subversion in the South, which had been going on from the start, reached its climax on March 13, 1959, when Hanoi declared that the time had come "to struggle . . . perseveringly to smash the Southern regime". This was followed by systematic attacks across the border. So much for the identity of the aggressors.

What had happened in Korea, in other words, was repeated with even greater ruthlessness in Vietnam; but whereas the United Nations resistance in Korea, with predominant American support, was regarded in the West as legitimate and laudable, America's

defence of the freedom of the South Vietnamese people has been received with mounting and almost hysterical condemnation. The gigantic American civilian effort in Vietnam has been ignored. The existence of the "Caps", fortified villages where Americans live alongside the Vietnamese and provide medical attention as well as defence, is scarcely known. The presence of more than a million refugees from the North is dismissed with a shrug.

Despite electoral proof to the contrary, the South Vietnamese Government is declared to be both unrepresentative and corrupt. Finally, every opportunity has been taken to denigrate the conduct of the American troops, whereas *The Times* correspondent, writing from Hué last March, declared that "generally speaking the behaviour of American servicemen in a particularly difficult war does them real credit".

Of course the Vietnam war has been agonising and destructive. Of course America has made mistakes and miscalculations. Of course we should all hope for a just and speedy settlement. But what do our peace-loving "idealists" and their more sinister hangers-on, both here and in America, shout for?

AS WE know from the demonstration on October 27, last year, they shout not for peace, but for *victory for the National Liberation Front* — namely, the Communist spearhead of North Vietnam, which is endeavouring to destroy the freedom of the South as surely as the Soviet Union is striving to prevent the emergence of freedom in Czechoslovakia.

Even the Communist parties of the West have expressed disgust over Russia's action. What sort of mental obfuscation is it that has impelled so many of our Western intellectuals to become the dupes of Communist propaganda over Vietnam? U

# Moscow criticism annoys New Delhi

By Ernest Weatherall

Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

New Delhi

New Delhi is becoming increasingly annoyed with the anti-Indian broadcasts of Radio Moscow's "other station."

"Radio Peace and Progress," as it is termed, has proved a constant critic of the Indian Government ever since it began beaming its programs to the subcontinent some three years ago.

India's Foreign Minister, Dinesh Singh, long a champion of Indo-Soviet friendship, has told Moscow that the broadcasts "will not help relations between the two countries." India's Parliament was told that the Soviet reply to India's objections was, "we will look into it and see what can be done in the future."

The Soviet Union has given a very curious explanation as to why Radio Peace and Progress has continued its tirades against India at a time when relations between Moscow and New Delhi are at their zenith. The Russians have told the Indians, they have "no control" over the objectionable broadcasts because it is a "private radio station."

## Broadcasts monitored

Radio Peace and Progress began broadcasting from the Soviet Union late in 1964. The first programs were beamed in Spanish to Latin America on frequencies formerly used by Radio Moscow. Two years later, the Indian Government monitoring station in the Himalayan foothill town of Simla began picking up broadcasts from the Soviet station in English and Hindi. Later transmissions were in Urdu and other Indian languages.

Unlike Radio Moscow, which carefully avoided any attacks on the Indian Government, Radio Peace and Progress went all out attacking not only the Indian Government, but the non-Communist opposition parties.

With the approach of India's national elections, the number of broadcasts were stepped up on Radio Peace and Progress. They praised leftist V. K. Krishna Menon, who was trying to make a political comeback. They condemned Morarji Desai (now India's Deputy Prime Minister) and S. K. Patil as "imperialist accomplices who want to strangle democracy."

## Industrialists assailed

But the prime targets were the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the Swatantra, and other right-wing Indian parties, which they branded as "chauvinists, communalists, reactionaries, fascists, and stooges for the Americans." Bir las, and others, were targets of the Soviet station. When the Indian Government first protested to Moscow about the station, it

slowed down its attacks on India's Congress Party leaders.

During the brief reign of the left-wing United Front government in West Bengal after the national elections, Radio Peace and Progress became their apologist. The Soviet Union bitterly attacked India's government for using "Nazi techniques" when New Delhi dissolved the state legislature in West Bengal and put the floundering state under "president's rule."

Americans, of course, came in for their share of tirades. The station continued to hammer away at a story that the United States Government through the Central Intelligence Agency had furnished India's right-wing parties with millions of dollars to help them win the elections.

Exasperated by the station's bitter broadcasts, United States Ambassador Chester Bowles asked the Russians whether these tirades against the United States and India really served the best interests of the Soviet Union on the subcontinent. Apparently the Russians felt they did, because the broadcasts have continued.

The latest flare-up caused by Radio Peace and Progress came during India's recent midterm elections. Leaders of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh Party complained that the station had kept up a "continuous barrage of false and malicious propaganda against them."

## Demonstration held

The Bharatiya Jan Sangh held a demonstration outside the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, protesting that the Russians were interfering in the internal affairs of India.

The source of Radio Peace and Progress's material on India is no mystery. It is supplied by Tass, Novosti, and other Soviet correspondents in the subcontinent.

It is interesting to note that the Novosti news agency made a deal with India's Public Information Bureau, with the approval of the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, to distribute Novosti material. When an Indian newspaper broke the story, howls of protest were heard on both sides of the aisle in Parliament. This ended the arrangement.

Soviet specialists say that Radio Peace and Progress was set up "to speak for the international Communist movement." It is, they say, the "covert Soviet policy" toward the Communist Party and their allies in India. Radio Moscow, with which it shares broadcast channels, reflects the "open Soviet policy" toward the Indian Government.

Radio Peace and Progress can say things that would embarrass Soviet officials in India, if they were said over the "official" electronic voice, Radio Moscow. However, Radio Moscow has become more critical in its broadcasts to India. The latest target was the attack on Ram Nath Goenka, publisher of the respected Indian Express.

Speech by Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro at Havana University, 13 March  
(Excerpts)

In the beginning the revolution began practically from scratch. It began struggling against illiteracy. After the battle against illiteracy, the battle of general learning, primary education for everyone, began. The problems it involved -- of teachers and schools -- were huge, and many of those problems still exist. Subsequently it was the struggle for six-grade education, which has also produced notable results in the number of workers in our country who have completed all their primary schooling and have gone beyond it.

In the near future all the people will discuss the problem of general or compulsory education up to the preuniversity level. That is, only to the sixth grade, not only to junior high school, but up to preuniversity level. The last leap will have to be a much more gradual one, that is, in stages. We are not saying that it will be a leap from the primary to the preuniversity level. It will take us a long time until we reach the final jump, which will be universal university learning. Indeed, it will not be a jump. It will be simply a result of the earlier jumps, because once learning up to the preuniversity level becomes universal, the step to universalizing university education will flow normally...

Therefore, our next basic step will be to establish by the law of all the people, by the participation and understanding of all the people, universal education for all children and all youths of various ages through preuniversity. This will demand enormous effort of all of us. This will demand enormous effort of all the higher level students because we do not have and we will not have for many years other cadres, other teachers to begin to carry out this program, than the higher level students. And this is being done today on a sizable scale.

This will help resolve some contradictions -- the contradiction between defense and studies. This is one of the patent contradictions in the revolutionary process. Let us say that there are three contradictions: The enormous necessity of development, the enormous necessity of the defense of the nation in the conditions in which our revolution is evolving, and the enormous necessity of study.

We must overcome these contradictions. These contradictions must be solved. The contradiction between the necessities of underdevelopment and of study are resolved to the degree that work is combined with study. Work combined with study is developing today at the secondary, preuniversity, and university levels. However, it is developing to the extent of our possibilities.

Military School Training  
(Excerpts)

A Camilo Cienfuegos Military School now stands on what was an air base until 17 months ago; there are now nine schools of this type in the country with 2,489 students, and in the coming year, there will be 3,500. Now all students are boys, but this year the first girl students will be enrolled. The school's objective is to provide cultural-political and military training to students until they reach the preuniversity level and then promote them to different cadet schools of the Revolutionary Armed Forces where they will continue their studies until they graduate as infantry, aviation, rocketry command cadres. There are now 170 teachers at this school, although 104 of them are practice teachers, 4th year students of the Enrique J. Varona Institute. Besides engaging in productive work for 45 days, the students receive basic military training in marksmanship, infantry, physical training; they get a good idea of military life and make periodic trips to various FAR special units. Lt. Martinez is deputy director of this school.

Today we have the school-plus-farmwork plan and in the future we will have schools in the farms. Rural secondary schools will be located in the farms. And soon we will begin to build the first rural secondary schools in the countryside. This will contribute to the solving of this contradiction. Therefore, the enormous mass of hundreds of thousands of youths who are taking secondary education will do so in institutions in which they will combine their studies with production activities of the type which is possible at that age. It will be the type of work they are able to do.

The technological and preuniversity schools are participating today in the hardest job we have, the sugar harvest. There is no question but that a serious contradiction confronts us. In the face of the tremendous necessity for training technical cadres, three-or four-month periods have to be devoted to productive jobs as a basic necessity....

But it is also urgent and of utmost importance, it is of highest precedence in the revolution, to mechanize the canecutting process. This is one of the problems which at this time occupies the priority attention of the revolution. Logically, we cannot long permit a situation which forces such a vast employment of energy, of students, of workers from industry, because other branches of the national economy, industry and construction, and other sectors demand the investment of such energies....

In addition, we have the third necessity, that demanded by the defense of the nation against imperialism...

We will therefore have to reconcile the problem of defense with the problem of studies and with the problem of production. We shall solve this problem by linking it with the phase of preuniversity education or technological education, as we will call it.

Therefore, some day in that phase, studies, military training, and productive work will be done, but in another ratio. In other words, with a different intensity. It cannot be 3 consecutive months, because time will have to be divided among studies, military instruction, and a shorter time than in the past will be spent in productive work -- as training rather than a necessity...

The problem of the huge number of repeaters in school, the problem of a comparatively large number of boys and girls who do not attend school -- these problems must be totally overcome, and they must be totally overcome with the active participation of the people. We do not think there is a single conscious citizen in this country who thinks it possible to admit that this society will accept illiterates in the future, that this society will accept ignorant persons in the future. What will be the maladjustments, and what will be the problems of those individuals who, compared with a mass with greater and greater knowledge, remain backward and ignorant of everything...



We must learn to see things in perspective, and understand that it is everyone's task to fight tenaciously, decisively against all these shortcomings, all these possibilities which still exist that a child does not go to school. They will become society's problems, candidates for delinquency, for conflict with the society they cannot adapt to, and in which they can scarcely live.

Society still has a long struggle against these faults, these vices, the vice of delinquency which still exists and will remain for a long time. A parasite from the past, a milestone from the past, it feeds on the ranks of all those youngsters without preparation, without knowledge, culture, or consciousness. There are also cases of individuals who use minors for criminal purposes. Since the law punishes robbery with a certain severity, they resort to using minors criminally.

The very concept of minors is elastic. It is a sketchy one and some of these concepts will have to be revised. If we consider age 16 old enough to serve in the fatherland's armed forces, protect it, and die for it, why do we not consider them answerable for robbery or other criminal activity of any kind at age 16, 17, or 18?

Evidently this is an old concept, and the revolution must analyze it so that society will face this type of problem. There are habitual offenders in society; there are some who are incorrigible, who because of their record, their inveterate habits, are incapable of adapting to normal living -- incorrigible, unrehabilitated, and some on whom prison life has a negative and dismal influence. Our country will have to study the whole problem of its penal institutions for common delinquency, since in recent years the idea of struggle against counterrevolutionary delinquency was uppermost -- persons who acted against the revolution. The other struggle was somewhat behind. In principle, our society believes and feels the need to give every man a change and every chance, but it will also have to face those virtually unsolvable situations, cases of incurable criminals, including those in prison who continued to commit evil deeds, who continued on occasion to commit murder and extend their imprisonment. There is a whole world worthy of sociological study for society to determine what to do with this class of incorrigible individuals and with the habitual offenders. We may have to face the need of eliminating them radically. It is true that we have individuals who take up this life and practically no method exists to correct them. And some of them even take advantage of that type of impunity after they are penalized in order to continue their criminal activities...

The 1970 harvest goes well in one sense -- in the plans for planting cane. All of the basic material for the 1970 harvest is being ensured. The season is favorable in some areas -- relatively dry, or, let us say, without using "relatively," very dry in Oriente Province. However, most of the hydraulic work is being done in Oriente Province. And this province will receive the reinforcement of the necessary equipment for irrigation.

If nature discriminates against Oriente Province, the revolution will make Oriente a priority in the provision of irrigation equipment and in an effort to provide the water that nature denies it. So, drought in Oriente will be compensated by such an effort. Hard work is being done on hydraulic projects throughout the island so that we may be able to face a drought.

But there is a difficulty still in connection with the present harvest. This harvest has not yet reached the desired rhythm. And this is not a mobilization problem. No one believes more mobilization will be necessary. It is a matter of organization. This shows up our weakness in this field...

Ignorance in many places is reflected in the organization of transportation, in the organization of collection centers, in the organization of cane cutting, in the organization of industries. In all this organizing weaknesses are reflected. And during the coming weeks, our country should make a special effort in these areas of organization.

At a moment when the sugar price is satisfactory, at a time when our country is approaching a great achievement in its work, we cannot permit one single cane fit for grinding in 1969 to be left uncut.

Always, every year, when the rain starts, at the end, excuses are heard -- too much rain, too many problems. It is the intent of the revolution this year not to order the end of the harvest until every cane is cut in every province of the country.

It is not a matter of saying that some of the cane can be cut in the succeeding harvest, which could begin earlier. This is a matter of commitments by the country regarding the sugar it must export. It has to do with the needs of the country. It is our duty to win the battle of 1970, but it is basically our obligation also to win the battle of the 1969 harvest. If the 1969 harvest is to prepare the ground for the 1970 harvest, then it will. If we must grind cane in June, we will grind in June; and if we must grind in July and August, we will grind in July and August. And our cadres, our parties, will have to learn to fight and win simultaneous battles, and they will have to learn to put into effect simultaneous plans -- sugar cane, livestock, the 1969 harvest, the 1970 harvest, the rice program, and all the other plans. It is necessary to learn to win simultaneous battles. The people have the ability and disposition. There is enthusiasm. We must contribute what is missing, that is, common sense, organization. We must improve ourselves.

We were saying that we have many limitations, but we must learn to overcome them. The will of the revolution, the will of the people, continues to be to wage and win the battle completely. The lag in the harvest implies that it will continue through May and June, while the new plants will be undergoing cleaning and sprouts will be fertilized and cultivated.

A tremendous mixture of activity in a limited period of time. Unfortunately, this results in us getting behind schedule, and extends the tense pace of work in the six-month period beyond May, beyond June. We must face up to this situation and solve it, above all because this harvest is the forerunner -- this year's work will produce the first great results of 1970.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

25 March 1969

# Historian asks Stalin indictment

By Paul Wohl

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

Another voice has been raised in defense of truth in the Soviet Union.

Historian Pyotr L. Yakir, a friend of the exiled physicist Pavel M. Litvinov, has addressed a letter to the editor of *Kommunist* demanding a posthumous indictment of Stalin.

This letter, dated March 4, takes issue with a review of memoirs of Soviet Army leaders by Maj. Gen. E. A. Boltin in the second January issue of the magazine which extolled Stalin's military and political merits.

The significance of Mr. Yakir's letter comes close to that of Prof. Andrei D. Sakharov's famous essay "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom" (published by Norton with comments by Harrison Salisbury).

Since taking their respective stands, both Professor Sakharov and Mr. Yakir have been demoted.

Professor Sakharov, a top nuclear scientist, has been dismissed from his post of chief consultant to the Soviet State Committee for Nuclear Energy; he retains so far his membership in the Academy of Sciences. Mr. Yakir, however, is said to have been dismissed as a staff member of the academy's institute of history.

Like Professor Sakharov's essay, Mr. Yakir's letter originated from a discussion in this case among historians.

Copies of Mr. Yakir's letter, which *Kommunist* is not expected to publish, circulate in Moscow. The bulk of the letter appeared on March 17 in the respected French daily "Le Monde."

## Earlier attack fails

This is not the first time a posthumous indictment of Stalin has been demanded. After the 22nd Party Congress of October, 1961, a group of rehabilitated victims of Stalin's persecutions asked that the dictator be posthumously expelled from the party. At that time a long list of Stalin's crimes and failings was drawn up. But nothing came of it.

Now Mr. Yakir has presented a formal indictment of Stalin on 17 counts, referring in each case to the appropriate articles of the penal code and corroborating his charges with quotations from official records.

On the basis of Mr. Yakir's reasoning, Stalin would have to be sentenced to 69 years of imprisonment while in three cases the capital penalty should be pronounced against him. Extenuating circumstances are ruled out by the penal code. Stalin also should be deprived of all military titles and honors.

The charges listed in Mr. Yakir's indictment are overwhelming. They include abuse

of authority, unwarranted mass arrests, the introduction in 1937 of physical torture, the murder of hundreds of prominent party members and foreign Communists who had been granted asylum in the Soviet Union, of uncounted numbers of inventors and scholars, military and industrial leaders. Even the widows and children of the victims often were executed or imprisoned.

Included in Mr. Yakir's indictment are cases of serious negligence and arbitrary judgment which caused the setbacks of the Soviet Army at the beginning of the war. Also mentioned is the Soviet Union's refusal to participate in Red Cross aid to prisoners of war. This led "to the loss of large numbers of honest men, who in many cases were wounded, unconscious, and unarmed when captured."

## Precedent cited

In his concluding paragraph, Mr. Yakir challenges the editors of *Kommunist* to refute his charges. Otherwise he and his colleagues who have participated in the discussion will "collectively" ask the Procurator of the Soviet Union to open a criminal investigation against Stalin. "I am convinced that a posthumous sentencing is possible and legal, just as posthumous rehabilitations are possible and legal."

Mr. Yakir has come out against Stalin previously. In the fall of 1966, he participated in a discussion of a book by Prof. A. M. Nekrich, "July 22, 1941," held under the chairmanship of General Boltin at the Academy of Sciences. Professor Nekrich's thesis was that Stalin personally was responsible for the Soviet Union's lack of military preparation. According to the transcript of the discussions published in "Le Nouvel Observateur" of Dec. 14, 1966, Mr. Yakir at one point protested against those speakers who had referred to "Comrade Stalin."

"This is a wrong formula," said Mr. Yakir. "Stalin was no one's comrade and especially not our comrade. Stalin obstructed our armament by eliminating many eminent technicians. We were at war and millions of able-bodied men sat in concen-

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tration camps, including specialists in every branch of the economy and of the armed forces. Many men were needed to guard the camps."

At that time, the (partial) rehabilitation of Stalin was only at its beginning. General Boltin himself in his concluding speech insisted on the validity of the resolutions of the 20th and 22nd congress condemning the cult of (Stalin's) personality and protested against "certain comrades who had referred to criticism of Stalin as an exaggeration of the Khrushchev era."

Now, two years later, with characteristic Soviet versatility, General Boltin has written in *Kommunist* that "Stalin, with all the complexities and contradictions of his character, stands out as a prominent military leader." Professor Nekrich's book in the meanwhile has been banned and its author expelled from the party.

But for Mr. Yakir the past can be neither warped nor blotted out. He is the son of Gen. Ion Yakir who in June, 1937, was executed on faked charges together with Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, chief of staff of the Soviet Army, and six other top military leaders. The flower of the Soviet officers corps was annihilated by Stalin in the wake of the Tukhachevsky-Yakir trial. Col. Phillip Famounville, United States military attaché who attended Soviet Army maneuvers under General Yakir, referred to him as an exceptionally brilliant commander.

#### Khrushchev defends Yakir

General Yakir's case was quoted at the 22nd Party Congress when former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev said: "The son of

Yakir, whom I knew well, came to me and asked about his father. What should I tell him? . . . Neither Tukhachevsky nor Yakir nor any of the other generals indicted by Stalin had committed any crime against the party and the state. At the time of his execution Yakir shouted 'Long live the party! Long live Stalin.'"

At the same congress, Politburo member Alexander N. Sholev, then head of state security, read a letter which General Yakir had addressed to Stalin from his prison cell.

"My whole conscious life has been spent working selflessly and honestly for you, for the party, and the country, with boundless faith in the victory of communism." Stalin scribbled the following comment on this letter: "Scoundrel and impostor."

#### Book recalls trial

Few cases are as poignant as that of General Yakir. Few have been aired as fully and made so deep an impression on millions of Soviets. General Yakir's wife and brother also were executed. Little Yakir, then 14 years old, spent many years in camps and prisons. In one of the Arctic camps he met the aide-de-camp of his father who told him the full story of the malinations to which his father had fallen victim.

In 1963, Mr. Yakir, together with Y. A. Geller, published a book about his father "Kommandarm Yakir," which has aroused much attention.

In view of his background and status as a recognized historian, Mr. Yakir is eminently qualified to issue a warning against "the sinister atmosphere of suspicion and police [terror], the consequences of which apparently have not yet been overcome today."

# New Nationalism Hits U.S. Investments

First of a series

By John M. Goshko

Washington Post Foreign Service

BUENOS AIRES—French journalist

Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, addressing Europeans in his book "The American Challenge," wrote that "the power, the speed, the pervasive nature of American investment are a warning and a challenge to us. What kind of future do we want?"

He predicted that the third greatest industrial power soon might be "not Europe but American industry in Europe."

Now, like fallout from a nuclear explosion, Servan-Schreiber's warning has drifted across the Atlantic to Latin America, where U.S. business casts perhaps its longest shadow.

Direct private U.S. investment is estimated at more than \$10 billion. That is less than in Canada or in Europe, but Latin America is underdeveloped—with little home-grown industry. On this limited economic landscape, U.S. business looms large.

U.S. business directly employs almost 2 million Latin-Americans, and there is no estimating the number indirectly dependent on this investment. It accounts for 10 per cent of the total output of goods in Latin America and pays one-fifth of all taxes.

American business produces a third of all Latin-American exports. In countries like Chile or Venezuela, dependent on mining activity requiring a high degree of technology and financial resources, the basic means of national livelihood is controlled by firms owned in whole or in part by U.S. investors.

Even where this is not the case, the American presence intrudes prominently on the business scene.

For example, the largest country, Brazil, earns its living from such agricultural products as coffee, and the agricultural sector of the economy is almost entirely in the hands of Brazilian citizens.

However, in recent years, Brazil has built up a sizable industrial base that produces for internal consumption, and here the picture is considerably different. Of the 30 largest companies in Brazil, six are controlled outright by Americans (Ford, General Motors, General Electric, Union Carbide, Firestone, Anderson Clayton).

Thus it is that "The American Challenge" is probably the most widely read and talked about book in Latin America today. In Servan-Schreiber's warnings about the impending decline of Europe as an independent economic force many think they see the story of what has happened to Latin America.

In some countries, if a man is of the upper or middle class, the corn flakes he eats for breakfast and the refrigerator from which he takes the milk were made by American firms. Afterward, he is apt to drive

to work in a car manufactured or assembled in an American-owned plant.

Along the way, he may drop his wife at an American supermarket. In the evening, they will probably relax in front of an American-made television set or go to see an American film released by an American distributor.

The worker in manufacturing, mining, or the growing of commodities like bananas or sugar, frequently will have an American employer. He may even live in a house and send his children to schools provided by that employer.

Whatever the worker grows or refines at some stage it will pass through a machine or process invented by American technology and brought in by American business. If the product is exportable, the chances are that its ultimate sale will take place in the U.S. market.

## Overall, An Impact

All this activity has had an impact fully as important as the influence of such powerful home-grown institutions as the military and the Church.

On the surface, at least, that impact looks like an unrelieved plus.

Wherever American investment is at work, the results usually can be measured in terms of a higher gross national product and increased prosperity for formerly depressed communities. It has meant better wages, working conditions, fringe benefits and social mobility for thousands who would otherwise face bleakest poverty.

At the same time, the onslaught of U.S. investment has played a big part in producing the political and social ferment that is the story of modern Latin America. Frank Tannenbaum, the dean of U.S. scholars specializing in Latin America, points out that much of this ferment is directly caused by the "consumer revolution propelled by the United States."

to make Latin Americans dissatisfied with the existing order.

"Americans," Tannenbaum says, "are unaware of their role as the gravediggers of class-ridden and stratified societies. They are merely selling toothpaste, fountain pens, and modern plumbing. In fact, however, they are undermining the stratified society characteristic of Latin America."

Ironically, U.S. business now is the target of the ferment that it helped to create, and it may thus soon face the most serious threat since Fidel Castro expropriated the sizable private U.S. interests in Cuba.

In part, this is because the American business community here has been identified in Latin eyes with the most intractable elements of the "stratified society." Foreign investment is thought of as part of the old order, and is vulnerable to attack from those who would end the old ways.

## New Nationalism

In addition, in recent months Latin America has been subjected to a strong new tide of nationalism that looks with hostility on all foreign influences. It is a nationalism that finds many elements on the political right—long regarded as the staunch ally of foreign investment—joining forces with the left to shout that outside business interests must be curtailed or even expelled.

Last October, for example, a nationalistic outcry against the status of a U.S.-owned oil company in Peru triggered a military coup, the nationalization of the company and a severe crisis in U.S.-Peruvian relations.

In the face of this hostility, U.S. companies are increasingly reluctant to make new investments. David Rockefeller, board chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, sums up the feeling of investors: "People don't want to invest their money if their property may be taken away from them, even if they get their money back."

Latin America, in turn, is now finding it harder to compete with other areas in attracting foreign investment. Over the last five years, the U.S. share of Latin American investment has fallen from 40 per cent to 30 per cent.

ment to Latin America has remained relatively stable while in such areas as Europe and Canada there have been large annual increases.

These are the cross-currents that preoccupy Latin American leaders as they ponder the question posed by Servan-Schreiber: "What kind of future do we want?"

Is Latin America to continue as an underdeveloped area producing raw materials for industrial nations? Or can it break the restraints of underdevelopment and become a modern industrial consumer society like the United States and Europe?

Does progress imply an even greater abandonment of the Latin business sphere to American firms with the money and technology to create new industries? Would it be better to make a clean break—to cast out not only foreign investment but also the region's traditional capitalist structure and go it alone with new forms of statist control over the economy?

Or does the solution lie in some middle group? Can American business be brought into new forms of partnership with both private and public Latin American capital—partnerships in which the Latins would eventually become the principals and reassert control over their own economic destinies?

These are the elements of the debate in a region groping for both modernity and an independent identity.

Those who remain confident that foreign investment can not only survive but can actually expand its role, base their thinking on many factors—not the least of them being the change of administrations in Washington.

The shift from the Democrats to the Republicans, it is argued, provides a convenient time to reexamine the Alliance for Progress. Until now, the Alliance has given almost exclusive emphasis to development through governmental action, and U.S. assistance has concentrated on government-to-government lending.

#### Alliance for Progress

Recently, however, there has been a growing conviction on all sides that the Alliance is failing to do the job for which it was conceived. The U.S. Congress last year showed its disenchantment by slashing U.S. Alliance contributions.

Now, the United States has is not expected to be as willing as his Democratic predecessors to go to the mat with Congress over foreign aid appropriations. As a result, it seems unlikely that U.S. Alliance contributions will again reach the \$1-billion-a-year level.

During his campaign, President Nixon spoke of the need for "new approaches" to the Alliance, and many students of the aid problem are now suggesting that these approaches should follow the same lines proposed by Mr. Nixon for the solution of domestic problems—turning a big share of the burden over to private business.

To many people, including most Latin government leaders who have been in the forefront of fighting to affect Alliance or Progress reforms, this has some alarming implications. They hear that increased emphasis on business investment gradually would become a substitute for government-to-government lending and an excuse for the United States to make less and less of a direct foreign aid contribution to Latin America.

It is true that many U.S. business leaders take the simplistic view that private enterprise alone can solve the problems of Latin development and that large-scale foreign aid is not needed. But there are others who, while continuing to believe that first emphasis should remain on governmental aid, also see an urgent new role for private investment.

Because of disenchantment with the Vietnam war and other factors, they contend, the United States is going through an internal reappraisal of its foreign commitments. The increasing hostility within the U.S. Congress to foreign aid is only one symptom.

However, they point out, world events will not stand still while the United States completes the process of redefining foreign policy goals, deciding where it will put its future priorities and where it will make some measure of disengagement. During the interim, it is necessary to erect temporary structures that will provide some element of continuity and allow a transition to whatever new directions emerge in U.S. foreign policy.

Where the problems of

concerned, private U.S. foreign business leaders seem to lend itself to use as such a temporary structure. By accelerating its tempo and changing some of its emphasis, it could keep alive the spark of development in underdeveloped areas while the United States gropes toward new approaches to foreign aid.

Among the world's underdeveloped areas, it is Latin America where U.S. business has its most sizeable commitment. Therefore, according to this argument, it is in Latin America where the idea of foreign investment as a temporary—or even permanent—solution to development problems can best be tested.

Such a proposal turns on premises that Latin America's problems are mainly due to a lack of capital, and that development of the region would be hastened if there were more local and U.S. private investment.

This argument can be faulted on the grounds that it tends to concentrate on economic considerations and slights the need for reform of outmoded political and social institutions.

The importance of capital is denied. Castro lectures on the error of "geographic fatalism" that had tied Cuba's economy to the United States. But Castro, too, needs capital, and has simply traded the U.S. source for the Soviet.

Yet, even when it is concluded that Latin America has a critical need for capital, the problem remains of how to attract it at a time when the tendency of potential investors is to shy away from the area.

In the past, this problem was overcome in one of two ways: by offering a profit return so high that investors were willing to take the risk of going into an unstable situation, or by creating what businessmen like to call a "favorable investment climate"—often a euphemism for a business-oriented, right-wing dictatorship.

The first answer represents one of the chief reasons why so many Latins regard foreign firms as exploiters. The second runs counter to the Alliance for Progress goal of fostering democratic, equitable governments.

It is because business relied so heavily on such inducements and safeguards in the past that the current wave of Latin nationalism finds so many converts.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8

**Risk vs. Reform**

The problem then becomes one of finding a way to overcome the high risk of investing in Latin America and still allow the Latins to engage in political and social reform. Those who believe in the need for increased foreign investment advocate changing the focus of U.S. foreign aid to provide subsidies, incentives and safeguards to American capital.

Among suggested measures are eliminating the tax on repatriated earnings from investments in Latin America, tax credits on initial investments, and insurance to protect investors against expropriation and other forms of political penalty. Without such measures, businessmen and government officials often agree, there is no hope for any substantial increase of private U.S. investment in Latin America within the foreseeable future.

Peter T. Jones, who dealt with Latin-American problems as a Commerce Department official under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and who now works for International Telephone and Telegraph as a vice president of its Latin-American division, states the argument this way:

"The problem of introducing jobs and progress into a poverty-stricken area like the Northeast of Brazil is the same as the problem we have at home in Appalachia. There's no reason why business should want to go in there unless you give it special incentives. Either you subsidize it, or it just doesn't grow."

Jones and others who advocate more emphasis on private enterprise within the foreign aid program call for vigilance against a return to the *laissez-faire* days before the Alliance when benefits went largely into the pockets of a small group of businessmen, and their cohorts in government.

To prevent this, they say, any private business subsidies and incentives built into the aid program should concentrate on investments that would be clearly beneficial to large numbers of Latin Americans. In this category, they advocate a priority status for "joint venture" investments that would give local Latin capital the chance to get in on the action by associating with U.S. financial and technological resources.

In the view of most Latin American businessmen and economic analysis, joint ventures represent the key to whether foreign investment will continue to be an important force in Latin America.

They warn that unless indigenous Latin capital is allowed to have a share of the region's future economic development — indeed, eventually to control this development—foreign investors will find themselves increasingly threatened by the nationalistic argument that they represent an alien, exploitative force.

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In addition, they add, incentives are needed for investments that will create jobs, promote the tourism and exports on which Latin America relies for foreign exchange, modernize backward technology, and help bring private enterprise into a bigger role in community and national development.

This is a tall order, and even the most enthusiastic partisans of the idea do not pretend that private enterprise on its own will be able to complete the development process.

**Public Sector**

Most concede that continued large-scale governmental planning and spending will be necessary to cover many areas that business investment cannot reach. This means that the aid program, however it is changed, would still have to provide long-term development loans on a government-to-government basis.

There is also the need to expand Latin America's foreign trade opportunities—a need which many Latin leaders consider even more important than increased investment.

In short, almost everyone agrees that no matter how much capital is supplied or saved through increased foreign investment, additional

hard currency obtained through trade and aid would be needed to sustain a satisfactory rate of growth.

Advocates of government incentives to spur investment also point out that Latin America is a good place to test the idea because it is the least underdeveloped of the world's emerging areas. Since Latin America already has the beginnings of a substantial industrial base, it can benefit readily from a shift in emphasis from public to private development.

If the idea worked in Latin America, the experience gained could be applied to Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

But would the Nixon Administration regard the incentive approach as worthy of being included in its foreign-aid proposals, and would Congress, in turn, be willing to appropriate the needed money and sacrifice the tax revenues? And could enough private investors even then be found to give the idea a real test?

Would American business find the inducements attractive enough? Would it be willing to change its traditional methods of operation and combat Latin hostilities by engaging in more joint ventures and more involvement in the non-business activities of the Latin community?

And, perhaps most important, what would be the reaction of the Latin American governments and peoples to such an initiative by the American business community? Would they see the advantages of working with foreign investment on a new, more equitable basis?

Or have the appeals of nationalism and statist-oriented ideas already made such inroads that the proposed changes in investment emphasis are doomed?

These questions will be answered only when the Latin Americans decide how to answer Servan-Schreiber's question, "What kind of future do we want?"

All that is certain today is that the nature of foreign investment in Latin America will have changed drastically a decade from now.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8



# U.S. Companies Strive for New Image

CPYRGHT

Second of a Series

By John M. Goshko

Washington Post Foreign Service

BUENOS AIRES—From the time of

Cortes and his gold-seeking Spanish conquistadores, no subject has aroused greater bitterness in Latin America than "economic exploitation."

Today, this bitterness is directed against the group that many Latins regard as the modern equivalent of freebooters like Cortes—the foreign investors who have been prominent since the 19th Century wars of liberation.

To help pay for these wars, leaders like Simon Bolivar granted concessions to foreigners for the extraction of mineral wealth. After independence, the new nations, lacking money and technical expertise, continued to abdicate development of resources to investment capital from abroad.

After 150 years of seeing what Latins regard as their patrimony in pawn, they have become increasingly frustrated. Inevitably, this emotion focuses on the vast U.S. business investment—a \$10-billion stake that represents roughly one-third of all the foreign capital in the area.

David Rockefeller, chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank and of the U.S. business-sponsored Council for Latin America, summarizes the case made against private U.S. interests by their enemies in Latin America:

"North American capitalists, they say, are out to exploit resources and markets to the detriment of the host nations; the capitalists want to keep the people in poverty so they can take over their minerals and metals; they are obsessed with excessive profits and have no concern for the land or its inhabitants."

Rockefeller dismisses the charges as "largely without foundation." Still, there is no question that allegations of economic exploitation lie at the root of almost every grievance that Latin Americans have against the United States.

Even the Brazilian economist, Roberto Campos—a man so thoroughly pro-American that his countrymen call him "Bobby Fields" after the English translation of his name—cites the "overwhelming influence exercised by American private interests" as the chief cause of Latin America's "reactive tensions." History offers evidence of at least some truth in the Latin indictment.

In the old days of "dollar diplomacy," the United States frequently sent troops to protect American investments. More recently, business pres-

ures have prompted the white House and the State Department to prop up reactionary governments because of fear that social reform would prejudice investments.

Yet, even after allowance is made for all these justifiable complaints, U.S. business in Latin America is not nearly so exploitative or monolithic as many critics contend.

In recent years, it often has been a generous employer, honest taxpayer and all-around good citizen. It even has started learning how to live with the new breed of social reformers and central planners in many Latin governments—although it still regards them uneasily and feels more comfortable with traditional right-wing regimes such as those in Argentina and Brazil.

## New Interests

It also has expanded into many economic vacuums created by a continuing shortage of home-grown capital and technology. This has brought in modern methods stimulated local industry, given work to thousands, helped train a technical and managerial class, improved living standards for the small consumer and contributed to the beginnings of a modern industrial plant.

It has failed to make these accomplishments understood or appreciated by the great mass of Latin Americans. As David Rockefeller and other corporation executives readily admit, the U.S. business community suffers from an image problem rooted in its past excesses.

These excesses are part of a story that began a century ago with such unregenerate adventures as Henry Meiggs, the "Yankee Pizzarro" who parlayed his skill at building railroads across the Andes into a financial empire founded on corruption and intrigue. In his time, Meiggs virtually owned every leading politician in Peru from the president on down and maintained what was almost a private harem of wives and daughters of Lima's leading families.

Meiggs eventually died broke and discredited, but others built more enduring monuments to ambition and business acumen.

## Grace's Beginnings

Also in Peru at that time was a young Irish immigrant ship's chandler, William Russel Grace, who quickly spotted the possibilities of chartering and servicing ships engaged in the guano fertilizer trade. From this modest enterprise, its headquarters later transferred to New York, grew

what are today the many-faceted, world-wide activities of W. R. Grace and Co.

And there was Henry Meiggs's nephew, Minor Cooper Keith, who in Costa Rica forged the first rails across the Central American isthmus. Seeing that his railroad could not prosper without freight, Keith began bidding for control of the "green and gold empire," the then infant banana trade.

Acquiring lands the size of Rhode Island, Keith embarked on a bitter, 30-year war with rivals. By 1899, most competitors were ready to consolidate. The result was the United Fruit Company—the organization that more than any other would symbolize the U.S. business presence in Latin America during the first decades of this century.

From the company's board rooms in Boston, Keith, together with such associates and successors as Andrew Preston and Samuel ("Sam the Banana Man") Zemurray, exercised a hegemony greater than any government over vast areas around the Caribbean. Keith was known as "the uncrowned king of Central America."

The atmosphere created by United Fruit in its domains was that of a gigantic company store. Thousands of farmers were coerced into selling bananas exclusively to United Fruit at prices set by the company; hired thugs enforced cooperation and Latin governments either pocketed "subsidies" and looked the other way or they didn't last very long.

## Coup For Sale

Toward the end of his life, Zemurray, who openly admitted having "bought" one coup in Honduras, told an interviewer that he had done many things in the early years of the company that he didn't like to think about "in the dark hours of the night."

Because these things were done with the tacit approval of successive administrations in Washington, the impression grew that the United States promoted dictatorships to further the aims of United Fruit. This cry was heard as recently as 1954, when the CIA incited right-wing military elements in Guatemala to overthrow a popular but leftist government.

Actually, the 1954 incident was prompted mainly by Cold War fears of a potential Communist takeover. However, one of Washington's conditions for aiding the coup leaders was a promise to eliminate a land reform program that had offended United Fruit; a former United Fruit executive had been the CIA and the rebel military officers.

United Fruit, which remains an important force in the economies of the banana-grafting nations, has had a hard time in recent years to project a more progressive image. But among Latin Americans, who have long memories, the effort has largely been unavailing.

In Mexico last year, for example, the news that United Fruit was planning to buy a well-known local grocery chain touched off a full-scale furor including a congressional debate about why the government was allowing the company into the country. And in Ecuador, the taint of association with United Fruit once played a big part in destroying the presidential ambitions of Galo Plaza Lasso, now secretary general of the Organization of American States.

Plaza, who had been president in the late 1940s and who is generally regarded by outside observers as the outstanding Ecuadorian leader of this century, ran for a second term in 1960. But he had written a book that praised United Fruit for housing and educational benefits provided its plantation workers.

During the campaign, his opponents attacked him for "selling out." He ran a poor third.

As United Fruit was establishing its hold over the banana trade, other American firms were making their presence felt.

#### Venezuelan Oil

The discovery of oil in Venezuela quickly brought that country's economy under the control of such organizations as Gulf, Royal Dutch Shell (a European firm) and, most prominent of all, the Creole Petroleum Corp.—a Standard Oil of New Jersey subsidiary that is said by industry sources to be the largest and probably the most profitable petroleum-producing company in the world.

Kennecott, Anaconda and Cerro de Pasco were digging copper and other minerals out of Chile and Peru. International Telephone and Telegraph was controlling telephone and cable facilities, and in the power utility field, the dominant names were those like American and Foreign Power Corp.

This concentration formed the basis of present-day Latin American resentments toward U.S. investment. Yet, although about 60 per cent of the total U.S. investment is still in these fields, the main thrust of American business here has been changing radically.

Over the past two decades, American investment has been going through a second-stage development—one powered by rising demand for American-style consumer goods. With orders for their products increasing, more firms established subsidiary manufacturing facilities in the area.

#### New Investors

The names that intruded most prominently became General Motors, Ford and Chrysler in automobiles, Merck and Parke Davis in drugs, General Electric and Westinghouse in electronics, Goodrich and Firestone in rubber

It was an expansion that touched all but the tiniest Latin countries. In Mexico, Brazil and Argentina it laid the foundations for a large national industrial base.

The depth of the new U.S. involvement is evidenced by the fact that since World War II, direct U.S. investments soared from less than \$3 billion to the present \$10 billion—almost one-fourth of total U.S. investments abroad.

At the end of 1967 (the last year for which complete figures are available) the largest share of American investment was in Venezuela, with \$2.5 billion. Of this, \$1.8 billion was in the petroleum industry. Since Venezuela is not expected to renew the concessions of foreign oil companies when they run out during the next decade, the present U.S. stake in Venezuela appears to have hit its peak.

In fact, U.S. investment in Venezuela actually showed a small decline between 1966 and 1967. Unless the current stake in petroleum is replaced by other types of investment, this trend can accelerate rapidly in the years ahead.

#### Manufacturers in Mexico

In contrast is Mexico, where U.S. investment is put at \$1.34 billion, the second highest total. Mexico had relatively little U.S. investment at the end of World War II. The once-large American holdings in basic industries were expropriated or expelled during the 1920s and 30s.

In the post-war period, though, Mexico has been the most successful of all Latin countries in attracting American capital to consumer manufacturing activities. The outlook there is for U.S. firms to continue putting in money.

The same is true of the countries in third and fourth place, Brazil with

\$1.32 billion and Argentina with \$1 billion. The big upsurge of American investment there has come within the last decade and has been concentrated almost exclusively on manufacturing.

Even some of the old-line American firms have started to move in this direction. ITT, for example, has gradually been disengaging from telephone operators to concentrate on service activities like hotels.

#### Some Encouragement

In contrast to the hostility directed against the mining, petroleum and utilities companies, this new wave of investment is one that sophisticated Latin Americans are generally inclined to encourage.

They have read "The American Challenge," Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's analysis of the impact of American investment in Europe, and they have perceived its applications: to become a modern industrial region, Latin America must rely on the Americans, in the short run at least, to supply the capital and teach the management. "Latin America cannot generate from its own resources,"

they regard this as especially urgent because Latin America's decade-old fast approaching its outer limits. Concentrated on the production of import-substitute consumer goods that exist behind tariff protection, industry is getting close to saturating available markets.

To grow further, either its consumer market must be broadened—through creation of the long-stalled Latin common market and incorporation of population now outside the money economy—or the changeover must be made to manufactured goods that can compete as exports to world markets. Eventually, this would presuppose an attempt to shift the industrial base toward manufacturers employing the raw materials produced in Latin America.

But that involves industrial activity far more sophisticated than the current import-substitute industries. So far though, U.S. business—the only force really capable of leading Latin industry to this next stage—has been unwilling to invest the necessary money and technology.

#### Anti-Business Feeling

One of the most compelling reasons, from the potential investor's point of view, is the increasing anti-business feeling.

To be sure, all but the most doctrinaire of the Latin leaders make clear distinctions between what they regard as "good" and "bad" investment—between what it is politically expedient to say they want to get rid of (the old-line extractive investments) and what it is economically imperative to woo (new-style manufacturing ventures).

Such distinctions frequently get blurred in an emotional atmosphere. When the Latin masses constantly have it dinned into their ears that a particular American company is bad, they are unable to understand why the indictment does not extend to all American firms.

The military regime in Peru expropriated a large American oil company while trying to explain that this was a special case—and that it really was anxious to have other kinds of American investment come in.

#### Investors Discouraged

What is got instead was a climate of mutual recrimination, threatened reprisals and a fanning of public sentiment against "imperialist exploiters" that currently is discouraging potential investors in Peru. Yet, Peru needs new investment if it is to shake out of the fiscal depression of the past two years.

As David Rockefeller says, "One of the most formidable barriers to private investment abroad, in my judgment, is the barrier existing in the minds and emotions of those who need foreign investment most."

This barrier was built by the greed and excesses of American business. But what keeps it high and forbidding today is the realization that many old prejudices are no longer valid.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01192A000500120001-8

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01192A000500120001-8

11 March 1969

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8

The American Challenge—III Peru Gains Wide

CPYRGHT :

# Sympathy in U.S. Oil Dispute

CPYRGHT

Third of a series

By John M. Goshko

Washington Post Foreign Service

BUENOS AIRES — On

April 4, President Nixon may be forced to make a decision that could determine the course of U.S. relations with Latin America for years to come.

At issue is the expropriation of an American-owned oil company by the military regime that seized power in Peru last October. And what Mr. Nixon must decide is whether to invoke against Peru certain financial sanctions prescribed by U.S. law.

That decision will touch every aspect of U.S. interests in Latin America. But none will be affected more than the \$10 billion of direct private investment held by U.S. corporations in Latin America.

In Peru alone, sanctions undoubtedly will bring retaliation by the government against the substantial and varied private U.S. interests remaining there. Peruvian officials have considered courses ranging from a ban on the remittance of profits to the United States to further expropriations.

## Reaction Expected

Invoking of U.S. sanctions is certain to touch off widespread sympathy for Peru elsewhere in Latin America and fan the economic nationalism crackling through the continent.

Since U.S. investments represent more than a third of the foreign capital in the area, they have been the favorite target of this nationalism. Peru's expropriation of the oil company is only the most dramatic of the many recent incidents.

After almost a century of entrusting outside interests with the development of their petroleum resources, several other Latin countries have joined Peru in shouting, "The

In Bolivia, there has been rising demand for expropriation of the concessions held by Gulf Oil Corp. In Brazil, the president recently vetoed a decree permitting foreign firms to explore in competition with the state-owned company, Petrobras.

On Jan. 2, Peru decreed that all banks must be at least 75 per cent owned by nationals within a year. Two weeks later, Argentina took similar steps to curb foreign bank expansion.

## Home-owned Phones

In international telecommunications, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Panama and Mexico have frozen private companies out of plans for satellite earth stations. In most cases a government monopoly will be established over international cable services that have been run by private firms like International Telephone and Telegraph.

Such broad-gauge attacks on foreign investment are hardly new in Latin America. They stem from deep-seated resentment of control exercised by outside interests.

During the past two decades, this indignation has been boiling over with increasing frequency. Many observers foresee the virtual elimination of foreign holdings in most Latin basic industries by the end of the century. In almost every case, they will be replaced by government ownership.

## Transition Trend

Most electrical power services and internal telephone and telegraph facilities already have made the transition—usually with disastrous results in service and efficiency. Now the trend is the same on other basic industries, particularly petroleum.

Looked at in strictly economic terms, a good case can be made that such nationalism does a disservice to Latin hopes for development. As Servan-Schreiber points out in "The American Challenge":

"To nationalize U.S. industries in response to increased American investment is a typical reaction of an underdeveloped country and ignores the real nature of the problem. Even if the newly nationalized firm managed to keep American-developed techniques, it would nevertheless be cut off from the flow of creatives from the parent company" . . .

"Governments which committed such acts of folly would have to close their frontiers to shut out scientific advances made elsewhere. Nationalization may be tempting, for it spares us the effort of thinking and seems to offer an easy answer. But it is a weapon that would only work against our own development."

## State Oil Monopolies

Nothing would appear to prove his contention more pointedly than the record of Latin American state-owned monopolies in petroleum, for example. Although such state companies have been a great source of pride, their economic performance has been one of almost total inefficiency.

Mexico's nationalization of the oil industry in 1938 provided the basis for the first important Latin oil monopoly, Pemex. After 30 years, however, Pemex has been a consistent money loser, riddled with graft and political patronage. It is quietly importing oil from Venezuela to meet domestic demand.

Argentina, whose state monopoly had never been able to get a drop of oil out of the ground, brought in American companies in the late 1950s. Within a year, the country not only was self-sufficient in many types of fuel oil but was exporting.

Yet the nationalistic outcry of "sell-out" was so great that in 1963 President Arturo Illia summarily threw out all foreign firms. Two years later, with production entirely in the hands of the state's YPF company, Argentina was importing \$100 million worth of petroleum annually to meet domestic needs as well as incurring huge operating losses.

## Led to Coup

The failure of his oil policy was one of the factors prompting the military coup that overthrew Illia in 1966. Argentina's current military regime has moved against the trend in neighboring Latin countries and has invited the foreign companies back in hopes of again making the country self-sufficient in petroleum.

Current Latin nationalism is of such an intensity that many foreign businessmen are frankly fearful about its long-range implications. Most sophisticated investors long ago were reconciled to the fact that Latin Americans intend to reassert control over basic industries; and as a result, the main thrust of recent U.S. investment here has been directed toward activities like manufacturing, retailing and service.

These are the fields in which many Latins say they need and welcome foreign capital. Now, however, there is fear that the new eco-

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8

economic nationalism—with mistrust of all things foreign and preoccupation with state ownership—will eventually extend to all areas of private enterprise.

This sentiment is no longer confined to the left of the political spectrum. The right, chief bulwark of the capitalist system in South America, has been moving toward an identification with nationalist aspirations and statist ideas.

The trend is apparent in such formerly monolithic guardians of the status quo as the Catholic Church, the entrepreneurial class and the officer corps of the powerful Latin armed forces. For the most part, the change in the thinking of these key institutions is still a minority sentiment. But it is growing.

For example, the two countries of South America currently having the greatest success in attracting foreign investment are Argentina and Brazil. Both have military-backed governments whose policies aim at bringing about rapid national development and industrialization by pursuing laissez-faire economics favorable to big business and foreign investment.

However, in both countries, there is also increasing pressure from important groups in government, business and the armed forces that want a far greater government control over the economy.

#### Peruvian Showdown

Within the Peruvian armed forces—the staunch allies of foreign investors during past periods of military rule—this showdown already seems to have taken place. From the evidence of the regime's expropriation of the International Petroleum Co., the victory appears to have gone to the nationalists.

The growing consensus of right and left on nationalistic economics was vividly underscored by a four-hour meeting recently in Lima.

On one side were Gen. Miguel Angel Valdivia Moriveron, the Finance Minister, and his chief deputy. Both are men with reputa-

tion for their hard foreign capital and a belief in state control of basic resources.

On the other side were a number of Chilean intellectuals, some with ties to the Chilean Christian Democratic Party, which is regarded by many not only as the most important force on the Latin non-Marxist left but also as the antithesis of military government.

Yet, these seeming opposites discussed seriously the formation of an over-all statist-oriented oil policy for Peru. They also explored the possibility of state-owned oil and steel entities throughout Latin America that would combine forces to increase their leverage with regard to freight rates, supplies and services.

#### Historic Dependence

The seductive appeal that such ideas hold for such widely disparate forces is traceable to the historic dependence of their respective economies on foreign investment. For a long time, the life blood of Chile, its vast copper deposits, were under the exclusive control of American mining companies; the same was true of Peru's more varied resources.

In Chile, the 1964 presidential campaign almost saw election of a Marxist candidate calling for nationalization of copper and virtually all other foreign holdings. The actual winner was the Christian Democrat, Eduardo Frei, who enjoyed the backing of the United States for his much more moderate stance.

Frei proposed "Chileanization" of copper—a process now being implemented that calls for the government to buy into partnership with the U.S. copper companies, which were also to make new investments. For the rest, Frei's official policy was to favor continued foreign investment.

However, Frei, whose term as President ends next year, has been losing control of the Christian Democratic Party to its left-wing, avowedly statist, factions.

As a result, foreign investment in Chile outside the copper sphere has come al-

ready on the scene have shied away from expanding; and at least one, W. R. Grace and Co., long an important force in Chilean distribution and manufacturing activities, is liquidating most of its holdings.

In Peru, the seizure of International Petroleum was only the outward symbol of an atmosphere that foreign businessmen find increasingly worrisome.

On the day of the coup that ousted civilian President Fernando Belaunde Terry and brought Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado to the presidency, every political party and all but one of Lima's newspapers roundly denounced the unconstitutional takeover. One week later, all of them—together with the rest of the nation—were loudly applauding the IPC expropriation.

Even before the coup, there were signs that Peru was preparing a radical break from its past hospitality toward foreign capital. The law restricting foreign holdings in Peruvian banks, put into effect by the Velasco regime, actually was the culmination of a move started prior to the coup by Belaunde's finance minister, Manuel Ulloa.

#### Amassed Fortune

For most of his adult life, Ulloa has been identified with U.S. corporate and banking interest, amassing a personal fortune in the process. But he was planning to become a candidate in the presidential elections that would have taken place next November.

His reading of public opinion told him that attacks on American investors were good politics, and the banking law was the result. Also prior to the coup, Ulloa was preparing another openly nationalistic measure—one relating to the fishmeal industry—that the military government is expected to adopt.

Fishmeal, the country's largest single earner of foreign exchange, made Peru the world's front-ranking fishing nation and created a strong sense of national pride because it was built up primarily by Peruvian initiative and capital. Foreign

part, but the major achievement was clearly Peruvian.

#### Fishmeal Decline

With success, however, came over-expansion of fleet and factory capacity. Costs rose, increased competition came from other fishmeal-producing countries and from alternate kinds of animal feeds, and the industry two years ago went into severe recession.

The inevitable result was consolidation. Inefficient factories and fleets operated by under-capitalized companies began going under. These were almost always Peruvian-owned.

Foreign companies, often better financed and with more modern equipment, weathered the recession and began to control an increasing share of the industry. Some also were subsidiaries of parent companies that made large-scale use of fishmeal, and Peruvians began charging that the subsidiaries were trying to depress the world market price in order to benefit their parent companies.

At the time of the coup, the Peruvian congress, supported by important segments of the local business community, was considering legislation limiting foreign ownership of any fishmeal company to one-third of the equity.

The present U.S.-Peru collision course over the oil seizure has put the rest of the U.S. investment stake in Peru, estimated at about \$600 million before the IPC seizure, in somewhat the same position as the U.S. business community in Cuba at the time of the 1959 revolution. What happened in Cuba—the eventual expropriation of all U.S. holdings—could now happen in Peru.

If the Peruvians, aided by the Soviets, were able beneficially to exert their independence of the United States, the example would be taken up by other countries' nationalists clamoring for a showdown with foreign investment.

The Washington Post

12 March 1969

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8

## The Latin Challenge—IV

# U.S. Businessmen Try to Adapt to New Realities

By John M. Goshko

Washington Post Foreign Service

**BUENOS AIRES**—He is a familiar figure in the financial districts of every big Latin American city—his close-cropped hair, natural-shoulder suit and brisk step setting him apart from the Latins around him.

He works long hours, broken only by forced adoption of the local custom decreeing a two-lunch. Efficient, tireless and frequently impatient with the slower Latin pace, he seems the perfect model of that American whom a European once described as "born to make transatlantic calls and jump aboard international jets."

At night, he goes home to an elegant house or apartment in a foreign colony suburb. There, he spends his leisure hours complaining about the plumbing, trading cocktail invitations with his neighbors and arranging the foursome for his weekend of golf.

He may be a plant manager, an engineer, a financial analyst, a sales manager. And he is in Latin America as the proconsul entrusted by the great North American corporations to oversee the \$10 billion worth of private investment that they have put into the region.

To Latin Americans, he is the visible symbol of that massive U.S. economic presence. In the past, he usually seemed to them a remote figure walled off behind the suburban American enclaves he has created in their midst.

Now, half a century after he and others like him began arriving here in significant numbers, he is trying to change this image.

### Faces Threat

It is an effort born of necessity. With a strong new tide of nationalism sweeping through the region, U.S. business finds itself facing its greatest threat in a decade—one that poses dangers both for existing investments and for the future of U.S. interests in the Latin American marketplace.

As a result, there is great emphasis these days on developing what home office directives call "an effective message."

Basically, it reads like this:

American corporations are neither robbers nor exploiters but simply expanding organizations seeking new outlets for their products and services. They ask reasonable profits; in exchange, they offer Latin America the chance to develop and prosper, to acquire new industries and technology and to raise the living standards of its masses.

Among American firms with substantial interests in Latin America, the spreading of this message lately has become almost a creed. Nowhere is it talked about with more missionary fervor than by the Council for Latin America, an organization of more than 220 U.S. companies that has achieved almost institution status as the spokesman for American business on Hemispheric affairs.

### Rockefeller Statement

In its literature, the Council describes its purpose as "assisting the business community in discharging its environmental responsibilities in Latin America." What this means was spelled out in a recent speech by David Rockefeller, board chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank and the chairman of the Council.

"If the intent of the Council and its members can be expressed in a single sentence, it is that we are citizens first, and businessmen second," Rockefeller said. He then offered this ambitious summary of the organization's aims:

"The Council must seek acceptance of its convictions and its goals into the standard operating procedure of as many U.S. business enterprises in Latin America as possible. This means that we shall seek to have companies formally embrace, as a matter of routine, responsibilities for the success of the environment in which they operate fully as intensively as they accept responsibility for the success of their own operations.

"This acceptance, in turn, implies that company chief executives will consciously divide their time and energy between coping with environmental issues and problems of their own business; that labor relations executives will devote time not only to in-plant labor relations but also to the strengthening of the free labor movement as a whole; that executives charged with recruiting and training skilled personnel for management will also concern themselves with the health of the universities, the schools and the vocational training institutions . . ."

It is a very tall order. And many people familiar with the Latin scene are frankly skeptical about the ability of the U.S. business community within Latin America to make such changes.

Their skepticism is understandable when one considers the neanderthal attitudes of some "old Latin hands"—particularly those who grew up in such long-entrenched extractive industries as mining and petroleum. They are men whose thinking was conditioned by a Latin America ruled largely by old-style dictators.

In those days, the game was played according to simple if brutal rules: the dictators got their under-the-table pay-offs; in exchange they provided a firm hand to keep the natives in line, and the foreign companies were free to go about the business of mining or drilling for oil.

Despite David Rockefeller's warning that "business must attune its ear anew to the democratic clamor in Latin America," there is no question that most U.S. firms retain a marked preference for investment in the stable environments provided by traditionalist, strong-man regimes.

The two most prominent of these—the military dictatorships in Brazil and Argentina—have no more enthusiastic boosters than the U.S. Chambers of Commerce in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. And, of all the countries in South America, these are the two that business currently regards as offering the most "favorable investment climate."

### Other Factors

Nor are politics the only impediments to business's efforts to build a new image for itself.

One management consultant, referring to "an invisible barrier" which exists between Americans and the country in which they live and work, observed that the nationals are largely unseen at cocktail parties, dinners and golf matches hosted by Americans; that the Americans often isolate themselves from the country's cultural activities and that they frequently have a "Man Friday" to deal with national officials.

Eventually, the American is promoted back to the States, the acknowledged "company expert," who all too often extends his ignorance of the Hemisphere at home.

Yet, despite the prevalence of this pattern, corporate leaders remain optimistic that it can be broken by putting time and effort into creation of a new breed of managers and field executives. Increasingly, many firms are attempting to recruit new personnel from among young men who have served in Latin America as Peace Corps volunteers or who have made studies of the area's language, culture and history.

The president of one big corporation's Argentine subsidiary sees signs that the effort already is beginning to pay off. Says he:

"It's the rare American who's going to become a native. But there definitely is

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8



areas, it has demonstrated such activities add up to a good image, and therefore, to good business.

The Washington Post  
13 March 1969

The Latin  
Challenge-V

# 'Joint Ventures' Link Nationalists and U.S. Firms

Last of a Series

By John M. Goshko

Washington Post Foreign Service

BUENOS AIRES — The businessman set down his coffee cup, swung his desk chair slightly to the side and gestured toward the wide, tinted-glass windows looking out of his penthouse office. "You want to know about American investment?" he asked. "Well look out that window. From here, I could show you ten, perhaps fifteen buildings that have American companies inside."

The scene was Sao Paulo, the sprawling, booming hub of Brazil's financial and industrial world. But it could have been any other big city in Latin America.

The man speaking was a former cabinet minister who is now a director and consultant of several large Brazilian corporations. What he said applies to all the Latin countries where U.S. enterprise is at work.

"It's a big thing. Certainly, it's important to your country because you have a lot invested here. It's even more important to us, because our economies depend on it for much of the nourishment that makes them grow."

"But there is a question about whether it will continue to be important. If our development is to continue, its dependence on American capital, there will have to be some changes in your thinking. Your government will have to change, and the men who sit in Wall Street and run your corporations will have to change."

Increasingly, there is agreement that the \$10 billion U.S. investment, if it is to remain, must change its structure.

## Choice Is Risky

Such change entail risks that most corporate leaders would find hard to justify before their stockholders. Many may drop out, a trend already felt. It is alarming the Latin business and governmental leaders who see the region's hope for prosperity in capitalism and who believe that U.S. investment is the seed money on which much business activity depends.

Faced with a growing ultra-nationalist trend toward statism, the Latin entrepreneurial class is nervous about its own survival. As a result, there is a growing awareness of the need to reduce the frictions attendant upon foreign investment.

Guarantees often are mentioned as a means of calming investors' anxieties about political instability, inflation and other monetary ups and downs. But lack of financial resources and political inhibitions often restrict what Latin governments can offer.

Now there is talk about the U.S. government attempting to spur increased private investment by building incentives and guarantees into the U.S. foreign aid program.

Even assuming that this were done and that private U.S. business was willing to respond to these incentives, there is the question of whether Latin public opinion will allow foreign capital to continue with as much control over their economies as in the past.

An American firm may provide excellent wages and fringe benefits, pay heavy taxes and reinvest most of its profits. It may lend its resources to the solution of Yet, if ownership remains in U.S. hands and policy

direction comes from New York or Detroit, a firm will be regarded as controlling resources and profits that should belong to Latin Americans.

## Joint Ventures

What can U.S. business do to overcome this essentially political hostility? Among leaders of the Latin business and governmental establishment, an answer is "joint ventures"—under which foreign money works in partnership with Latin capital to establish or expand businesses.

Like their European counterparts, Latin American business leaders look with a mixture of fear and admiration at the managerial and technological superiority of U.S. business. They would like to apply this superiority to their own development, but they do not want to be dominated by it.

They think the joint venture would bring in American capital, technology and administrative technique yet would allow Latin business to share in the profits, acquire know-how and eventually gain control.

This last consideration is all-important. As the Colombian government says: "It cannot be allowed that the commanding heights of our economy remain forever under the control of outsiders."

The trouble is that most American firms are unconvinced that such a system holds out any special benefit to them. They argue that many businesses are not adaptable to the joint venture approach, and that a number already in effect have not worked.

As the U.S. divides control, especially when the American firm is making the

biggest contribution and is expected to be the minority member.

These arguments have focussed interest on two countries that have made joint ventures governmental policy. The approaches are known as "Mexicanization" and "Chileanization."

## Mexico Case

Mexico has bounced among various extremes in its efforts to take advantage of foreign investment yet be master in its own house.

During the revolutionary ferment of the 1920s and 30s, Mexico drove out most foreign interests that previously had controlled its natural resources, transportation, communications and utilities.

More recently, Mexican governments have followed a policy of pushing rapid industrialization on the theory that creation of a domestic capitalist class will eventually provide benefits for the entire country.

Since the end of World War II, Mexico has welcomed foreign investment. However, as one Mexican government official phrases it, the welcome is a provisional one that limits key sectors of the economy to the exclusive ownership of the state (petroleum, petrochemicals, electricity) or of Mexican nationals (banking, publishing, insurance).

Foreign investment is wanted where Mexican businessmen have neither the capital nor the technology to venture on their own. The Mexican government repeatedly has said it "prefers" foreign capital to associate in a minority equity position with Mexican capital.

In a number of fields—mining and smelting, secondary petrochemicals, food packaging—

greater bridging of cultures. Twenty years ago, if you went to a party given by or for everyone there would be American. Today maybe 40 to 50 per cent of the guests will be Latins; and there'll be as much Spanish spoken as English."

In addition to its efforts in the personnel area, American business also is spending more time on public relations activities, on becoming active in local trade associations and non-business groups and in lending its considerable resources to development problems.

American enterprise has also introduced some imaginative and effective innovations. These include organizations like ADELA, an investment company capitalized by contributions from U.S. and European firms that provides financial backing for Latin American businessmen trying to launch new enterprises.

In the five years it has been in business, ADELA has put money into everything from a packing house in Guayaquil, Ecuador, to a tourist hotel in Managua, Nicaragua.

#### A Rockefeller Project

And, there is the International Basic Economy Corp. (IBEC), started by Gov. Nelson Rockefeller, and dedicated to the proposition that private business can introduce new ventures to underdeveloped areas for a profit and for the good of the host country at the same time.

Although IBEC usually has lost money on its operations, it has had unquestionable impact on the countries where it does business. Among its accomplishments have been the revolutionizing of the growing and distribution of hybrid corn in Brazil and the introduction of the American-style supermarket to Venezuela and Peru.

Yet, in the long run, everyone agrees, the battle will be won or lost by individual companies and the impression that they create in the Latin community through their normal, day-to-day operations.

Historically, the picture presented by many American firms was one of oppressive bigness, of rapacious spoiling of natural resources, of hunger for excessive profits, of unwillingness to hire Latin Americans for responsible positions. From this came the present nationalistic demand for expropriation and curtailment of American interests.

To be sure, there are firms that have found the key to operating successfully in Latin America and whose names do not arouse widespread resentment.

#### Household Name

Sears Roebuck, for example, has become a household name in many areas of Latin America where it has introduced American mass-retailing methods. Sears has further ingratiated itself with Latins by making the bulk of its purchases from local factories (many of which did not exist before Sears came over here) and by introducing such benefits as stock and profit-sharing for its employees.

Perhaps no American firm has better adopted the formula for working successfully and harmoniously in the Latin environment than one of the oldest, W. R. Grace and Co., which began its corporate life more than 100 years ago with shipping activities in Peru.

Although Latin America now accounts for only a minority percentage of Grace's far-flung activities, it still has extensive holdings in several Latin countries. Nowhere is this more true than in Peru, the country where the firm was born and where Casa Grace (the name by which it is locally known) reaches into every corner of the national economy.

With its two enormous plantations at Cartavio and Paramonga, Grace is Peru's largest producer and processor of refined sugar. It manufactures 70 per cent of the paper products produced in Peru and is also the country's leading manufacturer of textiles, industrial chemicals and quality paints.

It is active in the production of fishmeal and the trading of ore concentrates. It makes candy, cookies and flour, gin, vodka and rum. It imports, sells and services machinery and appliances.

So extensive are its interests that there is hardly a Peruvian within the money economy who does not eat, wear or use something processed, manufactured or imported by Grace. With between 11,000 and 15,000 people on its payroll, Grace is Peru's second largest private employer and one of its biggest taxpayers.

#### Enjoys Immunity

Yet, in a country where nationalist feeling against foreign economic influence runs very deep, no one seems to harbor any resentments toward Casa Grace. Other American companies in Peru are constantly under attack but Grace continues to make money while staying out of trouble.

In large measure, this is because Grace did not follow the road to expansion taken by most of the early American firms in Latin America, namely the production of raw materials for marketing in the industrial areas of the world. Instead, it was the first to venture into the local manufacturing of consumer goods for distribution in the local market.

This early concern for and attention to the basic internal needs of the country quickly set Grace apart from most old-line foreign enterprises in South America. Where the others were thought of as plunderers, Grace developed the reputation for being "almost Peruvian" in its integration with the local economy.

Then too, over the years, Grace has developed a style of operating carefully designed to keep Peruvian sensibilities in mind.

In most of its ventures, Grace operates through a network of wholly or partly-owned subsidiaries whose connections to the parent company are not made known to the public. Thus, when a Peruvian buys a bottle of Wolfschmidt Vodka or a package of Arturo Field biscuits or a Gen-

eral Electric refrigerator, he generally is unaware that the article was made or imported by Grace.

#### Employs Nationals

The same muted tone about the company's size and foreign connections is evident in its employment policies. Although Peruvian law allows up to 20 per cent of all personnel in business enterprise to be foreigners, Grace's employment of non-Peruvians is less than one per cent of its total staff.

Moreover, Grace was among the first American firms in this part of the world to open the doors of top management to Latin Americans. The general manager of all Grace activities in the country is a Peruvian, as are most of the heads of the divisions under his control.

Officially, the company says it has no set policy other than to fill jobs with the best men available. However, some Grace executives say privately that there is an unwritten law decreeing that the top job in Peru (and in the other Latin countries where Grace operates) be filled by a national of the host country.

Similarly, most North Americans working for Grace in Peru are regarded as in training for higher responsibilities in the parent company's overall operations and are not competing with Peruvians. As a result, Grace has become known in Peruvian business circles as a firm that posts no barriers to the advancement of Peruvians to top jobs.

The few Americans that the company has assigned to Peru are expected to take active part in community affairs, to cultivate the friendship of Peruvians and have an extensive command of Spanish.

#### A Pace-Setter

Grace has also been among the pace setters in Peru regarding wage scales and fringe benefits it provides its workers.

Despite its sizable investment in this area, the company is sometimes criticized for taking an overly paternal approach that promotes what Latin sociologists call a "compound" or "stockade psychology." One critique of the brick-and-stone housing blocks built by Grace at its plantations contained this observation:

"One may question whether these plans have fully taken into consideration the problems of the agricultural and rural highland dweller who is in transition. To him, inside plumbing, concrete floor and glass windows may be much less important than land for a garden and shelter that is not a part of large block units."

Nevertheless, the company does seem willing to admit it has things to learn in the social welfare field. From time to time, it employs social anthropologists to evaluate its worker benefit projects and advise how they can be more effective. In one case, when its shortcomings, Grace was among the first foreign or domestic companies in Latin America to involve itself in social pro-

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8

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per cent ownership Mexican. In other areas, the government tries, through tax exemptions and liberal import permits, to induce foreign investors to accept a minority status. Almost all new investment enters on a "Mexicanized" basis.

The process is also applied to long-established, wholly owned foreign companies. Subsidiaries of American Smelting and Refining, Pan American Sulphur, Allis-Chalmers, Eaton, Yafe and Towne, Union Carbide, Kimberly-Clarke, and John Deere and Co. are now 51 per cent or more held by Mexican nationals.

The government makes exceptions when it wants a particular kind of investment badly enough and can attract it only by allowing the foreign company to retain control. This pragmatism is evident toward automobile and electronics manufacturers and toward agricultural firms willing to invest in backward rural areas.

Parent U.S. firms retaining full or majority ownership are Philco, General Electric, Admiral, Sears Roebuck, IBM, ITT, Monsanto, Anaconda, Ford, General Motors and Anderson Clayton. The last three are among the largest business operations in Mexico, each with annual sales in excess of \$80 million.

#### Some Opposition

Some foreign investors have found themselves unable to work amicably with Mexican partners, and others complain that the government went back on earlier understandings—by failing to provide promised benefits, or by forcing "Mexicanization" against their will.

Yet, Mexico's soaring rate of industrial growth—the most active in Latin America—indicates that the program has been a success. As Octaviano Campos Salas, the secretary of industry and commerce, points out: "No matter what may be said, we continue to have more than enough suitors."

This is because Mexico offers investors a number of conditions that cannot be matched elsewhere in Latin America: a large potential market, stability, no restrictions on the remittance of profits and next-door proximity to U.S. money is moving south of the Rio Grande at a record rate. During 1967

(complete figures are available), Mexico increased their total investment by \$100 million, compared with an increase of only \$62 million in 1966. The total now is \$1.34 billion.

The implication is that the key factor is the chance to make money. In exchange for that opportunity, American firms apparently are willing to favor Mexican partners with manufacturing licenses, technical assistance and capital—all for minority share of the new enterprise.

#### Chile's Alternative

At the opposite end of Latin America, the Chileanization program represents different ideas than "Mexicanization."

Chile's problem is that of a country that depends for its livelihood on a single natural resource—in Chile's case, copper—and that has lacked the capital or technology to exploit it alone.

By 1964, when President Eduardo Frei was elected, nationalistic resentment over the dominant role played by American mining companies made this a subject that could no longer be ignored.

To nationalize the copper industry and throw the American firms out, as extremists demanded, could have ruined the economy. Instead, Frei worked out Chileanization—a form of joint venture designed to bring the Chilean government into partnership with the mining companies.

The plan, which went into effect in 1967, called for the Chilean government to become part owner of the holdings of the three firms controlling 85 per cent of Chilean copper production—Kennecott, Anaconda and the Cerro Corp. The government became majority shareholder in some operations and a junior partner in others. The companies pledged big investments to expand existing mines and to join in new explorations. The aim was to double Chile's copper production to 1.2 million tons by 1972, making it the largest copper producer.

Payment to the companies for the shares taken by the government was to be made in U.S. dollars. The companies were to receive a

percentage of the tax base and guarantees against expropriation. Originally, the companies accepted "Chileanization" only because the alternative would have been nationalization. Now, partially because of the stability created by the agreement and partially because of high world market prices for copper, they are prospering as never before.

There is a growing feeling within the Chilean government that the agreement so far has not worked out as favorably for the state as had originally been hoped.

Many Chileans expect that in next year's presidential campaign parties on both the left and the right will pressure to abrogate the existing agreements—despite their ostensible guarantees—and either rewrite them or nationalize the industry.

Because of these unsettled issues, it is difficult to pass any judgments on Chileanization. At any rate, these are the two programs that growing numbers of Latins think should serve as the models for future foreign investment throughout the region—Mexicanization as the means of creating a modern, locally controlled industrial base and Chileanization as a way to reassert a country's control over its basic natural resources.

However, to get U.S. investors in the rest of Latin America to do what they have in Mexico, and Chile is something else again.

When the potential investor looks at countries whose stability falls short of the Mexican standard, his enthusiasm for joint venture is apt to decline.

Despite the reluctance, the feeling is growing among Latin Americans that U.S. investors really have no choice—if they want to remain in the area.

#### Private Panacea?

The risk can be reduced, they say, if the United States will move away from government-to-government lending and put part of its emphasis on incentives to private investment.

This is especially important, many students of the aid question say, at a time when the U.S. Congress is hostile to traditional foreign assistance methods. While the U.S. Government decides on future aid goals, many feel that the

Nixon Administration can buy time by putting forward and proposals designed to encourage increased private investment in Latin America.

One hears increased talk of such potential legislative ideas as tax relief on repatriated earnings from U.S. investments equal to the tax reductions originally offered by Latin governments to attract these investments. There is talk also of U.S. tax incentives for firms willing to make socially productive investment in underdeveloped areas and greatly expanded guarantees against expropriation.

But, in the view of many impartial observers, these ideas will not have much lasting impact unless American business changes its thinking sufficiently to make a broad new push in the direction of joint ventures. Moreover, they say, such joint ventures should be a real transitional process leading to the Latins becoming masters of their own economies.

These observers say that the continued timidity of American investors toward joint ventures is playing into the hands of their enemies. Joint ventures, they say, offer foreign investors their only real hope of turning aside nationalistic charges that the Latin American economy is in pawn to outsiders.

If these charges are not answered convincingly, they warn, the nationalists eventually will become strong enough to impose really harsh restraints on foreign capital. If that happens, the eventual result will be not only the loss of the sizeable stake that U.S. private enterprise has in Latin America but the end of the capitalist system in a region to which the United States has important geographic, strategic and business ties.



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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8

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SOME FRENCH COMMUNISTS RUFFLE THE PARTY FEATHERS

Some dissidents within the Communist Party of France (PCF) want an open break with the USSR and they have begun saying so in print by way of a new magazine, Politique Aujourd'hui (Politics Today), the first two issues of which appeared in January and February 1969. Editor of the new Politique is Paul Noirot, who until October 1968 ran the PCF-managed and financed Democratie Nouvelle -- an ineffective party mouthpiece, but one which gave party intellectuals a degree of editorial leeway.

Noirot is one of that group of communist and "left intellectuals" who realized, after the fanfare and flurry generated by the PCF's original strong condemnation of the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia had died down, that internally the party was unchanged. For Noirot and his fellow editors, confirmation came when Democratie Nouvelle was put out of business in October 1968 on the eve of issuing a 30,000-copy special edition devoted to Czechoslovakia. The PCF refused to approve the special edition and closed down Democratie Nouvelle, ostensibly because of "strained financial conditions," a semi-believable claim since the publication had been operating at a loss for several months. The "intellectuals" were even more dissatisfied with the lack of any internal party evolution as it was reaffirmed by the conservative PCF "doctrine" issued by the December 1968 French Party's Congress.

During December a flier for Politique Aujourd'hui, numéro zéro, advertised the imminent appearance of the journal's first issue and included an editorial statement-of-purpose (copy attached hereto) and a list of sponsors and associates, many of whom were well-known members of the PCF. By the time the first edition of Politique finally became available at Paris newsstands on 15 January, names of several "sponsors" given in numéro zéro had disappeared from the listing of communist backers.

An article in the 20 January Nouvel Observateur (attached hereto) hailed the new magazine as a "courageous venture"; the French Communist Party had the opposite view and dubbed it a "right-wing, revisionist rag." Public condemnation of the new magazine by the PCF Politburo was followed by threats of disciplinary action, including expulsion from Party cells, to be taken against the communist editors of Politique.

With the appearance of Politique's edition number two on 22 February, names of some communist party members who were editorial contributors to edition number one, had disappeared from the masthead. Some more intrepid party members, on the other hand, turned up as new contributors in the second edition.

The story of the heavy-handed tactics used by the PCF to put an end to this "courageous venture" emerges clearly from the attached newspaper clips from the PCF-controlled l'Humanité and the widely circulated and respected Paris Le Monde. That this maverick French Communist journal has also ruffled a few Soviet feathers is reflected in an article, published 26 February

(attached hereto) in Literary Gazette, by Novosti's Paris correspondent who claimed that the creators of Politique were "putting forward in concealed from anti-Marxist ideas" which represent a "movement toward essentially petit bourgeois positions."

The controversy over Politique, which has been bubbling over in the French press, has occasioned little reaction outside of France. The Italian press took note of the publication in Politique, edition number two, of an article by the Italian Communist Party (PCI) Politburo member and spokesman, Pietro Ingrao, and reported a rumor coming from several West European capitals that "good communists" were receiving strongly worded warnings to steer clear of Noirot, his associates, and especially of Politique Aujourd'hui.

## Communistes

### Le pari d'une revue

□ Tirer à 30 000 exemplaires le premier numéro d'une revue témoigne en France d'un assez beau courage. L'équipe qui vient de lancer « Politique » (1) a jugé que l'importance de son projet exigeait cette audace. Il y aura bien, estiment ses animateurs, 30 000 personnes dans ce pays pour s'intéresser à un libre dialogue entre communistes et non communistes.

L'initiative, on s'en doute, a déplu à la direction du P.C. Celle-ci n'est pas hostile, au principe du dialogue mais elle ne pense pas qu'il puisse être totalement libre. Les communistes, dit-elle, doivent développer les positions de leur parti et non des positions personnelles. Or le texte de présentation de la revue insiste sur le fait que des « brassages » s'opèrent actuellement au sein de la gauche française, que de « nouveaux partages » s'y dessinent et que les nouvelles lignes de clivage « passent souvent à l'intérieur des organisations ». Constatations de bon sens mais qui ne satisfont évidemment pas les hommes du bureau politique.

Ceux-ci ont relevé soigneusement les noms des intellectuels communistes qui figurent dans le comité de soutien de la revue (ils sont près de 90 sur 184 membres de ce comité). A chacun d'entre eux, il a été demandé de retirer sa signature. Deux seulement ont accepté de le faire. La direction du Parti a subi ainsi un échec. Mais l'affaire n'est pas close. Le contenu de ce premier numéro de « Politique » va être analysé avec un soin particulier.

L'unique article consacré aux événements de politique intérieure ne fera certainement pas problème. Ecrit par Fernand Nicolon — l'un des bons économistes du P.C. —, il a pour thème « le Franc et les impasses du gaullisme ». Il sera également difficile de contester les textes et les documents consacrés à la Tchécoslovaquie. La politique de libéralisation suivie de janvier à août 1968 y est défendue sans équivoque et l'invasion soviétique condamnée sans appel. Mais le P.C. français n'a-t-il pas lui-même témoigné officiellement

de sa sympathie à l'égard de la ligne Dubcek et n'a-t-il pas regretté l'intervention de l'U.R.S.S. ? Il est vrai qu'il n'est pas prêt à tirer toutes les leçons de l'expérience tchécoslovaque et à accepter les véritables implications des réformes amorcées. Mais comme les textes publiés par « Politique » évoquent ce qui s'est passé et non ce qui aurait pu se produire si l'expérience n'avait pas été brutalement arrêtée, il n'y a pas là matière à procès.

**Inculpation...** Aussi est-ce vraisemblablement le très intéressant débat de politique étrangère mené par Philippe Devillers, André Fontaine, Albert-Paul Lentin et Paul Noirot qui retiendra toute l'attention des censeurs du P.C. Une phrase de Fontaine en résume l'esprit : « Il y a des facteurs de désagrégation dans les deux empires (le soviétique et l'américain) ; il y a deux pommes face à face, et un gros ver dans chacune : le problème est de savoir celle qui sera mangée la première. » Donc on parlera aussi longuement des contradictions des camps socialistes que de celles de l'impérialisme.

« Je pense, a dit notamment Paul Noirot (rédacteur en chef de « Politique »), que les causes profondes qui ont amené le « printemps de Prague » subsistent et que nous vivrons probablement d'autres événements dans le monde socialiste qui amèneront des révisions déchirantes. Je crois que l'on peut conserver l'espoir — sinon même avoir la certitude parce que des forces immenses au sein des peuples soviétiques jouent aujourd'hui dans le sens du progrès — que le jour viendra où ces peuples prendront conscience que la politique actuellement suivie en leur nom conduit en fin de compte à un acquiescement total au partage du monde entre super-puissances et à la renonciation de fait à une lutte véritable pour le socialisme à l'échelle de la planète. » Cette condamnation par un communiste de tout ce que représente et défend aujourd'hui la bureaucratie soviétique pourrait évidemment fournir prétexte à une « inculpation » (c'est-à-dire à l'ouverture d'une procédure disciplinaire). Encore faudrait-il que les procureurs soient assurés eux-mêmes de leurs propres convictions et qu'ils se résignent à couper les ponts entre le Parti et les hommes de gauche non communistes qui participent à l'expérience de « Politique » (2).

Cette participation constitue l'un des aspects essentiels de l'expérience. Les communistes qui sont à son origine s'interdisent ainsi de transformer la revue en organe de tendance. Ils se mettent d'autre part dans l'obligation de répondre à des questions qu'on ne peut encore soulever dans le parti. A la condition bien entendu que leurs partenaires jouent le jeu à fond et ne se contentent pas d'être les témoins discrets et bienveillants d'une évolution dont dépend, pour une large part, l'avenir de la gauche française.

GILLES MARTINET

CPYRGHT

# POLITIQUE

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*L'abondance des matières nous a contraints à ajourner plusieurs articles et études prévus pour ce numéro et portant notamment sur la Tchécoslovaquie et les problèmes du socialisme, ainsi que sur la littérature soviétique contemporaine (Cl. Frioux).*

*Nos lecteurs les trouveront dans le numéro 2, avec une étude de B. Dort sur le théâtre politique, une analyse de notre correspondant aux États-Unis, A. Kopkind, sur « les relations spéciales U.S.A.-G.-B. », une discussion avec S. Ikoku sur la guerre du Biafra, de premières réflexions sur la situation universitaire, etc.*

*Nous tenons à remercier ici la Galerie du Dragon qui nous aimablement autorisés à reproduire certaines des affiches qu'elle avait exposées en juin dernier.*

POLITIQUE AUJOURD'HUI  
January 1969

(Excerpts)

ABOUT "POLITIQUE"

Our magazine would like to be placed where experiences and analyses confront each other. Not only to establish better the right to information, but also because a free and loyal confrontation of facts and of theories is indispensable to the serious exploration of convergent conditions on which ultimately depend the weakening and defeat of imperialism, the victory of socialism: the research of these objectives is the only "line" Politique will follow..

...One thing is certain in any case, equally for those among us--the majority--who espouse Marxism as for the others: no mutual understanding is assured; no accord pre-established.

...Not only do we not pretend to substitute ourselves for the organizations--parties, unions, divers groups--which structure the French left, but our objective and our nature forbids us to engage with them in a certain type of polemic.

...We appeal not only to our readers' imaginations, but for their material support. That Politique must enjoy total independence from all States or foreign powers goes without saying; from all financial groups as well; from all political parties and all movements as such: Politique is a commitment made by each member of the editorial committee...

POLITIQUE AUJOURD'HUI  
January 1969

CPYRGHT

**SUR « POLITIQUE »**

Pourquoi une nouvelle revue ? Pourquoi cette nouvelle revue ?

Si le comité de rédaction de *Politique* a confiance dans son entreprise, si tant de militants venus d'horizons divers la soutiennent, c'est qu'à leurs yeux, aux nôtres, malgré le nombre et la diversité des publications qui, aujourd'hui, se réclament du socialisme, une exigence nouvelle s'est fait jour, lentement au cours des dernières années, avec force depuis quelques mois. Nous voulons y répondre.

Aux origines de *Politique*, une interrogation fondamentale née de notre époque multiple, de ses luttes, de ses victoires, de ses tragédies, de ses espérances : comment assurer la convergence des combats pour la libération des hommes, la convergence des luttes révolutionnaires, des perspectives socialistes, dans un monde où les discordances semblent parfois prendre le pas sur les rencontres ?

Que le socialisme, pour emporter l'adhésion dans les pays industriellement avancés, où la classe ouvrière joue depuis longtemps un rôle dirigeant dans les combats révolutionnaires, doive tenir compte de tout un acquis culturel et politique, s'appuyer sur l'actuelle révolution scientifique et technique, imaginer un art de vivre pour les collectivités urbanisées et se montrer en même temps à chaque instant disponible devant l'événement, voilà une de nos certitudes.

Mais il nous importe tout autant de savoir qu'en Asie, en Afrique, en Amérique latine, la voie vers le socialisme passe souvent par les luttes agraires

et toujours par la conquête d'une pleine indépendance nationale. Les armes à la main, une solidarité active. Et nous entendons suivre de près les expériences des peuples qui, au prix d'un immense effort, ont, à des degrés divers et sous des formes diverses, jeté les bases du socialisme, où apparaissent aujourd'hui d'intéressantes et nouvelles recherches et où se posent de nouveaux problèmes.

La rupture entre la majorité des pays socialistes et la Chine, le massacre de quelque cinq cent mille Indonésiens, la guerre des Six jours, le drame récent de la Tchécoslovaquie, autant de sujets d'inquiétude, de déchirement parfois. Mais le combat exemplaire du peuple vietnamien, l'explosion de Mai en France, l'expérience tchèque inaugurée en janvier, autant de raisons, certes inégales, d'espérer, de réfléchir et d'agir. Une chose est certaine en tout cas, aussi bien pour ceux d'entre nous — la plupart — qui se réclament du marxisme, que pour les autres : aucune rencontre n'est assurée, aucun accord préétabli.

Notre revue voudrait être un des lieux où seront confrontées ces expériences, ces analyses. Non seulement pour mieux établir le droit à l'information, mais parce qu'une confrontation libre et loyale des faits et des théories est indispensable pour que puissent être sérieusement explorées les conditions d'une convergence dont dépendent finalement l'affaiblissement, la défaite de l'impérialisme, la victoire du socialisme : la recherche de ces objectifs est la seule « ligne » que suivra *Politique* ; elle ne saurait viser en aucune façon à susciter un nouveau mouvement.

Qui peut observer aujourd'hui, d'ailleurs, l'opinion française sans être frappé par les brassages qui s'y opèrent, les nouveaux partages qui s'y dessinent ? Alors qu'une lente mais puissante lame de fond porte vers la mise en question de la société existante, vers la révolution, vers le socialisme, les travailleurs, les étudiants, les intellectuels, l'événement les rapproche selon des lignes parfois mal prévisibles et qui passent souvent à l'intérieur des organisations ; ainsi en fut-il en mai. Ce sont pour nous des raisons supplémentaires de croire qu'il est possible de nous opposer sans nous diviser et, à travers l'exposé de nos divergences, de clarifier nos concepts et nos analyses, bref de faire progresser, selon nos moyens, la réflexion sur le socialisme.

Ce qui exige aussi à nos yeux les confrontations les moins exclusives, les analyses théoriques les plus diverses, c'est l'état même de la connaissance, de nos connaissances. Notre propre vocation est en question : à l'intérieur du « travailleur collectif » dont parlaient Marx et Gramsci, quelles sont les fonctions des intellectuels — écrivains, scientifiques, artistes, cadres et ingénieurs de l'industrie —, à quels niveaux se situe leur intervention ? Et quelles liaisons s'établissent entre les traditions, les orientations, les novations culturelles, et la politique au sens plein, qui donne son nom à notre revue : nous savons bien que celle-ci n'est pas, comme on voudrait nous le faire croire, le lieu privilégié de conflits sans issue.

De telles questions renvoient aussitôt à d'autres, auxquelles notre temps nous somme de chercher réponse : comment s'explique l'actuelle acuité du « conflit de générations » et quel rôle réel joue-t-il par rapport aux processus socio-économiques fondamentaux, aux conflits de classe ? Comment, de son côté, le système de relations économiques entre pays industriels riches et pays affamés s'y rattache-t-il ? La libération de l'homme suppose la satisfaction de ses besoins élémentaires. Si l'abondance ne règne pas pour tous dans les sociétés d'abondance, que dire de celle où les hommes ne maîtrisent encore ni les forces de la nature, ni leurs propres forces sociales ? Et où sont les responsables ?

Plus profondément il s'agit de dévoiler ce qui est souvent caché ou inconscient. Il nous importe par exemple de savoir quels sont les rapports et les influences réciproques du mode de production et de l'idéologie dominante, et de pouvoir opérer une critique sérieuse de la vie quotidienne. La même attention critique doit être appliquée aux idéologies socialistes : leurs bases sociales, les séquelles du passé et ses résurgences, les moyens par lesquels celles-ci sont véhiculées. Et du « black power » au mouvement de Mai, il nous faut saisir les aspects novateurs. Tout cela appelle notre réflexion commune.

Celle-ci s'exercera aussi sur des problèmes plus classiquement « politiques » : comment les groupes de pression influencent-ils le pouvoir ? Où sont les centres de décision réels dans l'entreprise, dans la nation, dans le monde, et par quels processus, dans des régimes différents, parviennent-ils à leurs fins ? La « crise du franc » vient-elle de nouvelles structures ou de la concurrence des grands intérêts

qu'il se vante de sa force et de son indépendance. Mais les voies sont souvent plus subtiles et il importe de les connaître si l'on veut donner un contenu au mot « révolution ». Si l'on veut aussi aborder sérieusement la question cruciale de la guerre et de la paix et la signification actuelle de la coexistence pacifique.

Quelles sont les causes et les effets de la ruineuse et démentielle course aux armements ? Quelles sont les conséquences des interventions discrètes ou brutales de l'impérialisme dans l'évolution intérieure des peuples, comme on l'a vu à Saint-Domingue, en Grèce, au Vietnam ? Enfin et surtout une transformation socialiste de notre société française, de notre temps, est-elle possible et quelles pourraient en être les conditions ?

Pour répondre à ces exigences, nous entendons faire large la part d'une information aussi complète et aussi critique que possible. Et nous voulons ouvrir la revue aux controverses les plus approfondies, mais non pas les plus quotidiennes : non seulement — c'est l'évidence — nous ne prétendons pas nous substituer aux organisations — partis, syndicats, groupements divers — que structurent la gauche française, mais notre objectif même et notre nature nous interdisent de conduire avec elles toute espèce de polémique ; s'efforcer de connaître et librement débattre, ce n'est pas opérer les choix qu'impose chaque jour l'action politique. Il reste que la réalisation matérielle de ces débats n'est pas aisée si nous voulons éviter les amalgames et les modes divers de l'éclectisme. Un procédé presque traditionnel déjà : la table ronde. Un autre, moins répandu : le commentaire critique en marge — au sens littéral du terme — d'une analyse théorique ou d'un important document. Que l'imagination de nos lecteurs nous vienne aussi en aide ! Qu'ils abandonnent le rôle de l'inconnu fidèle pour se faire associés actifs !

Nous ne faisons pas appel à leur seule imagination, mais à leur soutien matériel. *Politique* doit en effet jouir d'une indépendance financière totale : à l'égard de tout État ou pouvoir, cela va de soi ; à l'égard de tout groupe financier aussi ; à l'égard enfin de tout parti politique et de tout mouvement en tant que tel : il s'agit ici d'un engagement pris par chaque membre du comité de rédaction.

Si certains peuples sont parvenus, au prix de luttes souvent héroïques, toujours difficiles, à édifier dans leurs pays des infrastructures socialistes encore en évolution, il n'existe pas d'exemple d'une société pleinement socialiste. Puisse *Politique* contribuer à son élaboration scientifique et pratique ! Elle ne le pourra qu'avec la coopération de tous ceux qui pensent qu'on ne peut agir sans savoir, sans s'informer librement et sans approfondir sa réflexion par la controverse.

P.S. — A la demande de certains des lecteurs de notre numéro zéro, nous avons précisé quelques formulations du texte initial.



L'HUMANITE, Paris  
18 January 1969

CONCERNING A NEW MAGAZINE

A new magazine, POLITICS TODAY [POLITIQUE AUJOURD'HUI], has just appeared. The communists who have established it against party opinion and those participating are, with certain others, among some of the party's declared enemies. Therefore one must not be surprised if, as soon as the first edition appears, one finds that it contains articles whose aim it is to attack party unity. Thus the leadership role of the communist party and the theoretical, political, and organizational principles which form the basis of its activity are called into question. The accumulation of criticism and attacks against the Soviet Union in several articles result in fact in the expression of an anti-Soviet line, which can only weaken the necessary solidarity of the communist parties against imperialism. In the name of so-called "permanent research" another political line is substituted for the necessary investigation of party principles and policy and for the immediate demands of the struggle against Gaullist power.

The PCF has spoken out for and continues to speak out for a real dialog, but the dialog must be based on the clear confrontation of mutual positions, which supposes that communist opinion is held by communists who approve and express their party's policy. Thus it is possible to begin a dialog that is not an end in itself but helps to gather democratic forces together by striving to clarify common objectives at every stage.

The PCF supports constant investigation of theoretical research in order always to give a better answer to the new questions that life poses and to make a creative contribution to the development of Marxist-Leninist theory. Paying special attention to the scientific and technical revolution that deepened the contradictions in capitalism, it considers the participation of intellectuals--allied to the working class--in political and social struggles as a fundamental factor in building a democratic and social future.

The review POLITICS TODAY is inspired by very different preoccupations. In short, it proposes a rightwing revisionist line which is opposed to the policy that has just been reaffirmed and enhanced by the manifesto adopted by the Central Committee at Champigny.

The Political Bureau considers the participation of communist militants in this magazine as a contradiction of the party's general effort to gather together all progressive forces. It calls on communists to continue the struggle against rightwing and leftwing revisionism and to make known the answers proposed by the PCF to the aspirations of manual and mental workers, especially by insuring at the present time the widest dissemination of the ideas contained in the Central Committee manifesto. The communist will thus contribute to working class unity and to gathering together the democratic forces that must find their expression in cooperation between the communist party and all parties and other democratic formations for an advanced democracy and a socialist France.

## A propos d'une nouvelle revue

### DECLARATION du Bureau Politique du Parti Communiste Français

CPYRGHT

UNE nouvelle revue, « Politique aujourd'hui », vient de paraître. Les communistes qui l'ont fondée contre l'avis du Parti et ceux qui y participent s'y retrouvent avec, entre autres, certains adversaires déclarés du Parti.

Dès lors, il ne faut pas s'étonner si, dès le premier numéro, on y trouve des articles qui visent à porter atteinte à l'unité du Parti. Ainsi, le rôle d'avant-garde du Parti Communiste et les principes théoriques, politiques et d'organisation qui fondent son activité, y sont mis en cause. L'accumulation dans plusieurs articles de critiques et d'attaques contre l'Union Soviétique aboutit en fait à l'expression d'une ligne antisoviétique qui ne peut qu'affaiblir la nécessaire solidarité des Partis Communistes contre l'impérialisme. C'est au nom d'une prétendue « recherche permanente » qu'on substitue une autre ligne politique à l'approfondissement nécessaire des principes et de la politique du Parti comme aux exigences immédiates de la lutte contre le pouvoir gaulliste.

LE Parti Communiste Français s'est affirmé et s'affirme pour un dialogue véritable. Mais le dialogue doit être fondé sur la claire confrontation des positions réciproques, ce qui suppose que l'opinion communiste soit soutenue par des communistes qui approuvent et expriment la politique de leur Parti. Ainsi, peut s'instaurer un dialogue qui n'a pas sa fin en lui-même, mais qui aide au rassemblement des forces démocratiques en s'efforçant à chaque étape de dégager des objectifs communs.

Le Parti Communiste Français soutient un constant approfondissement de la recherche théorique afin de toujours mieux répondre aux questions nouvelles posées par la vie et d'apporter une contribution créatrice au développement de la théorie marxiste-léniniste.

Attentif notamment à la révolution scientifique et technique qui approfondit les contradictions du capitalisme, il considère la participation des intellectuels aux luttes politiques et sociales, en alliance avec la classe ouvrière, comme une question capitale pour la construction d'un avenir démocratique et socialiste.

LA revue « Politique aujourd'hui » s'inspire de préoccupations bien différentes. Elle propose en définitive une ligne révisionniste de droite, opposée à la politique que vient de réaffirmer en l'enrichissant le Manifeste adopté par le Comité Central à Champigny.

Le Bureau Politique considère la participation de militants communistes à cette revue comme contredisant l'effort général du Parti pour le rassemblement de toutes les forces de progrès. Il appelle les communistes à poursuivre la lutte contre les révisionnismes de droite comme de gauche et à faire connaître les réponses que propose le Parti Communiste Français aux aspirations des travailleurs manuels et intellectuels, notamment en assurant actuellement la plus large diffusion aux idées contenues dans le Manifeste du Comité Central.

Ils contribueront ainsi à l'unité de la classe ouvrière et au rassemblement des forces démocratiques qui doivent trouver leur expression dans la coopération du Parti Communiste avec l'ensemble des partis et autres formations démocratiques pour une démocratie avancée et pour une France socialiste.

Le Bureau Politique du Parti  
Communiste Français.

Paris, le 17 janvier 1969.

LE MONDE, Paris

22 January 1969

"Over The Czechoslovakian Experience

There is more than a misunderstanding between the P.C.F.  
and the magazine 'Politique Aujourd'hui'"

Although it maintained from the very first a desire for independence with regard to all political formations and a refusal to "conduct any kind of polemics", the journal Politique Aujourd'hui is going from difficulty to difficulty with the CP (Le Monde, 22-23 December 1968 and 19-20 January 1969). The growing animosity of the PCF [Parti Communiste Francais; French Communist Party] is obviously due to the fact that the editor of the new publication, Mr. Paul Noirot, belongs to the party, as do 19 of the 38 members of the editorial committee and more than 60 of the 183 who signed the "inaugural" manifesto of Politique Aujourd'hui. However, other factors are involved.

The first issue of the journal, completely and fundamentally in favor of the Czechoslovakian attempt at democracy, includes essays which obviously could only serve to reinforce the distrust and hostility of the leaders of the CP. The legal condemnation of Soviet military intervention expressed by Mr. Georges Fischer, director of research of the CNRS [Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; National Center of Scientific Research] is increased and aggravated by the reprinting of three articles which Rude Pravo, the main organ of the Czechoslovakian party, had published in July, 1968, and which absolutely question the conception of democratic centralization held by the PCF.

The authors of these articles speak in a manner that would please Mr. Guy Mollet when they declare that "a socialism without democracy and its constant strengthening is not socialism," and they propose abandoning a key dogma when they write:

"Groups within the party holding differing opinions can no longer, in the movement to crystallize and reconcile various points of view, be designated as factions which should be eliminated. The right should be granted to the minority to aim at becoming the majority by working openly within the Party. Even though the relegating of the periphery of party life may be justified in the midst of a bitter class struggle, it paralyzes the development of ideas at a time when the fundamental task of the party is research into new and unknown roads, into socialist development and the unification of socialist interests at all social levels. It is not unity in all things and at all cost, but the capacity for action, that is the main demand of the party."

It is very obvious that after having publicly censured Mr. Roger Garaudy, who was guilty of expressing a similar point of view in much more moderate terms, the CP could not do less than accuse the leaders

of a publication which echoes such unorthodox propositions of following a "right-wing revisionist line."

The fact that the political bureau of the party itself should insist on being involved -- which does not exclude the intervention of the cells to which the Communists responsible for Politique Aujourd'hui belong -- is enough to prove the considerable importance with which this affair is viewed.

While the journal has a stated objective to successively present opposing points of view on various problems, the PCF continues to treat Mr. Paul Noirot as though he were still the editor of Democratie Nouvelle, a monthly strongly dependent on the party.<sup>1</sup> It identifies those responsible for Politique Aujourd'hui with what they publish.

There is here more than a misunderstanding. It is a new and interesting episode in the old debate between those who wish to expose a variety of thoughts to leftist militants, particularly those of the PCF, and those who persist in not wishing to pass on to them anything but the proven and previously controlled "truths."

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<sup>1</sup>The journal Democratie Nouvelle ceased publication in October 1968; its disappearance was officially explained by "the severe financial difficulties which are those of the democratic press."

LE MONDE, Paris  
22 January 1969

"Mr. Roland Leroy: The magazine aspires to  
attain party unity"

Tuesday's L'Humanite published the text of the speech given Sunday in Pantin by Mr. Roland Leroy, a member of the CP Secretariat, on the occasion of the national study days concerned with "the work of the Communists among engineers, officials and technicians." Mr. Leroy was highly satisfied with the "individual and collective work" that had gone into preparing these work days, and he stated:

"This preparation constituted in itself an answer to those who maintain that the party will become inflexible, unfit for dealing with new problems, that its theoretical research will become ineffectual, and that the confrontation of ideas will be impossible. It is with such reasons that the founders of the journal Politique Aujourd'hui attempted to justify the collecting of declared adversaries of the party, among them Trotskyists and those barred from the party, with a certain number of other intellectuals, some of them Communists. Some of this latter group are well aware of what they are doing. In May-June they attacked the party policy from the left, after having for years maintained revisionist positions of the right or the left, depending upon the circumstances. Today they are again taking part in a right-wing revisionist enterprise which is aimed at damaging the unity of the party and questioning its theoretical, ideological, political and organizational principles. I think that these people, few in number, will be reminded by their cells that we have never forced anyone to be a member of the party and that if they claim liberty to attack the party with complete independence from it, they can be given that freedom and that independence. There are other comrades among those who signed the Manifesto who, along with non-Communists, may think that it is necessary to provoke dialogue and theoretical research and who believe they have found through this journal a means of doing this. We are, and we have constantly stated this, in favor of dialogue. But in order for there to be dialogue, certain conditions must exist. To compare the party's politics and theory with other points of view obviously implies an initial expression of the policy of the party itself. If such a possibility existed, we would not be opposed to founding, as a party, openly and with other partners, a journal for dialogue aimed at the continuing search for common objectives. It is possible for communist intellectuals to actively participate, within the party, in the free exchange of ideas which the party encourages and promotes. These comrades should therefore understand, as the Political Bureau said the day before yesterday, that participation in this journal is contradictory to the party's common endeavor to gather all the forces of progress."

CPYRGHT

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LE MONDE

22 January 1969

## A PROPOS DE L'EXPERIENCE TCHÉCOSLOVAQUE

## Il y a plus qu'un malentendu entre le P.C.F. et la revue « Politique aujourd'hui »

Bien qu'elle ait affirmé d'emblée son désir d'indépendance à l'égard de toutes les formations politiques et son refus de « conduire avec elle toute espèce de polémique », la revue « Politique aujourd'hui » va de difficulté en difficulté avec le parti communiste (« le Monde » des 22-23 décembre 1968 et des 19-20 janvier 1969).

L'animosité croissante du P.C.F. tient évidemment au fait que le rédacteur en chef de la publication nouvelle, M. Paul Noirot, appartient au parti, de même que 19 des 38 membres du comité de rédaction et vingt-trois signataires du manifeste « inaugural » de « Politique aujourd'hui », mais d'autres facteurs entrent en ligne de compte.

Le premier numéro de la revue, totalement et fondamentalement favorable à l'expérience de démocratisation tchécoslovaque, comporte des études qui ne pouvaient, de toute évidence, que renforcer la méfiance et l'hostilité des dirigeants du parti communiste. La condamnation juridique de l'intervention militaire soviétique formulée par M. Georges Fischer, directeur de recherches au C.N.R.S., se double, en effet, et s'aggrave de la reproduction de trois articles que le *Hude Pravo*, organe central du parti tchécoslovaque, avait publiés en juillet 1968 et qui remettent entièrement en cause la conception qu'a le P.C.F. du centralisme démocratique.

Les auteurs de ces articles tiennent un langage que ne réprouverait pas M. Guy Mollet lorsqu'ils affirment qu'« un socialisme sans la démocratie et son approfondissement constant n'est pas le socialisme », et ils proposent l'abandon d'un dogme essentiel lorsqu'ils écrivent :

« Les groupes d'opinions différentes à l'intérieur du parti ne peuvent plus, dans le mouvement de cristallisation et de rapprochement des points de vue, être désignés comme des fractions qui doivent être éliminées. Le droit doit être reconnu à la minorité de s'efforcer de tendre, sous les yeux du parti, à devenir la majorité. Si repousser en fait les débats d'idées à la périphérie de la vie du parti peut avoir une justification au milieu d'une lutte de classe, cela paralyse le développement des idées dans une période où la recherche de voies nouvelles, inconnues, du développement social est la tâche fondamentale du parti... Ce n'est pas l'unité en tout et à tout prix, mais l'aptitude à l'action qui est l'exigence fondamentale du parti. »

Il est bien évident qu'après avoir publiquement blâmé M. Roger Garaudy, coupable d'avoir exprimé un point de vue analogue dans des termes beaucoup plus mesurés, le parti communiste ne pouvait moins faire que d'accuser de suivre une « ligne révisionniste de droite » les dirigeants d'une publication qui fait écho à des propositions aussi peu orthodoxes.

Le fait que le bureau politique du parti ait tenu à se saisir lui-même de cette affaire — ce qui n'exclut pas l'intervention des cellules auxquelles appartiennent les responsables communistes de « Politique aujourd'hui » — suffit à prouver l'importance qu'il lui donne, et qui, en effet, n'est pas négligeable.

Alors que la revue s'est donné pour objectif de présenter successivement des points de vue contradictoires sur divers problèmes, le P.C.F. continue de traiter M. Paul Noirot comme s'il était toujours le rédacteur en chef de *Démocratie nouvelle*, mensuel étroitement dépendant du parti (1). Il identifie les responsables de « Politique aujourd'hui » à ce qu'ils publient.

Il y a là beaucoup plus qu'un malentendu. C'est un nouvel et intéressant épisode du vieux débat entre ceux qui veulent soumettre des éléments de réflexion aux militants de gauche, et notamment à ceux du P.C.F., et ceux qui persistent à ne vouloir leur transmettre que des « vérités » éprouvées et préalablement contrôlées.

RAYMOND BARRILLON.

(1) La revue *Démocratie nouvelle* avait cessé de paraître au mois d'octobre 1968 ; sa disparition était officiellement expliquée par « les lourdes difficultés financières qui sont celles de la presse démocratique ».

CPYRGHT

## M. Roland Leroy : la revue vise à atteindre l'unité du parti

L'Humanité de mardi publie le texte du discours prononcé dimanche à Pantin par M. Roland Leroy, membre du secrétariat du parti communiste. A l'occasion des Journées nationales d'études sur « le travail des communistes parmi les ingénieurs cadres et techniciens ».

M. Leroy s'est félicité du « travail spécifique et collectif » qui avait permis de préparer ces Journées, et il a déclaré :

« Cette préparation constitue en elle-même une réponse à ceux qui prétendent que le parti serait sclérosé, incapable d'aborder les problèmes nouveaux, que la recherche théorique y serait stérilisée, que la confrontation d'idées y serait impossible. C'est avec de telles raisons que les fondateurs de la revue *Politique aujourd'hui* essaient de justifier le rassemblement d'adversaires déclarés du parti parmi lesquels des trotskystes, des exclus du parti, avec un certain nombre d'autres intellectuels parmi lesquels des communistes. Certains de ces derniers savent très bien ce qu'ils font. Ils avaient attaqué de gauche la politique du parti en mai-juin, après avoir soutenu depuis des années des positions révisionnistes de droite ou de gauche suivant les circonstances. Ils participent aujourd'hui à nouveau à une entreprise révisionniste de droite qui vise à atteindre l'unité du parti et à remettre en cause ses principes théoriques, idéologiques, politiques et d'organisation. A ceux-là, qui sont peu nombreux, je pense que leurs cellules rappelleront que nous n'avons jamais obligé personne à être membre du parti et s'ils revendiquent la liberté de combattre le parti en toute indépendance à son égard, on pourra leur donner cette liberté et cette indépendance. Il est parmi les signataires d'autres camarades qui, avec des non-communistes, peuvent penser qu'il est nécessaire de susciter le dialogue et la recherche théorique et qui croient avoir trouvé là un moyen de le faire. Nous sommes, nous l'avons toujours dit, pour le dialogue. Mais pour qu'il y ait dialogue, il faut qu'en existent les conditions. Confronter la politique du parti et sa théorie à d'autres opinions, cela suppose évidemment d'abord d'exprimer la politique du parti lui-même. Si la possibilité n'existait nous n'aurions pas d'opposition à fonder, comme parti, et ouvertement, avec d'autres partenaires, une revue de dialogue destinée à la recherche constante d'objectifs communs. Il y a, avec le parti, pour tous les intellectuels communistes, la possibilité de participer activement à la libre recherche théorique que le parti encourage et stimule. Que ces camarades comprennent donc que, comme l'a dit le bureau politique avant-hier, la participation à la recherche théorique est l'un des moyens de réunir et d'harmoniser de toutes les forces de progrès. »

LE MONDE, Paris,  
30 January 1969

"Fifteen Editors of 'Politique Aujourd'hui'  
Denounce the 'Summary Accusations' by the Communist Party"

Responsible editors of the review Politique Aujourd'hui appear determined to reply to the attacks launched against them by the CP, which, after a warning on 20 December 1968, had accused them of "proposing a rightist revisionist line," according to a Politburo declaration of 17 January.

For 15 non-Communist members of the editorial board, who feel that the review is not the exclusive property of their militant French CP colleagues, have just addressed to the politburo an "open letter" in which they assess in vigorous terms the condemnation of 17 January.

Will this initiative expose the Communist editors of "Politics Today" to disciplinary sanctions, as was intimated by Mr. Roland Leroy, a member of the French CP secretariat, in his speech of 20 January (see Le Monde, 22 January)?

That possibility cannot be dismissed, but as a first reaction, party leaders seem to be making great efforts to rally the dissident editors to the fold of politburo orthodoxy.

In any case, the incident seems to presage new and serious tensions between the CP and its intellectuals (R.B.).

The following are the major passages of the "open letter" addressed to the politburo of the CP:

"From its inception, Politique Aujourd'hui has been subjected to preemptive warnings and summary accusations. We are saddened, surprised, and perturbed thereby

"We are saddened because, as non-communist members of the editorial board of Politique Aujourd'hui, it was our aim, in associating ourselves with communist intellectuals known for their seriousness of purpose, competence and faithfulness to their party, to create a forum for discussion and a center for reflection in which all problems confronting the various currents of socialism in the world could be examined in a critical and constructive manner. . . . Thus conceived, the review is to be seen not as the exclusive creation of communists or of non-communists but of all those who believe in socialism and who contribute in a personal way to its development through their individual commitment, for which they themselves are responsible.

"Furthermore, your reaction surprises us. Does it mean that a party destined to participate in necessary coalitions among socialists, and without whose support such coalitions would be doomed to failure, has not yet renounced a unilateral conception of dialogue?

"The non-communist intellectuals who have contributed to the creation of the review Politique Aujourd'hui or who support it consider, for their part, that the quality of an interlocutor, his worthiness to be heard, is determined by the value of the information, convictions or ideas which the individual, whether or not he is a member of a political group, is capable of contributing to the debate. They consider that the dialogue must, of course, meet the needs of an active policy and particularly, as you say 'to the immediate requirements of the struggle against Gaullist power.' But they consider also that socialist confrontation and debate, like scientific research, requires a measure of free inquiry without which inventiveness, imagination and spontaneity become sterile. . . Dialogue, as we understand it, differs clearly from concerted action by organizations or parties, which entrusts discussion to representatives invested with defined powers, for then the objective is an alliance with a definite end in view. Such concerted action is necessary. But it is apparently not the intent of the review staff to place themselves on such a footing. As we have clearly stated, it has never been our intention to lay down a 'line' or 'platform' and still less to found a movement, but to reflect together, to seek and to confront.

"Finally, we wish to express to you our anxiety. The recent course of events could lead to the conclusion that communist intellectuals have acquired the right to overstep the role too long assigned to them by a narrow conception of democratic centrism. To consider them as mere proxies, even duly authorized ones, would not, you may be sure, result in making their role more effective. Yet it is our impression, judging by certain events and declarations of recent years, that in practice they were being relegated to such a role.

"If we are mistaken, the entire body of the Left will appreciate, etc. . . ."

Note: The 15 signers are Maurice Badiche, Jacques Berque, Jean-Paul Biondi, Paul Blanquart, Georges Casalis, Bernard Dort, Georges Fischer, Jean-Maurice Hermann, Pierre Joxe, Jean-Pierre Kertuds, Michel Lancier, Albert-Paul Lentin, Jacques Maitre, Roland Mounet, and Denis Woronoff.



## Quinze collaborateurs de « Politique aujourd'hui » dénoncent les « accusations sommaires » du parti communiste

Les responsables de la revue « Politique aujourd'hui » paraissent décidés à répliquer aux attaques lancées contre eux par le parti communiste qui, après une mise en garde en date du 20 décembre 1968, les avait accusés de « proposer une ligne révisionniste de droite » (déclaration du bureau politique du 17 janvier).

Estimant que la revue n'appartient pas seulement aux militants du P.C.F., qui y collaborent, quinze membres non communistes du comité de rédaction viennent d'adresser au bureau politique du parti, une « lettre ouverte » dans laquelle ils apprécient en termes vigoureux la condamnation du 17 janvier.

Cette initiative aura-t-elle pour conséquence d'exposer les collaborateurs communistes de « Politique aujourd'hui » à des sanctions disciplinaires, dont M. Roland Leroy, membre du secrétariat du P.C.F., laissait planer la menace dans son discours du 20 janvier ? (« le Monde » du 22 janvier).

On ne peut écarter cet événement, mais il semble que les dirigeants du parti s'efforcent d'obtenir, dans un premier temps, que les collues des collaborateurs incriminés se rallient au texte du bureau politique.

Il s'agit en tout cas d'une nouvelle et sérieuse tension entre le parti communiste et « ses » intellectuels. — R. B.

Voici les principaux passages de la « lettre ouverte » adressée au bureau politique du parti communiste :

« Les mises en demeure préventives et les accusations sommaires dont Politique a fait l'objet dès sa naissance nous attristent, nous surprennent et nous inquiètent.

« Elles nous attristent, car en s'associant avec des intellectuels communistes connus pour leur sérieux, leur compétence et leur fidélité à leur parti, les membres non communistes du comité de rédaction de la revue Politique aujourd'hui veulent créer une tribune de discussion et un centre de réflexion où tous les problèmes se posant aux divers courants socialistes dans le monde puissent être examinés de façon critique et constructive. (...) Ainsi comprise, la revue se veut non pas la création de communistes seuls ni de non-communistes seuls, mais de tous ceux qui, se réclamant du socialisme, y contribuent à titre personnel, en fonction de leurs engagements respectifs, dont ils sont juges.

« Votre réaction nous surprend. Veut-elle dire que l'un des partis qui devra participer à de nécessaires coalitions entre socialistes, et sans qui cette coalition serait vouée à l'échec, n'a pas renoncé à une conception unilatérale du dialogue ? (...)

« Les intellectuels non communistes qui ont contribué à la création de la revue Politique aujourd'hui ou qui soutiennent cette création estiment, pour leur part, que la qualité d'interlocuteur s'acquiert par la valeur des informations, des convictions ou des idées que des individus affiliés ou non à un groupe politique sont susceptibles de verser au débat. Ils estiment que le dialogue doit être une démarche politique active, et notamment, comme vous le dites, aux « exi-

gences immédiates de la lutte contre le pouvoir gaulliste ». Mais ils considèrent aussi que, tout comme la recherche scientifique, le débat et la confrontation socialistes supposent une part de libre recherche, hors de laquelle l'invention, l'imagination et la spontanéité créatrice se stérilisent. (...) Le dialogue tel que nous l'entendons se distingue nettement de la concertation politique entre organisations ou partis, déléguant à la discussion des représentants investis de pouvoirs précis, puisque l'objectif est alors une alliance en vue d'un but défini. De telles concertations sont nécessaires. Mais ce n'est évidemment pas le propos des collaborateurs de la revue de se placer sur un tel terrain. Notre intention n'a jamais été, et nous l'avons dit nettement, de fixer une « ligne », une « plate-forme » — encore moins de fonder un mouvement, mais de réfléchir en commun, de chercher et de confronter.

« Nous voudrions enfin vous dire notre inquiétude. L'évolution récente pouvait laisser croire que les intellectuels communistes avaient acquis le droit de déborder le rôle qu'une conception étroite du centralisme démocratique leur avait trop longtemps assigné. Les tenir seulement pour des mandataires, même dûment autorisés, ne serait pas, croyez-nous, rendre leur rôle plus efficace. Nous pensions que c'était là une évidence, et certains événements, certaines déclarations des dernières années nous avaient convaincus que cette évidence entrerait dans la pratique.

« Si nous nous sommes trompés, l'ensemble de la gauche appréciera. (...) »

— Les quinze signataires sont MM. Maurice Badier, Jacques Berque, Jean-Paul Biondi, Paul Biquart, Les Fischer, Jean-Maurice Hermann, Pierre Joxe, Jean-Pierre Kertudo, Michel Lancelier, Albert-Paul Lentin, Jacques Maitre, Roland Monod.

LE MONDE  
16-17 February 1969

SUMMARY

"THE COMMUNIST PARTY RENEWS ITS ATTACKS  
AGAINST THE MAGAZINE 'POLITIQUE AUJOURD'HUI'"

In France Nouvelle, the PCF weekly, Henri Fizsbin, PCF Central Committee member, scored the new magazine Politique as a "disastrous enterprise" for its slanted view of events in Czechoslovakia and for pressuring the PCF to adopt a line that would lead to a break in relations with the CPSU of the Soviet Union.

LE MONDE  
16-17 February 1969

CPYRGHT

LE PARTI COMMUNISTE  
RENOUVELLE SES ATTAQUES  
CONTRE LA REVUE  
« POLITIQUE AUJOURD'HUI »

Le parti communiste poursuit ses attaques contre la revue Politique aujourd'hui, que le bureau politique du 17 janvier avait accusée de « proposer une ligne révisionniste de droite » (1).

Dans France nouvelle, hebdomadaire central du P.C.F., M. Henri Fizsbin, secrétaire de la fédération de Paris et membre du comité central, reproche à cette revue de mener une « entreprise néfaste » en présentant « de façon unilatérale » les événements de Tchécoslovaquie et en « situant exactement sur le même plan impérialisme américain et Union soviétique ». M. Fizsbin écrit encore :

« Il s'agit visiblement de faire pression sur notre parti pour essayer de le pousser vers une ligne de rupture avec le parti communiste d'Union soviétique, une ligne de désagrégation du mouvement communiste international.

» C'est pourquoi tous les efforts tendent à développer la polémique et à généraliser, en l'aggravant, la divergence. Nous sommes mis en demeure « d'aller plus loin » et de renier l'Union soviétique.

» Cette démarche préconisée, y compris par certains communistes, a été massivement repoussée par le parti, notamment par les propres cellules et sections auxquelles appartiennent ces camarades. Il n'est pas question que nous acceptions aujourd'hui de nous engager sur ce chemin... »

(1) Voir le Monde des 22-23 décembre 1968, 19-20 janvier, 22 janvier, 30 janvier 1969.

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, Moscow,  
26 February 1969

Article by Novosti correspondent, Yuriy Bochkarev,  
"In whose interests"

Copies of the new journal POLITIQUE D'AUJOURD'HUI (POLITICS TODAY) are on the Paris newspaper kiosks. The public was notified of its publication in good time by a preview edition. It stated that "a group of journalists, writers, scientists, and engineers, who belong to certain schools of French socialism," has decided to publish a journal for "the free and frank discussion of its (that is 'French socialism's') problems."

Generally speaking there is nothing unusual about a new journal. Moreover, in France, where many false impressions exist about socialism, especially among sections of the youth who are stupefied by the narcotics of leftist propaganda, it could be very useful. But....

It is clear from the article published in the "preview edition" that the creators of the journal (and they also include communists) have set the aim--no more nor less--"of working out the theory of modern social development" as if such a theory was not created by Marx and Engels over 100 years ago. In addition, the journal flatters itself with the hope that it will be "totally independent of any states of foreign influence, of any financial groups, and, finally, of any political parties or movements."

The organ of the PCF Central Committee "L'HUMANITE" points out in this connection that in this way the "communists who are members of the editorial office of POLITIQUE D'AUJOURD'HUI have put all states and all political parties, including their own, on the same level. This is a direct rejection of class positions in an approach to 'modern social development' and a movement toward nonclass, that is, essentially petit bourgeois positions. Such a conclusion is also emphasized by the fact that the creators of the new monthly reject the leading role of the working class in the world revolutionary process and put forward in concealed form the anti-Marxist idea of a 'new historic bloc' in which the leading role would belong to the intelligentsia. It is typical that now, when the bourgeois organs of the French press have cooled their ardor considerably in the propaganda connected with events in Czechoslovakia, POLITIQUE D'AUJOURD'HUI has contrived nevertheless to make these events the theme of the first issue.

In a special statement devoted to the publication of POLITIQUE D'AUJOURD'HUI the PCF Politburo characterized it as anti-Soviet and rightwing revisionist. The statement says: "The participation of communists in this publication contradicts the efforts of the party aimed at uniting progressive forces."

Secretary of the PCF Central Committee Roland Leroy pointed out in one of his speeches that downright party enemies, including Trotskiyites, were members of the editorial office. In addition, those communists who had attacked the party line from leftist positions during the May 1968 events were members.

Roland Leroy said: "I think that the party cells will remind these people that we do not force anyone to be a party member. If they need their 'freedom' in order to wage a struggle against it in complete independence, then we can grant them such freedom and independence. Our enemies do not conceal their joy in connection with the trend of POLITIQUE D'AUJOURD'HUI. This is only a lightly camouflaged trench from which rightwing opportunism is firing on those who stand firmly on the positions of Marxism-Leninism...."

CPYRGHT

# POLITIQUE

aujourd'hui

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LE MONDE  
3 March 1969

SUMMARY

"THE P.C.F. INITIATES DISCIPLINARY PROCESSES  
AGAINST THE EDITORS OF 'POLITIQUE AUJOURD'HUI'"

Most recent of the abuses heaped on this "revisionist" magazine since the beginning of the year by the Communist party was the expression of "grief" on the part of P.C.F. Secretary General Waldeck Rochet and Secretary Georges Marchais at having discovered such diversionary tendencies, operating under the guise of "opinion groups", right in the bosom of the party. This pronouncement was followed by specific disciplinary measures taken against four Communist-party-member editors of 'Politique': An assistant professor of English was expelled from the Sorbonne cell of letters; an assistant history professor is threatened with expulsion from the same cell, but has been given a month for "reflection"; and public censure was inflicted on two other history professors.

LE MONDE  
3 March 1969

CPYRGHT

LE P.C.F. AMORCE UN PROCES-  
SUS DISCIPLINAIRE CONTRE  
LES COLLABORATEURS DE  
« POLITIQUE AUJOURD'HUI ».

Le parti communiste, qui, depuis le début de l'année, n'a cessé de dénoncer la nocivité de la revue « Politique aujourd'hui », accusée de préconiser une « ligne révisionniste de droite », paraît décidé à prendre des sanctions disciplinaires à l'encontre des collaborateurs communistes de cette revue.

Au cours des récentes journées d'études sur l'activité du parti dans les entreprises, M. Waldeck Rochet, secrétaire général du P.C.F., et Georges Marchais, secrétaire à l'organisation, s'en étaient pris tous deux aux dirigeants de la revue, leur faisant grief de songer à constituer, sous couleur de « groupes d'opinions », des tendances au sein du parti.

Peu après ces accusations, qui avaient été formulées samedi et dimanche derniers, la cellule Sorbonne lettres a décidé jeudi soir d'amorcer un processus de sanctions disciplinaires contre quatre collaborateurs de « Politique aujourd'hui ».

M. Paul Rozenberg, maître assistant d'anglais, est exclu de la cellule; Mme Madeleine Roberlioux, maître assistant d'histoire, est menacée de la même sanction, mais un mois de « réflexion » lui est octroyé; des blâmes publics sont infligés à M. Gilbert Lazard, professeur d'histoire, et à M. René Gallissot, maître assistant d'histoire, secrétaire de la section d'histoire du C.E.R.M. (Centre d'études et de recherches marxistes).

En vertu des statuts du P.C.F., les mesures disciplinaires prises au sein de la cellule se déclenchent effectivement à l'initiative du comité de section, par le comité fédéral et, enfin, par le comité central du parti.

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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8

April 1969

INSIDE NORTH VIETNAM

Despite the fact that a country with tightly sealed borders can largely create the image it presents to the world, it is not necessary to rely entirely on the writings of Hanoi-approved journalists to put together a picture of current realities in North Vietnam. Evidence about those realities exists in a composite form which is probably more accurate than the necessarily subjective observations of individual, often heavily biased writers. The composite is comprised of such elements as: gleanings from the North Vietnamese press and radio (particularly speeches by its leaders); impressions of life in Haiphong gained by foreign seamen whose ships call there; observations of foreign diplomats serving in Hanoi; foreign businessmen's accounts of commercial deals with North Vietnamese officials; the joint communiques issued by the North Vietnamese Communist Party, the Lao Dong, and visiting Communist delegations; statistics on imports and exports obtained from Hanoi's trading partners; and the somewhat more haphazard collection of rumors, impressions and observations offered by the occasional individual traveler or member of an international organization or cultural exchange group, etc., visiting North Vietnam. Information obtained from both prisoners and documents captured in South Vietnam has generally tended to confirm that obtained from the aforementioned sources. Joined together, or weighed against one another, these elements of information can form a remarkably complete picture, and a picture less subject to human foibles than the vastly different impressions presented by Hanoi-approved journalists. For instance, instead of the frequently projected view of a country blessed with an unending flow of manpower (and by implication able to continue suffering great battlefield losses almost indefinitely) the composite projects the image of a nation hard put to meet the seasonal needs of its agricultural production. Even when the November 1968 bombing halt permitted the reassignment of many of the 300,000 to 500,000 civilians involved in repair work, Hanoi's press and radio were noting the shortage of farm workers. The same media reported manpower shortages in forestry, construction, light industry and fishing. North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) regulars recently captured in South Vietnam have been as young as 14 -- telling evidence of how deep into the manpower barrel the Army is digging. The manpower squeeze is believed sufficiently serious to prevent North Vietnam from rebuilding her industrial and agricultural potential until the manpower drain imposed by the war is ended.

Manpower shortages do not explain, however, the very serious problem of absenteeism haunting the Hanoi regime. It is estimated that in numerous cases farm workers labor only 20 to 25 hours a week for the collectives. Dock, transport and electric-power workers have also been guilty of excessive absenteeism and the objects of stern reprimands from such personages as Premier Pham Van Dong and Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi. Mine officials at Hongay, North Vietnam's most important coal area, were even called to Hanoi to be reprimanded for "worker unrest" by Ho Chi Minh himself. All the public reprimands were replete with accusations of "lack of revolutionary zeal."

In deploring the pileup of Soviet and Chinese aid merchandise in warehouses, on docks and even on beaches in December 1968, Lao Dong officials did not hint at anything more serious than absenteeism and "loose labor discipline." But by February of 1969 reports were circulating in Hanoi's diplomatic community that North Vietnamese dock laborers and transport workers had been sabotaging foreign aid shipments. No tie-in was apparent between sabotage on the docks and an earlier case reported by British author P.J. Honey in the Canberra Times on 1 July 1968. According to Honey (who is one of the foremost western authorities on Vietnam), letters smuggled out of the North in 1968 revealed that disaffected North Vietnamese had repeatedly attacked North Vietnamese convoys heading South with supplies for PAVN and Viet Cong personnel.

Since March 1968 literally scores of articles, broadcasts, speeches and directives by Party and government officials have indicated regime dissatisfaction with the labor force, students, Party rank and file and even Party officials. Although it is admittedly difficult to assess just how serious the trouble is, it is most unlikely that North Vietnamese officialdom would exaggerate the situation. Asian experts, in fact, concluded that Hanoi was truly having serious problems with dissidence when the notorious presidential decree of March 1968 was published. The decree prescribed the death penalty for people found guilty of such crimes as:

plotting to overthrow the people's power;

disrupting public order and security;

sabotage of all kinds;

organizing escapes from jails;

harboring counter-revolutionaries;

fleeing to foreign countries.

The North Vietnamese media, as well as reports by travelers, diplomats, foreign businessmen and PAVN prisoners, have also reflected major deficiencies in North Vietnam's agricultural production and serious shortcomings in her industry. Lack of consumer merchandise is reported by many resident foreigners and foreign seamen regularly comment on the ready market they find for any goods they wish to sell directly to the population -- underclothing, sweaters and flints are particularly popular. Seamen also report that many North Vietnamese assumed that nonessential imports to meet consumer's needs would be boosted when the bombing halted, and the regime's failure to do so has been a major factor in the recently reported drop in morale of the North Vietnamese people.



Shortages are not confined to consumer goods, but extend to necessities and have led on the one hand to rationing and on the other hand to a flourishing black market which permits the wealthy to fill their stomachs while some of North Vietnam's poor suffer from malnutrition. Rice and rice products are strictly rationed as are meat, sugar, soy bean products, cloth goods and clothing, petroleum, cigarettes and tobacco. Many other essential items are in very short supply including ordinary medicines, vitamins and medical supplies, which compounds the difficulties already plaguing North Vietnam's primitive medical services. Electric power is generally available in the city of Hanoi but the power is weak and the supply erratic with frequent cutoffs for repairs or because of shortages. Standby generators are a common sight and frequently needed. The water supply is also unsatisfactory. It is still rationed in many areas and when available is sometimes dirty and impure. There is a general lack of maintenance for the city water systems and sanitation is poor in both urban and rural areas.

Despite these many problems, the situation in North Vietnam is far from desperate and the end of the war could solve or considerably improve a number of the difficulties. The point is, however, that the foregoing is also far from the regime-controlled picture of a highly-motivated, strongly united North Vietnamese people whose dedication and morale provide the motive power for an economy that would otherwise limp badly.

Possibly symptomatic of the divisions between North Vietnamese workers and the Party are the rumored divisions in the Lao Dong itself, which many observers predict will undergo a purge in the spring of 1969. Hanoi's present economic difficulties would probably be the most direct excuse for a purge, which could be brought about during the People's Council elections scheduled for April 1969 when management elements, currently the target of regime criticism for manufacturing and agricultural deficiencies, will be removed from their posts, ostensibly by the voters' mandate. An earlier purge occurred in late 1967-early 1968 as a result of a great debate over whether or not to escalate the war in the South. The hard-liners won that debate and the Tet offensive in February 1968 was the result. If the "doves" are again ousted in this purge, the future for the Paris peace talks will dim considerably.

## Ray Cromley



INFORMATION reaching this reporter from Hong Kong indicates the bombing halt which he wanted so badly has turned out to be no great gain for Ho Chi Minh.

Before, Ho could blame his growing economic and political problems on the bombing. He could use the air attacks as a spur and as an excuse for forcing people to endure greater sacrifices.

Now he has no such convenient crutch.

The people — and, more importantly, the cadre — are finding that the bombing was not the only cause of North Vietnam's economic stagnation.

The increasing number of troops mobilized and sent southward for the Vietnam war and held as backup for that war have caused important manpower shortages in agriculture and industry. For the most part these have been young men — of prime laboring age.

THE bombing halt is, of course, releasing tens of thousands who were needed for bridge and road repair. But the shortages remain. In part, the release of these men has been offset by a lessening of effort in recent months. With no war directly facing them at home, there's been a let-down.

So Ho has a morale problem.

Absenteeism is growing on the docks at Haiphong, North Vietnam's major port. Black markets are flourishing in the goods pilfered by idle dock workers from the mountains of goods in the port areas. (Officials complain that many men

don't find it possible to put in full time at their jobs, they're so busy pilfering and black marketing).

There are reports of serious port management corruption and waste as well.

HO'S troubles are not limited to the ports. Black markets are reported growing in tea, sugar cane, cotton and rice.

Rice production has fallen more seriously than predicted — and shortages are made up by more severe rationing and increased imports of rice from Communist China and wheat from Russia.

Coal output continues to decline.

There are slowdowns in forestry, construction, the light industries and fishing. Work lags at the collective farms because farmers are busy with their own private — and more profitable — plots.

None of this is to suggest Hanoi is now ready to end the war in South Vietnam, or prepared to make major concessions at Paris. Ho and his men are dogmatists willing to make much greater sacrifices than this to achieve their ends.

This is not to suggest either that the bombing was a failure. It had a long-term erosive effect in the great numbers of men and women it siphoned off for road repair, in the constant work interruptions it caused and in the gradual increase in nervous tension that grew into bone tiredness.

The effectiveness of the bombing was evidenced by Ho's extreme determination to get it stopped.

What these reports seem to say is now that the bombing is stopped, things are not as rosy for Ho's planners as they had expected.

CPYRGHT

NEWSWEEK

10 March 1969

### HOW HANOI SHOT DOWN ITS DOVES

U.S. intelligence has pieced together from war prisoners and other sources the first report of a split in Hanoi's middle-level leadership over the Vietnam war. Several hundred North Vietnamese functionaries were removed, and many of them imprisoned, in late 1967 and early 1968 because they opposed escalation of the war on Hanoi's part. The "doves" reputed leader was Hoang Minh Chinh, director of the political indoctrination school for intelligence agents and army generals. Le Duc Tho, now Hanoi's senior delegate at the Paris peace talks, was in charge of the purge of these dissenters. Their final defeat was underlined by the Tet offensive in January 1968.

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT  
10 MARCH 1969

Allied intelligence now has firm evidence of a sweeping purge of Government officials in Hanoi in 1967. This evidence suggests that the victims were plotting with the Soviet Union to overthrow the "hard line" regime of Ho Chi Minh and install a "peace" government in its place.

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8  
CHICAGO DAILY NEWS

27 February 1969

## Defector tells of split

# Purge confirmed among Viet Reds

By Keyes Beech  
Daily News Foreign Service

SAIGON—The existence of a split inside North Vietnam's Communist leadership over the "war of liberation" in the South has been confirmed to the satisfaction of allied intelligence agents.

A high-ranking North Vietnamese intelligence agent who quietly defected to the South Vietnamese government last month confirmed persistent reports of a major purge of "counterrevolutionary" elements inside the party.

He said between "200 and 300" party functionaries were purged in September, 1967, in classic confrontation between dominant hawks and minority doves. The doves lost.

A U.S. EMBASSY official said the embassy had the same information as the South Vietnamese government.

Opposition leaders were subsequently arrested and charged with treason for plotting the overthrow of the Hanoi government. Their offense was opposing the "liberation" of South Vietnam by armed

force. They argued it could be done by political means alone.

Information supplied by the defector, a 47-year-old Southerner who went to North Vietnam in 1954 and returned to the South in 1968, suggested that the Soviet Union was supporting the antiwar elements.

SOUTH Vietnamese intelligence sources refused to reveal the defector's name for security reasons. However, he held a key job in the North Vietnamese ministry of light industry until he came south.

His story was substantiated by another North Vietnamese, a 45-year-old Communist newspaperman who came south in March, 1968, with seven other Hanoi reporters and was captured last August in Thua Thien Province.

The two men do not know each other. But the antigovernment plot that precipitated the purge originated in the Ministry of Light Industry and among editorial employees of Nhah Dan, Hanoi's principal

newspaper. Communist filmmakers also were involved.

AMONG THOSE arrested were Hoang Minh Chinh, a leading political scientist; Brig. Gen. Dang Kim Giang, vice minister of agriculture; Col. Le Trong Nghia, chief of the central intelligence bureau; his chief deputy, Col. Tran Hieu Vien, and a host of lesser lights.

Dubbed the "Hoang Minh Chinh Affair" because of the name of its leader, the anti-government movement was known to the party leadership for a long time before the plot ripened. Members of the North Vietnam Central Reunification Commission had discussed their differences with Chinh and other antiwar elements before the arrests.

Chinh and the others not only opposed North Vietnamese participation in the war in the South but also had formed a "shadow cabinet" to take over from the Ho Chi Minh government.

WALL STREET JOURNAL  
12 February 1969

U.S. and Saigon envoys conferred in Paris to plan for the fourth session of substantive talks on Vietnam today. Members of the U.S. delegation were said to be studying articles in the official Hanoi press hinting at public impatience in North Vietnam for an end to wartime hardships. President Nixon appointed Lt. Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, a decorated Vietnam veteran, to the new post of military adviser to the U.S. delegation in Paris.

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WASHINGTON POST  
3 February 1969

CPYRGHT

*Stanley Karnow*

## Hanoi's Home Problems Grow Since the U.S. Bombing Halt

HONG KONG—Far from

demoralizing the enemy, as it was partly intended to do nearly three years of U.S. bombing may well have unified and disciplined the North Vietnamese more than ever before in their turbulent history.

This paradox has lately become apparent in the growing number of problems that have been nagging Hanoi since the bombing stopped, and it demonstrates the validity of the axiom that nothing cements nations internally as effectively as external pressure.

Indeed, it is tempting to suggest that had President Johnson not accommodated them, North Vietnam's leaders might have been prompted to invent an outside peril in order to infuse their people with a sense of urgency and dedication.

The portrayal of North Vietnam as a beleaguered fortress threatened by "U.S. imperialism" repeatedly threaded through Hanoi's rhetoric prior to 1965, when American escalation began in reality.

AND JUDGING from the style and substance of its present propaganda, Hanoi is again striving to create a synthetic climate of conflict and tension plainly designed to discourage the North Vietnamese population from backsliding.

"Firmly keep up the war-time way of life," runs the key slogan in this propaganda, and woven around that theme are hortatory tales of heroic peasants, workers, soldiers and youths who have not slackened despite the bombing halt.

But more significantly, the recent rise in official appeals and admonitions indicates that the Hanoi regime is frankly worried by a spreading mood of relaxation that, for any Commu-

nist system augurs debilitating economic, social and political effects.

Speaking to miners not long ago, for instance, President Ho Chi Minh blamed a drop in coal production on "poor management and poor organization," while the official Communist newspaper Nhan Dan recently attributed inefficient ploughing, rice transplanting and harvesting to peasant lethargy.

ON DEC. 16, commenting on the failure of a special government commission to improve operations at Haiphong, North Vietnam's main port, Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi deplored the pileup of Soviet and Chinese aid merchandise in warehouses, on docks and even on beaches. He said:

"Labor discipline is loose. Working hours are not observed. Some shifts put in only part of their time, and on certain days the percentage of absenteeism is high."

Meanwhile, increasing concern that North Vietnamese youths are losing their revolutionary zeal was reflected in a speech delivered in November by Lt. Gen. Song Hao, the deputy defense minister and the Hanoi army's chief political commissar.

Though he stressed that he was referring merely to "small minority," the General went to considerable lengths to warn youths against "romantic and soft sentiments" and such "primitive selfish desires as loving life and fearing death, loving pleasure and fearing hardship."

THE TROUBLE with youngsters these days, Song Hao explained, is that they are being lulled by an "illusion of peace." To revive their militancy, he advised, youths must "raise high their determination to fight

and defeat the U.S. aggressors."

While these and other problems may not seriously challenge their regime, it seems doubtful that the Communists can plausibly perpetuate the ersatz atmosphere of conflict they evidently need for the sake of domestic cohesion.

In fact, a glance back to the decade following the 1954 Geneva agreements reveals that the North Vietnamese leaders, then lacking an authentic outside threat to serve their internal mobilization efforts, were compelled to tread carefully to keep their people in line.

An attempt to impose a rigorous agrarian reform program in Nghean Province in 1956, for example, sparked a popular revolt that forced Ho Chi Minh to apologize—but not before his troops had executed or deported some 6000 dissident peasants.

During its post-Geneva period of comparative security, the Hanoi leadership group was also torn by fierce rivalries, among them the bitter feud between Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and the senior Politburo member, Truong Chinh, over the question of Party control of the army.

As the Vietnam war escalated, that sort of friction was pasted over. But now that pressures are subsiding, there are hints that the North Vietnamese hierarchy is again being split by differences.

All this, then, lends a measure of credence to Mao Tse-tung's old adage that a Communist society has far less to fear from the bombs of war than from the "sugar-coated bullets" that inflict a terrible toll among revolutionaries in times of peace.

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MELBOURNE SUN  
1 February 1969  
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8

# ALL TRADE WITH NORTH VIETNAM BANNED

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From LAURIE OAKES

**CANBERRA. — The Federal Government acted swiftly yesterday to ban all trade with North Vietnam.**

A special Executive Council meeting approved strict new regulations to remove any doubts about Government policy.

They were printed and circulated within hours and took effect immediately.

The Prime Minister, Mr Gorton, said:

"The new regulations will prohibit exports to or imports from North Vietnam without the written permission of the Minister for Customs, Senator Scott."

Government officials said the action had been taken to prevent a Sydney business man, Mr Patrick Sayers, from importing cigarettes and plywood from Hanoi.

Mr Sayers, managing director of Saywell International Pty. Ltd., revealed his plans two weeks ago while Mr Gorton was attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London.

The Federal Attorney-General, Mr Bowen, said then that the Government had adequate powers to deal with imports from North Vietnam under existing legislation.

But Mr Sayers claimed that trade between Australia and North Vietnam was taking place and there were no specific measures to prevent it.

Another Sydney business man, Mr Francis James, managing director of the Anglican Press Ltd., said at the time that he had conducted a small volume of trade with Hanoi for four years with the knowledge and approval of the Trade Department and the Treasury.

Mr Gorton said last night that it was a long-established Government policy that there should be no trade between Australia and North Vietnam.

"The Government holds firmly to the view that, in present circumstances, it would be most unfortunate and inappropriate for persons to engage in such trade for private gain while Australian forces are fighting in South Vietnam," he said.

The regulations were issued by the Minister for External Affairs, Mr Hasluck, on behalf of Senator Scott.

Customs authorities said that anyone who breached the regulations would be liable to a fine.

The goods involved would be seized.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

1 February 1969

Leaders complain

North Vietnamese leaders recently have complained about conditions at the port and about cargo losses due to mishandling and poor storage on the wharfside.

Meanwhile, there are continuing indications that North Vietnam is beset by major economic problems. A recent radio broadcast for home, and not foreign, consumption declared bluntly: "Productivity in general has declined, whereas the cost of products has remained high. Wastage of manpower and resources has become relatively widespread."

North Vietnamese listeners were urged to "change substantially economic guidance and management." Many branches and production units, said the broadcast, had "neglected organization and management, failing to achieve their economic and technical norms."

The broadcast also referred to labor indiscipline and economic mismanagement.

## Difficulties conceded

In agriculture, the North Vietnamese conceded there were "big difficulties" last year, caused by "prolonged cold and drought spells, repeated typhoons, waterlogging, and crop pests, in addition to enemy air raids."

But another radio broadcast also cited "shortcomings" in the management of agricultural coöperatives, specifically referring to "lax management of land and collective production means, in entrusting work to cooperative members' families, and so forth."

These shortcomings, said the broadcast, were "inconsistent with the socialist principle of management and discipline and have caused the collective economy to develop slowly."

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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8

# Port jam troubles Hanoi leaders

By John Hughes  
 Staff correspondent of  
 The Christian Science Monitor

Hong Kong

Despite the halt in American bombing, North Vietnam is experiencing serious delays and jam-ups in its major port of Haiphong.

One foreigner who has just returned from Haiphong says the streets of the city are clogged with huge dumps of cargo awaiting transportation. On the outskirts of Haiphong, crates and drums are stacked in fields and rice paddies for want of storage space.

This eyewitness report coincides with North Vietnam's own admission that the port has failed to cope with demands; that there are "many defects and uncoordinated aspects" of the port's operation.

The admission is contained in a North Vietnamese internal radio broadcast last month, details of which have just become available here.

## Thefts, damage reported

The broadcast was of a talk by North Vietnam's Vice-Premier Le Thanh Nghi. He is the North Vietnamese minister responsible for negotiating his country's trade and aid agreements with various foreign countries.

In his speech he revealed that:

- New vehicles, cranes, and other equipment coming into Haiphong have been damaged in unloading.

- Spare parts have been stolen on the dockside.

- Certain kinds of goods have been ruined after being left in the open, exposed to rain and sunshine.

- Some trucks and cranes in the port are "inoperable."

- Average productivity by port workers is "low," labor discipline is "loosely applied," and absenteeism, on some days, is "high."

Presumably the incoming goods and supplies most affected by all this are those from the Soviet Union, from which North Vietnam is believed to get most of its foreign aid.

## New deal concluded

The Soviets have provided most of North Vietnam's sophisticated weaponry. Now, with the end of American bombing, Soviet nonmilitary aid to North Vietnam is believed to be increasing. Under Vice-Premier Le Thanh Nghi's guidance, North Vietnam recently concluded a deal under which Moscow is to supply "large quantities of food, fuel, transport means, complete equipment, steel and ferrous metals, chemical fertilizers, weapons, ammunition," and other

at possible delays in moving all this through Haiphong. For, he said in his address, "the speed of unloading operations greatly affects our relations with various countries."

He went on: "If unloading is carried out unsatisfactorily and behind schedule, this will result in manifold disadvantages."

The Vice-Premier blamed American bombing for part of the trouble. If the Americans had not waged war against North and South Vietnam, he said, "Haiphong port would have become far more modern than it actually is." Houses and food and wages of workers and their families would have been better.

But he made clear that even though the bombing now has stopped, "labor productivity has declined and the implementation of the unloading and goods-movement plans has failed to meet requirements."

The minister said unloading of goods and discharge of ships is slow, there is a "heavy backlog" of goods in warehouses, on the beach, and on wharves, and therefore "serious cases of corruption and waste occur."

This story of trouble in Haiphong port coincides with reports of other economic and agricultural setbacks in North Vietnam. In November the Hanoi newspaper Nhan Dan warned of "slow and declining progress" in "many economic branches."

## Cadres criticized

The North Vietnamese minister said the adverse situation in the port had been attributed to the fact that: "In conducting management and organizing the implementation of tasks cadres have not yet broadened democracy, remaining bureaucratic and commandistic and slack in management. It has also been attributed to the fact that workers have not yet adequately exercised their right to collective mastership, have not yet brought revolutionary heroism and the revolutionary offensive spirit into full play, have not yet actively participated in the management of the port and of the state, and have not yet adequately heightened their sense of responsibility in production and in the performance of work."

"If any cadre is bureaucratic, commandistic and overbearing toward the masses or practices corruption and waste, which is detrimental to the common interests, you brothers and sisters must struggle and criticize him and use your power of supervision to expose him to responsible agencies for corrective actions. . . . You, brothers and sisters, can easily see that each step in the unloading, transport, and handling of goods and ships at the port has been marked by many irrational aspects and that labor in productivity is low. It is not true that only

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
12 December 1968

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# Rice troubles turn Hanoi to Soviets

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By John Hughes  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Hong Kong

There is continuing evidence that North Vietnam is beset by serious economic problems, particularly in the agricultural sphere.

According to information reaching here, the Hanoi regime has been having especial difficulty in getting in the autumn rice crop. Rice is North Vietnam's principal foodstuff. A poor and tardy harvest would not only deplete current stocks but could also upset the whole cycle of rice production for future months.

In a recent domestic broadcast, the North Vietnamese Government blamed harvesting difficulties on "slack leadership by many party and administrative echelons." Urging greater effort, the North Vietnamese leadership said it was "essential to postpone unnecessary meetings." Instead, cadres should be assigned to help cooperatives and production units gather the crop.

North Vietnamese problems with food production run almost parallel to the announcement recently of a massive new Soviet aid deal for the Hanoi government.

The deal includes the dispatch of "large quantities of food" to North Vietnam in the coming year. All this may be heightening North Vietnam's dependence on the Soviet Union and, correspondingly, Moscow's influences in Hanoi.

## Peking influence undercut?

Experts believe the Soviets now have embarked on a calculated campaign to supplant entirely Peking's waning influence in the North Vietnamese capital.

According to North Vietnamese radio broadcasts intended for internal consumption, the autumn rice crop has ripened late. Heavy rain has been a further complication. Many of the rice plants are lying in the water and must be harvested quickly to prevent spoilage.

Even then there will be a shortage of enough places to dry both rice and straw once the crop is in. The "main cause of this situation," said one broadcast recently, "is slack leadership of farming work by many party and administrative echelons and village cooperative managerial boards."

Unless the autumn crop is harvested quickly, there will be delay in preparing the rice fields for the spring crop.

The radio broadcast said party and administrative echelons "must concentrate their efforts on directing these tasks"—the

reaping of the autumn crop and the planting of seedlings for spring.

Cadres are being instructed to organize a "production emulation movement" and to "transform the masses' enthusiasm into new production strength." The broadcast said it is "essential to postpone unnecessary meetings and to assign cadres to go down to help cooperatives and production units in gathering completely the tenth-month [autumn] paddy crop."

The radio hinted that cadres should, as an emergency measure, impress all available workers for the task. For, it said, the cooperatives should not only "properly mobilize and organize manpower," but also of the prolonged rains there are "insufficient 'auxiliary' manpower."

The broadcast pointed out that as a result courtyards and warehouses in which to dry the [rice] paddy and straw. Therefore it is necessary to encourage cooperative members to use their own courtyards and houses as places to thresh and separate paddy from straw as soon as the harvest is over, thus preventing the collectives' courtyards and storehouses from being piled up with paddy."

Trouble with the latest crop follows earlier setbacks in North Vietnam. In July the official Hanoi news agency admitted that the early-1968 winter-spring rice crop was "not the best in the last few years."

There were also admissions that food production had been hampered by American air strikes.

## Soviet aid timely

The new burst of Soviet aid to North Vietnam may thus be particularly timely, perhaps even indispensable.

Since the halt of American bombing in the North, the Soviets have been able to cut back on supplies of sophisticated anti-aircraft weaponry to Hanoi. The emphasis on the new Soviet aid agreement just signed seems to be heavy on the economic side.

Some experts believe the Soviets already are deeply involved in plans for the rebuilding of North Vietnam's shattered economy after the war. By such a tactic the Soviets presumably hope to free North Vietnam from the embrace of Communist China.

The Soviet newspaper Pravda recently listed three priority areas covered by the new Soviet-North Vietnamese aid agreement. First, said Pravda, was the rebuilding of North Vietnam's road network. Second was the "reconstitution of the industrial infrastructure." This presumably means the rebuilding of bombed factories and the reconstruction of those moved into caves and other hiding places. Third was intensive development of agricultural areas.



duction, with particular emphasis on the growing.

For all their talk about fighting on to total victory, the North Vietnamese themselves are exhibiting considerable interest in economic reconstruction of their country.

Some sources say that what the North Vietnamese presented the Soviets with recently in Moscow was virtually their first postwar budget.

Meanwhile the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun a few days ago quoted the North Vietnamese as saying they would accept Japanese economic aid after the war. Asahi said Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh made the statement during an exclusive interview. The foreign minister was quoted as saying Hanoi would accept aid from Japan and other countries respecting North Vietnam's independence and sovereignty provided no political strings were attached.

WASHINGTON POST  
21 October 1968

*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

## Hanoi's Home Front Is Worsening But No Softening Seen in Attitudes

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ONE OF THE most surprising elements in President Johnson's inability this far to negotiate a total bombing halt is North Vietnam's worsening situation on the home front.

Hanoi's military problem in the South is now well-known. The new policy laid down by Truong Chinh, third-ranking member of the North Vietnamese Politburo, abandons for the time being all thought of sudden victory. This is the result of fearful enemy losses in the offensive last winter and the failure of subsequent offensives to accomplish their objectives—an uprising in the cities.

Lost in Washington's preoccupation with the military side of the war, however, is that Hanoi's home front is in far worse shape than U.S. experts had suspected.

The depth of deterioration on the home front, most of it tied into the domestic economy, was spelled out as never before in Truong Chinh's recent and fascinating report to Communist Party cadres (leaders) in Hanoi. Chinh, a veteran Party leader whose name

means "Long March" (he learned about protracted war from Mao Tse-tung during the Chinese Civil War), lashed out at: "The rather widespread situation of corruption" and at profiteers who are "taking advantage of the war situation."

IMPLICIT IN Chinh's language, couched in the understatement of Communist rhetoric, is the spectre of a major clampdown and purge by security forces on both war profiteers and political deviates. For example:

"We must pay continuous attention to consolidating the repressive apparatus of the People's Democratic State, the People's Army, the People's Police, the People's Control Institute, the People's Tribunal, and so forth."

The reason for this manifold. In the northern provinces, the trouble between "the socialist path and the capitalist path is still going on, to definitely determine who will defeat whom."

Communists entrenched in the bureaucracy are conniving with speculators to profit from serious short-

ages of food and goods.

On the collective farms, peasants are slicing off land and cultivating it as their own for private profit, thus reducing the food available for distribution by the State. Chinh's gloomy recital, in fact, hints at the steady growth of that decadent economic theory, free enterprise, and exhorts his Party cadres to root it out.

"AS FOR SMALL TRADER," he said, "we should resolutely educate them, help them move toward more productive work, bring them into service cells, and arrange so that they may have legitimate work and income." The word "educate" in the Communist idiom implies Draconian measures of repression.

Truong Chinh's authoritative speech hints at no yielding, except possibly for expedient and temporary reasons. To the contrary, Chinh points to the opposite direction — to repressive tightening-up at home and a patient rebuilding of political and military strength in the South for eventual resumption of full-scale war.



LOS ANGELES TIMES

13 March 1969

CPYRGHT

## WAR LOSES MEANING

# Hanoi Journals Print Letters Indicating Unrest, Corruption

BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT

Times Staff Writer

SAIGON—They read like questions to a lonely hearts columnist, but the subject is life and death.

From Haiphong: "Mine is an honored Socialist labor unit, but some workers disobey regulations, even stealing factory goods. . . I am afraid to say anything. Should I?"

From Hanoi: "In my enterprise, many leading cadres violate policies on material and goods, taking things for friends and relations. . . How can I speak out without being persecuted?"

The letters, selected from a recent issue of North Vietnam's widely circulated journal *Thoi Su Pho Tung* (Popular Current Events), may be deliberately planted or they may be true cries from the heart. In either case, the problems they point up and the fears they reveal are both real and pressing.

### Mounts Intensive Campaign

Since the bombing halt last November, the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam has mounted an intensive campaign to purge its Communist cadres, as well as its managers and workers, of widespread corruption, indolence and deliberate slowdowns. Those tendencies are severely affecting the country's economy.

The campaign became strident about the end of 1968 and is still rising toward a crescendo.

Instead of improving, those tendencies have become worse since the bombing halt, and they are still getting worse. That is the judgment of specialists on North Vietnam and the conclusion one draws from reading a mass of material from official Communist publications.

All those tendencies add up to two

stark facts for the Communists: loss of labor days ranging from 30% to 50%, and a decline in agricultural, industrial, mining and forestry production amounting to one-fifth to one-half of what the Communists plan to achieve.

The direct factors producing those startling losses are manifold. They include bad management, widespread theft, a flourishing black market, lack of effective central control, slowdowns to protest depressed living conditions, low technical standards and almost universal loafing on the job.

### Stems Directly From War

As specialists see the phenomenon, it stems directly from the war the north is still pressing to conquer South Vietnam. Having been told that they have won a tremendous victory over American aggression by forcing the bombing halt on the United States, North Vietnamese are finding conditions no better than they were before the victory and in many cases worse.

The grandiosely acclaimed victory has, so far, borne little but bitter fruit for the masses of the north—they are free of bombing attacks but the bombing threat remains, and indeed is strenuously kept alive by the regime's propaganda.

That emphasis is deliberate policy, for the people of the north would like to pluck the fruits of victory by relaxing the constant tension of their daily life. Only by maintaining the tension, the government appears to feel, can it secure the dedicated labor it needs not only to restore its shattered economic ma-

chinery, but merely to keep the present machinery turning over.

The greatest single factor appears to be vast popular disillusionment. It obviously is extremely disturbing to the regime, though not an immediate or grave danger.

Despite the initial "victory," the people of the north find themselves still deprived of all but the bare necessities of life. Moreover, young men still leave by the tens of thousands to "liberate" the south. Few return.

#### Nothing to Unite People

The pressures on the people intensify. But there are no bombers—no visible enemy to unite them.

Despite all Hanoi's propaganda efforts, the war in the south appears remote and interminable to men and women interested primarily in their own well-being. The "sacred mission of liberating our brethren in the south" is an unattractive abstraction.

Even from the official point of view, the continuing strain of the war daily increases the country's dependence on its fickle allies, the Soviet Union and Communist China. Hanoi depends upon those feuding nations not only for arms and the capital equipment essential to reconstruction, but for necessities like food and clothing.

A note of extreme concern, if not desperation, therefore, appears in Hanoi's exhortations to its cadres, managers and workers to practices which cost the country so much in basic production.

When the Executive Committee of the controlled Vietnam General Federation of Trade Unions met last December, the tone was somber. After the de-rigueur self-congratulations, themselves remarkably brief, the emphasis shifted immediately to condemnation

"The conference pointed out the negative factors," Lao Dong (Labor), the federation's journal reported.

"Workdays and work hours were not observed, nor were industrial regulations and technical rules; labor productivity did not increase, and state property and capital were not safeguarded; the state plan was not fully implemented, and the living standards of workers remained low and unhealthy."

The Executive Committee of the Trade Federation ordered its members to intensify their efforts to educate and discipline the workers, as well as mobilizing workers and managers to carry out the state plan for 1969.

The federation is the regime's instrument for controlling its labor force, rather than a representative of the workers which champions their rights.

The present labor hero of North Vietnam is a truck driver who worked for three years without taking a single day off. Since Communist heroes invariably exemplify the qualities lacking in the masses, the lesson of general loafing is not hard to read.

But Hanoi went on to make the problems explicit.

Tien Phong (Pioneer), the organ of the Communist youth movement, excoriated workers for "taking leave as they please, leaving one (state) enterprise for another or to work outside (in clandestine private firms), arriving late and leaving early, malingering on the job, leaving work to play and taking care of personal business during working hours."

In addition, Pioneer said:

"A considerable number of young workers, especially new young workers, do not truly observe labor discipline. Besides people who take leave because they are ill, there

children are ill or because there is no place to send their children (both latter complaints indicating a high proportion of women workers), many youths simply take time off as they please.

#### Absenteeism Scored

"They take leave because yesterday was Sunday and they played too hard, or because they overslept and are afraid of criticism for arriving late, because they must go out with friends or have clothing made (again an indication of the disproportionate number of young women workers, or because they fear the rain and cold of the night shift . . ."

The consequences on production are most frustrating. The journal Labor said:

"Recently, the situation has arisen where workers wait for work, tools, materials and blueprints while machines stand idle for lack of workers, semi-processed material or spare parts; in many enterprises useful productive time amounts to only five or six hours a day (in a nation working double shifts of eight hours each); equipment and machinery is badly maintained and is used only at half-capacity . . . there is a high proportion of damaged, low-quality, and badly made goods."

Other major factors have also come into play, including deliberate sabotage, as revealed in the technical journal Electric Power Technology.

"The enforcement of labor discipline in our sector has had more deficiencies than good points since the American bandits were defeated . . . and unconditionally stopped bombing," a recent article said.

"Rules and regulations on technical management and work systems have not been strictly enforced; safety measures have been disregarded; there have been deliberate work slowdowns; repair of equip-

prolonged; machinery has been ruined; and many serious accidents have occurred."

Those are the reasons for the desperate tone of the letters to Popular Current Events.

The admission that the total impact of war on a small, underdeveloped country has severely and adversely affected its economy is remarkable only because it is so far from the Communists' usual style.

But the concomitant admission of major deficiencies not only among workers and managers, but among leadership cadres demonstrates a most significant decay of both morale and Communist Party discipline.

By Hanoi's own account, the cumulative problems produced by bombing and the drain of the war in the south are still mounting.

Excerpts from North Vietnamese Media

An article in the December 1968 Hoc Tap, the Lao Dong Party theoretical journal, suggests that Hanoi is having morale and disciplinary problems within the North Vietnamese party and population. Written by Lieutenant General Chu Van Tan, the article calls upon party officials to wipe out "negative manifestations" among the populace and stresses to party members the need to "correctly settle the relationship between the rear and the frontline." It suggests that there is some disagreement within the party over war-connected priorities and economic shortcomings at home.

Falling industrial and agricultural productivity, together with signs of a lessening of effort since the bombing pause, have been repeatedly criticized by a party leadership bent on converting a traditional peasant freehold economy into a collectivized "Socialist" one. The leaders have laid most of the blame on factory and farm managements who, they say, have failed to extract maximum loyalty and effort from the workers, particularly in the key coal industry. Premier Pham Van Dong was quoted in the January, 1968 issue of Hoc Tap, as saying that there were similar shortcomings in "light industries, construction, forestry and marine products". On November 15, President Ho Chi Minh himself addressed coal industry representatives and reminded them that production had fallen steadily from the 1965 total of 4.3 million tons. He said that this was partly due to the war, but the main reason was "poor management and organization" and too many workers "do administrative, managerial and indirectly productive work".

Falling output and absenteeism among Haiphong's dock workers, some of whom "refuse to work for the community in order to have time to engage in private activities", has been criticized by Vice-Premier Le Thanh Nghi. In a talk to workers and cadres in Haiphong he complained of "the backlog of sea-going vessels...caused by slow unloading and transportation" (Hanoi Radio, December 16). Even though "the quantity of equipment for unloading or transporting goods increased...the volume of unloaded or transported goods is still small". Inevitably this led to a "prolonged backlog...in the warehouses, on the beach and on wharves" with consequent "serious cases of corruption and waste". He urged the dockers to work "eight precious hours a day" but also criticized the management which had "not yet broadened democracy, but remained bureaucratic and commandistic".

Maladministration on the co-operative farms and in the food distribution system is also blamed for current failures and abuses such as inadequate rice stocks, a thriving "free" (black) market and falling production of industrial crops (i.e. those for processing such as cotton, sugar cane and tea). The North's poor rice harvests have only reached about five million tons in recent years--well short of the 1965 Five-Year Plan target of 9.5 million tons a year--and have been further taxed by the drain of food supplies to the South. As a result, the proportion of cereal substitute in civilian rice rations has been as high as 50 per cent.

The Hanoi government has shown renewed concern at the growth of smuggling and black market activities in North Vietnam. Although strictly local "free markets" are still permitted in rural areas, because peasants would be unable to get a living wage if forced to sell all their products to the State, long-distance trading is forbidden except through State-owned agencies.

The black market has continued to flourish, however, and the government's periodic efforts to suppress it appear to have had little success. An article in the party daily, Nhan Dan, of October 15, which called for a more efficient system of State marketing, admitted that the situation was deteriorating and hinted that some government employees had become involved in illegal activities. It said:

"The free market appears more widespread than in the past not only for authorized goods but also for those goods under State management. This situation is having a bad effect on production, on the social order, and on the morals of cadres, workers, employees and the population".

On November 5, Nhan Dan again observed that "our distribution task still suffers from many defects which lead to a number of difficulties that might have been avoided and that cause a number of weak points to emerge".

The present black market problem stems from the increasing scarcity of food and materials in North Vietnam over the past three years due partly to the disruption of communications by bombing and partly to poor crop yields. As severer rationing was introduced, the black market expanded, and already in January 1966, the Minister of Internal Trade, Nguyen Thanh Binh, was speaking of the need to "actively combat" speculation and hoarding.

By the beginning of 1968, the problem was becoming serious, especially in the urban areas. After a poor spring harvest, food rationing became still more stringent and urban consumers had to accept 50 per cent of their rice ration in the form of flour. The position was aggravated by the fact that privileged members of the party and administration, who were entitled to special rations, were apparently disposing of unwanted items for cash. Traders were reported to be making profits of 500-600 per cent on some luxury items. The authorities had previously appeared to turn a blind eye to the situation, but press criticism of the "free market" and "distribution" began to increase. An article in Hoc Tap of April 1968, stressed the "need to guarantee that everyone has enough essential consumer goods and to prevent them falling into the hands of speculators and illegal traders".

In an article in the newspaper Hanoi Moi, on May 10, lorry drivers were accused of using State vehicles to carry "outside goods" and "in some cases, stealing State-owned goods and transporting smuggled goods for

businessmen". The key problem, it added, was "to stress political and ideological education, accompanied by control and supervision". A conference of "outstanding lorry drivers" was held in August and addressed by Le Duan, after which Nhan Dan carried an editorial attacking the drivers' indiscipline and disobedience of the rules. In August, black marketeers were moved from the main streets of Hanoi but still continued their business under cover. On September 6, Nhan Dan, turning to the problem of grain management, commented:

"The task of managing the market, opposing speculation, illegal grain trading and illegal brewing of liquor has not been carried out properly and has not been well organized".

The seriousness with which the North Vietnamese authorities view the increase in corruption is indicated by the attention given to it by the Politburo member, Truong Chinh, in his recent report to party cadres (Hanoi Radio, September 16-20). "Since the beginning of the US war of destruction over the Northern part of our country", he said, "the management of economy and of the market had been somewhat amiss... Taking advantage of the war situation, a number of persons in the old exploiting classes and speculators have resumed their activities and exploited the workers under modified forms. On the other hand, speculating rowdies have colluded with a small number of aberrant elements in State organs and enterprises to steal raw material, material supplies, and goods of the State to sell on the free market at a high price thus, to a certain extent, upsetting the market". Of those who "steal the property of the State or of the community or those who speculate on or monopolize the market", Truong Chinh said that "we must endeavor to educate them and, in serious cases, punish them according to law".

A similar line was taken in the Nhan Dan article of October 15, which advocated "Socialist transformation" for small traders and producers, and punishment for speculation and smuggling. Evidently a new drive against black marketeers is already under way.

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Higher imports of rice from China and wheat from the Soviet Union have averted any threat of famine, but that these have outstripped original assessments of North Vietnam's need was shown by the agreement signed in Moscow on November 25 which included a provision for "large quantities" of food. This was in addition to agreements signed with the Soviets earlier last year. The North Vietnamese drive for self-sufficiency produced a new food policy, details of which were published in Hoc Tap last August. This policy called for stricter party control over distribution, the eventual abolition of the "free" market and the allocation of food "according to labor". The party newspaper, Nhan Dan, complained in an editorial on December 11 that while the co-operative rice crop stood ready to harvest, the managements often could not persuade peasants to work in the fields because "they busy themselves with trade or with planting vegetables on their own plots of land".

The co-operative managements are also under pressure (according to articles in Nhan Dan on November 25 and 26) to step up the production of the essential industrial crops. Many co-operatives have abandoned them in favor of food crops, partly because these can be sold for cash on the "free" market and do not have to be channelled to the State at controlled prices, and because of a lack of equipment in many areas.

The government is backing up its production drive with a political and ideological campaign to suppress the worst forms of corruption and indolence. Prominent party figures have toured the country to address conferences of industrial and agricultural workers and even set an example by taking part in harvesting. Instances of correct and "heroic" behavior by individual workers have been published in a book entitled Good People, Good Deeds and it is hoped that this will "contribute to improving and developing...good morals and good customs" (Hanoi Radio, January 15).

No target figures for the 1969 Plan have been announced. The trend of government thinking, however, can be gauged from a Nhan Dan editorial on January 2. This said that the "great duty" was to "concentrate efforts on fully and promptly guaranteeing every demand of the frontline...for defeating the US aggressor". To achieve this it appears that the emphasis will again be on trying to reach "in a few years" the target of five tons of rice, two pigs and one person per hectare, and also on improving the efficiency of local industries which represent "a great trend in Socialist industrialization".

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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8



April 1969

NATIONAL MINORITY PROBLEMS IN THE USSR

The USSR's perennial problems with its national minorities have recently attracted more than normal attention in the free world's press (some representative examples of which are attached). This fact may reflect greater than normal dissidence among the Soviet Union's minority groups, or it may reflect greater recognition by the free world, in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, of the fact of repressive Soviet policies in those lands over which they gained dominance in the past.

When the Soviets came to power in 1917 they inherited an empire largely built by Russian force. Almost half of the USSR's present population is non-Russian; between 100 and 150 national minority groups are recognized. (The 17 largest groups and their percentage share in the total population are listed in an attachment.) These groups are dispersed around the periphery of the USSR from the Baltic to Central Asia. This dispersion, plus the fact that many Russians have moved into the border republics and taken disproportionately large shares of political and economic power, tend to muffle the voices of the national groups.

The major issues in the dispute between Moscow and the national minority groups are politics and language, culture and the economy. Moscow's concern is that "nationalist deviations" do not interfere with the Kremlin-planned economic and political goals and that nationalities groups do not reject the tasks set forth by Moscow in favor of pursuing their own local interests. The minorities, in turn, fear that the Russian language will entirely replace their native languages and that their own cultures, including religion, will be eaten away under Moscow's pressures. Discussed briefly below are several examples of the problems of the national minorities taken from the Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Central Asia.

Ukrainian Nationalism

The large size of the Ukrainian population--at 40 million it amounts to more than a sixth of the USSR's total--and the bitterness, frequency, and articulateness of protests by Ukrainian intellectuals, plus the accessibility of the Ukraine to travellers from the West, all help to explain why the Soviets' most troublesome national minority problem is in the Ukrainian Republic. Added to these factors is the continuing entanglement of Ukrainian national interests in Soviet-wide political and economic developments.

In April 1968 Pyotr Y. Shelest, the Ukraine's Party leader, forcefully stated the Party's views on the efforts of the nationalist intellectuals who are striving to keep alive Ukrainian culture, language and literature in an increasingly Russified environment when he said:

"Drivel about so-called independence, about a sort of degradation of culture and language, is rotten bait that will be taken only by a person who is politically blind, a narrow-minded and embittered man, demagogues or degenerates, or by persons who oppose everything our people do."

(Shelest, though of Ukrainian origin, is in fact Moscow's proconsul in the Ukraine. He could hardly be considered the chief representative of Ukrainian interests in Moscow.)

The reaction of the Ukrainian people has been vigorous and widespread. Their protests have resulted in hundreds of trials and imprisonments which were almost completely unknown to the free world. In the past year or so, however, many details of this protest movement have leaked to the west. They are presented in several articles which are attached and which discuss the struggle going on between the Ukrainians and Moscow. Deserving special attention for its rich documentation is a recently published book The Chornovil Papers, a review of which is attached.

#### The Baltic Area

Intense national pride characterizes the Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians in spite of forced large-scale transfers of those people to Eastern parts of the USSR after World War II. Their pride is expressed in many ways, including, according to Western travellers, their frequent refusal to speak Russian in public. The failure of the Soviets to suppress nationalism in the Baltic area, even among the Soviet-educated youth, is apparent from the admission in Pravda that bourgeois nationalism can "penetrate the minds of people who themselves have never set eyes on bourgeois society".

#### Central Asia

About 14 million Muslims live in the Kazakh, Uzbek, Kirgiz, Tadzhik, and Turkmen Republics of Soviet Central Asia. There is a wide gap between these Turkic and Iranian Peoples, most of whom adhere to the Islamic religion and Muslim customs, and the more than six million Russians, caused not only by cultural differences but also by differences in political, economic, and social status.

Moscow's objective in this large area has been to promote the development of mineral and agricultural resources. The peoples of Central Asia have resented outsiders coming in to manage new developments. They have also resented the attempts of the regime to eliminate their national character. Their opposition provoked Uzbek Party chief Rashidov to state that:

"Nationalist remnants are at times manifested by an effort to emphasize national exclusiveness, to idealize the past, to exaggerate the role of one people and denigrate the role of other peoples in the achievement of common victory, and to perpetuate old, harmful customs

and morals under the guise of national traditions. There are also still such abnormal phenomena, inherited from the past, as a feudal-bey attitude toward women and the observance of religious ceremonies. Instances are observed when individuals try to exaggerate the significance of the national cultures, and thus to create artificial barriers to their rapprochement."

Two current developments in Central Asia indicate the nature of unsolved problems in that area. The first concerns the poor economic and political management by the Party leadership in the Tadzhik Republic, where almost 60 percent of the population is Tadzhik, one of the Iranian peoples. The influential magazine Partinaya Zhizn (Party Life) in its January 1969 issue complains that capital invested in the Republic by Moscow is not being put to good use. Expensive irrigation projects are under-used. Industrial facilities suffer a shortage of workers. Not enough attention is paid to employing the "indigenous population" in industry. Few Tadzhiks are working in industrial production jobs at the Republic's chemical, machinery, and metal plants. Waste and embezzlement of "socialist party property" is not resolutely resisted by managers, some of whom are accused of engaging in fraud and account padding.

As if to explain these economic shortcomings, Party Life has this to say about the relationships of the party and the people:

"The Party organizations of the republic are not directing sufficient ideological and educational work toward the formation among all the workers of a Marxist-Leninist ideology and toward increasing their production and social activity. Atheistic propaganda has recently slackened, and the activities of the clergy and the religious sects have increased. A persistent struggle is not being conducted against vestiges of the past in the minds of the people, in their everyday contribution and family relations. This concerns especially the creation of conditions for the more active participation of women in public and cultural life...The proportion of women among communists is decreasing....The activities of many cultural institutions do not meet modern requirements....Mass-political work does not reflect sufficiently the peculiarities of the republic, the needs of various strata and groups of the population, and the necessity of more active introduction of general Soviet traditions into the everyday life of the Tadzhik people."

The other development concerns the long-exiled Crimean Tatars, 11 of whose leaders were reportedly to have been tried in the Uzbek Republic capital of Tashkent in late March 1969 for disseminating "anti-Soviet material." In the early days of Soviet power Lenin cultivated the Crimean Tatars, one of the Turkic peoples, providing them with their own autonomous republic, political and economic responsibilities, and the right to practice their own religion. In 1928 Stalin arrested the Tatar President as a "bourgeois nationalist" and later executed him; the intelligentsia subsequently were

executed or sent to concentration camps; and the Tatar clergy was almost entirely eliminated. At the end of World War II, during which 8,000 to 20,000 Tatars fought with the German army, the entire Crimean Tatar population of 250,000 was deported to the Uzbek Republic under such grisly conditions that 46 percent of them (mostly women and children) died. Khrushchev, referring to this act of Stalin, as well as to parallel mass deportations of the Chechen, Ingush, Karachai, Balkar, and Kalmyk Peoples, said in his February 1956 "secret speech":

"No sane person can understand how it was possible to accuse whole peoples, including women, children and old folk, of treason.... subject them to mass repression, condemn them to poverty and suffering for the hostile acts of individuals or groups."

In September 1967 a decree of the USSR's Supreme Soviet revoked the sweeping accusations against the Crimean Tatars and restored their rights as Soviet citizens and some of their cultural rights. However, the decree failed to address itself to the question of restoring the Crimean Tatars homes and land. In fact, the Crimean Tatars are still prevented from returning to the Crimea in spite of a labor shortage there which is being solved by bringing even more Russians and Ukrainians into the Crimean Peninsula.

It was to demonstrate their desire to return to their homeland that the Crimean Tatars planned a celebration of Lenin's birthday on 21 April 1968, in the Uzbek city of Chirchik. The demonstration was brutally put down by Soviet troops and militia. Subsequent petitions of the Crimean Tatars have apparently produced no concessions from the Soviet regime. On the contrary, the Tatars seem to have succeeded only in bringing the Soviet law down on them. The judgments in the Tashkent trial will show whether the winds of change in Central Asia are Lenin-like or Stalin-like.

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TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT  
London, 30 January 1969

## MOSCOW VERSUS THE UKRAINE

VYACHESLAV CHORNOVIL (Editor): *The Chornovil Papers*. 246pp. McGraw-Hill. £2 5s.

It is generally believed that one of the most violent of the Moscow hawks who advocated the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia last August was Pyotr Shelest, a member of the Moscow Politburo and head of the Ukrainian Communist Party. His great fear was that the spirit of independence shown by the Czechs since the previous January might well spread to the Ukraine, among whose young intellectuals strong "Away-from-Moscow" moods had been developing for several years. Some of them even liked to invoke the Soviet Constitution of 1936, under which each of the fifteen republics had the legal right to secede from the Soviet Union and declare itself an independent state. But Moscow's answer to such aspirations has been simply: "Just you try!" Any claims to greater (if not complete) national independence in the Ukraine, as elsewhere, are dismissed by the Moscow authorities as dangerous manifestations of a "bourgeois nationalism".

There has been, in recent years, a very remarkable development in the Ukraine; if, in the past, Ukrainian "nationalism" was associated with all that was most reactionary, Fascist, pro-Nazi, anti-Russian, anti-Polish and anti-semitic in the country, there has lately developed in Kiev, Lvov, Odessa and other Ukrainian cities a liberal intelligentsia with aspirations for greater intellectual freedom who are increasingly hostile to the Russification of the Ukraine—carried out in a variety of ways described in *The Chornovil Papers*—as being entirely contrary to Lenin's nationalities policy. They feel even more strongly about the Moscow-directed police terror which, judging from *The Chornovil Papers*, became particularly violent in the Ukraine after the early months of 1965, that is, since Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev as head of the C.P.S.U.

Chornovil himself—born in 1938

and, until his arrest in 1967, a journalist and member of the staff of Lvov television—was arrested and deported after refusing to appear as a witness in one of the numerous secret trials, particularly of writers and other intellectuals, which have been going on in recent years in the Ukraine—as also in Moscow, Leningrad and other places. He refused to give evidence on the ground that the secret trial was illegal in itself and that, under the arbitrary application of Article 62 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code, any expression of independent thought tended to be interpreted by the prosecution as a criminal conspiracy against the state and the social system.

*The Chornovil Papers* consists chiefly of the memoranda, petitions and other documents written by Chornovil himself and some twenty other Ukrainian intellectuals who have in recent years been deported to camps in the Mordvinian Autonomous Republic, which seems to have become the principal area for the post-Khrushchev concentration camps.

As both Professor Z. Brzezinski in his foreword, and Professor F. C. Baughorn in his introduction point out, the nationalities problem is becoming an increasingly acute one in the Soviet Union, where Russian population scarcely exceeds 50 per cent. The "Away-from-Moscow" polycentrism—which has been manifesting itself not only in a vast and rich country like the Ukraine, with a population of more than forty millions, but also in Georgia, Armenia and even "backward" Muslim countries like Bashkiria, as well as in Leningrad, with its European and old anti-Moscow tradition—is one of the greatest nightmares of the Kremlin today. In a spirit completely contrary to Lenin's nationalities policy, it was Stalin who, at the end of the Second World War, declared the Russians to be the "best" of the peoples of the Soviet Union, thus giving them a kind

of *Herrenvolk* status in relation to the other nations of the multinational country.

How, if ever, the non-Russian nationalities will acquire independence or at any rate a greater autonomy in relation to Moscow is one of the great historical questions of the next few decades.

For the present the prospects of the non-Russian nationalities being allowed to develop a "polycentrist" outlook are scarcely promising; for if such "polycentrism" in even a non-member of the Soviet Union like Czechoslovakia was intolerable to Moscow, one can imagine how many more tanks would be dispatched to Kiev, or Tbilisi, or Erevan if, by some miracle, the now Moscow-dominated Central Committees of the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union were suddenly to elect to the highest party post so many Dubček of their own—men who would reflect the national aspirations of their own people, but would be totally unacceptable to Moscow. Or is it conceivable that a more liberal leadership will, in a more or less foreseeable future, gain control of the C.P.S.U. itself and bring about a genuine de-Stalinization, both in the national and in the ideological field? So far the "Heirs of Stalin" (wholly indifferent, it seems, to what the people of the non-Russian territories of the Soviet Union, or of Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Rumania, or the French and Italian communist parties think) seem more determined than ever to support a system under which Russian Great Power nationalism, but no other, is permissible.

VICTOR ZORZA

## Nationalism Has Soviet Union Worried

The rising tide of nationalism among the peoples who make up the Soviet Union is causing concern in Moscow. Danger signals are coming in from areas as far apart as the Ukraine on the western border and Tadjikistan in Soviet Central Asia, as well as from the Baltic Republics, which were annexed by the Soviet Union only during the last war.

In the past, repeated waves of nationalism in the non-Russian areas were suppressed by wholesale deportations, arrests, and purges of party officials who spoke up for the interests of their own nationalities. But now Pravda, mindful of what happened in Czechoslovakia, is handling the Soviet Union's own nationalists with kid gloves—for the time being, at least.

Symptoms of nationalism should not be underestimated, it says, but it also adds—evidently in reply to those who want firm action now—that it would be wrong to "exaggerate" them.

What are these symptoms? Pravda speaks in generalities. Nationalism, it says, can disguise itself as an attempt to make one's own republic "flourish," as a desire to "exploit fully" its potential and thus takes the form of "disdain for contacts" with other Soviet republics.

Translated, this means that there are Ukrainians, and Tadjiks, and members of other nationalities in the 17 republics which make up the Soviet Union, who want to be masters each in their own house. The Ukraine, with its population of 47 million and an industry that stands comparison with the best in Europe, is still ruled largely from Moscow which decides the policy for the country as a whole, and therefore for each of its constituent parts.

This applies even more to the smaller republics. Yet the Russians, who largely make the policy, comprise only half the country's population.

Nor do the Russians rule the other republics only from Moscow. They hold many key posts in the capitals of the republics, where only the representative positions are reserved for indigenous officials. Pravda admits, in effect, the existence of resentment against this when it deplors "the distrust of cadres of other nationalities" and "the querades as a legitimate

urge to cultivate national cadres."

Thus, when the Party Central Committee in Moscow rebuked last month the leaders of the Tadjik republic for promoting to important posts certain people who were "without the necessary political and business-like qualities," it was really saying that the Tadjiks had been appointing their own officials to key posts instead of Russians, who were better qualified.

Eight years ago a big purge in Tadjikistan led to the dismissal of the leading Tadjik officials on exactly the same charges, which were accompanied then, as now, by criticism of the prevalence of Moslem customs. The same criticism is repeated now, but it is pitched in a lower key.

In the Baltic republic of Latvia, even the prime minister is making veiled complaints about Moscow's interference with the economic development of his area, but nobody has pulled up short yet. Ten years ago the Latvian deputy prime minister was dismissed with ignominy for the "narrow nationalism" which caused him to seek "the destruction ties" between Latvia and Russia proper. As Pravda now explains, survivals of nationalism are indeed the invisible allies of the Soviet Union's enemies—"but this does not mean that anyone who commits nationalist errors may be regarded as an alien character."

The Kremlin's commendable self-restraint is undergoing its most difficult test in the Ukraine, where a new economic nationalism is beginning to merge with the old-established cultural and the long-suppressed political ingredients to produce what is potentially a most explosive mixture.

The East Europeans, and particularly the Czechoslovaks, have long complained that the imposition on them by Moscow of its own pattern of industrial development, with primary emphasis on heavy industry, has hamstrung their development of the modern industries which are more important today. Now the same complaints may be between the lines of Ukrainian economic journals, which are beginning to hint at the damage to the Ukrainian economy caused by Moscow's continuing insistence on this poli-

The most important of these, "the economy of the Soviet Ukraine," notes that for many years "huge capital investments" went primarily into the heavy industry of the Ukraine's old-established industrial centres.

At the same time, the areas which needed new labor-intensive industries to absorb their surplus manpower, were starved of capital. Now there were "in our republic" whole branches of industry—in chemicals, light industry, engineering—which had still not attained "a satisfactory level of development." And the magazine complains of the electronics and motor car industries, that is those which really matter in a modern economy.

It lists "the most important products" which, in its view, the Ukraine makes in "inadequate quantities" and which therefore have to be imported from other republics—from metal cutting tools to washing machines and refrigerators. The predominance of heavy industry in the Ukraine used to be something to boast about, but now the magazine reminds Moscow that it played a major role in the development "not only of our republic, but of the entire Soviet Union," while the Ukraine's labor-intensive industries "lagged considerably behind."

It is, in short, a cry for more capital, which the Ukraine believes it has earned by its own exertions, and which is being siphoned off to other areas to the detriment of its own population.

It is a cry that is today being heard in many parts of the world, where the rise of regional and national ambitions can hardly be blamed on the communist mismanagement of the economy.

But in Communist countries, with their ideologically predetermined centralization of economic and political decision-making, this cry has a power and an eloquence all its own. In the Soviet Union, moreover, it combines with the traditional distrust and envy which subject peoples develop for "imperial" rulers, whether they be Russians or Britons. The analogy must not be taken too far, because in most cases the Russians have become integrated in the social fabric of the nations they have ruled to a much greater

extent than the British ever did.

In one sense, indeed, this is the cause, of the present trouble in the Ukraine, where the Russians comprise a third of the urban population. And in many of the important towns their proportion rises to a half.

It is the rural population, the "Helots," that is overwhelmingly Ukrainian. The Russian-dominated towns rule the country. They have a much higher standard of living.

Much of the teaching is done in Russian, so that Ukrainians in their own country sometimes find it more expedient to send their children to non-Ukrainian schools.

Before the revolution, Ukrainians had to fight very hard for the rights of their own language, so that this struggle became something of a barometer of national feeling.

Now the increasing use of Russian has led to widespread "nationalist" demands that more textbooks, particularly for universities, should be printed in Ukrainian. When the issue was put to the party secretary responsible for ideology, he gave the standard reply that what was important was that technology should develop, "not the language in which the textbooks are published."

More recently, however, the Ukrainian Party's first secretary, Mr. Shelest, has announced that it was time to compile new textbooks—"and, most important of all, they must be published in Ukrainian."

At the same time, the party press keeps calling for a "merciless struggle" against every manifestation of nationalism. It is less than 50 years since the Ukraine boasted, for a brief spell after the revolution, an independent national statehood.

Long after the last war, Ukrainian nationalists, who had collaborated with Hitler in the hope that he might restore the Ukraine's independence, continued to harass the Soviet administration from their forest hideouts.

Today young Ukrainians, in prison for demanding freedom of thought—as the young Russians in prison for demanding national heroism. More Ukrainian textbooks are no doubt welcome, but this is only a begin-

ning. Politics and language, these are at issue now. Concessions will only lead to further nationalist demands. Repression will only strengthen the nationalist sentiment, in the Ukraine as well as in the other republics. Nationalism is on the rise throughout the world, but the Czechoslovakia shows—is less able to accommodate itself to it than other regimes. If Moscow does not learn the lesson soon it will be faced with another Czechoslovakia—this time inside the Soviet Union.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
20 February 1969

## Ukrainian Mystery: Library Fires

By PETER GROSE

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 19

There was an explosion, and then a fire. Historic collections of Ukrainian and Jewish archives were destroyed as the blaze swept through a 17th-century monastery library in Kiev, capital of the Soviet Ukraine.

An obscure paragraph in a local Kiev newspaper, *Kyivska Pravda*, reported the destruction last November of the Church of St. George in the Vydubetsky Monastery, along with its priceless Slavic and Hebraic manuscripts.

Strange coincidences attach to this event, which otherwise could have been only a tragic but routine incident. The same night, Nov. 26, 1968, another mysterious fire was reported to have destroyed the Great Synagogue in the Ukrainian port of Odessa, destroying a library of Jewish documents.

And the fire at St. George's Church was the second time in recent years that archives of Ukrainian history had been destroyed by a large fire of obscure origin.

In the first fire, in 1964, documents on Ukrainian history and culture were destroyed in the library of the republic's Academy of Sciences.

### Political Implications Raised

To Ukrainians living in this country and Canada, and to many analysts of Soviet affairs, the fires have political implications concerning the whole problem of national minorities under Soviet Russian rule.

Cultural and religious suppression of the Jews of the Soviet Union has been widely noted through the years. The Ukrainian nationality and heritage has been a more intermittent target of the Kremlin's drive for cultural assimilation.

Starting with the arrests and secret trials of dozens of Ukrainian intellectuals in the autumn of 1965, there is mounting evidence of a Soviet police drive to clamp down on dissident writers and teachers whose calls for cultural freedom are blended into their heritage.

Soviet spokesmen often de-

revolutionary culture as "bourgeois nationalism," anti-Soviet and subversive. The existence of nationalist dissent in the Ukraine is cited by Western analysts as one of the main reasons why the Kremlin decided to occupy Czechoslovakia last August and reverse the liberalization movement in Prague, before its effects spread across the Carpathian Mountains to the western Ukraine.

It is this context that gives the fires of Nov. 26, 1968, their political overtones, for irreplaceable archives of the Ukrainian heritage and that of Jews settled in the Ukraine were reported to have gone up in smoke. Exactly what manuscripts were destroyed in Odessa is not yet known here.

### Archives From Jewish Centers

The Hebraic collections of the Vydubetsky Monastery consisted mainly of archives from two Jewish institutions that were closed in 1933-34, the Vinchevsky Hebrew Library and the Scientific Research Institute of Hebrew Proletarian Culture of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

These institutions had over 150,000 volumes in their libraries when they were liquidated. The collections were transferred to the Vydubetsky Monastery in 1934.

The Slavic collection included Ukrainian archives from the Czarist and Hapsburg past, when the Ukraine was divided between Russian and Austro-Hungarian rule.

The collection contained some of the manuscripts that had escaped destruction when, four and a half years earlier, the library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev was set afire.

The Odessa synagogue fire originated from a short circuit in an adjoining matzoh bakery, according to a report from Moscow released by the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The Vydubetsky Monastery fire is under investigation, the Ukrainian press agency said.

But the first fire, on May 14, 1964, was acknowledged by officials in Kiev to have been arson. The fire, which burned Pohluszhalsky was tried in Kiev in August, 1964, sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on a

court finding that he was emotionally unbalanced.

The official version was that he had set the blaze in anger over a feud with the chief librarian.

George Luckyj, professor of Russian and Ukrainian literature at the University of Toronto, was in Kiev at the time and witnessed the fire.

He wrote this description in the academic journal *Problems of Communism*, published by the United States Information Agency.

"Standing in a crowd of rather apathetic spectators," Mr. Luckyj wrote in a recent article, "I was struck by the magnitude of the blaze (it was still burning the next day). When no word about this disaster appeared in the local press, I talked to some Ukrainian writers who told me that they thought the fire was an act of sabotage, but they had no answer as to who might be the saboteur."

Many months later an anonymous pamphlet reached the West, one of the first of the so-called "underground" documents to be smuggled out of the Soviet Union, describing the trial and charging that the arson had been a deliberate maneuver of the Soviet secret police, the K.G.B., to wipe out archives that could have been a rallying point for Ukrainian nationalist sentiments.

Among the manuscripts destroyed were records of Ukrainian folklore, literature and history, including documents of the short-lived anti-Soviet Ukrainian regime of 1918-19.

The library of the Academy of Sciences, in downtown Kiev, had the largest collection of Ukrainian writings known to exist. "A portion of those archives was not even catalogued yet so that no one knows what there was and exactly what burned," the underground pamphlet said. "They are lost forever to history."

Whatever was left when the fire was extinguished was taken to the Pohluszhalsky Monastery near Dnipro, overlooking the Dnieper River.



THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 25, 1969

*Soviet Union***The Ukrainians argue back**

FROM A CORRESPONDENT

The Ukrainians' national history has long provided a battleground for scholars; they attack and defend the very notion of the Ukraine's nationhood, which can only be said to have existed in clear-cut forms for brief periods in the seventeenth century and from 1917 to 1919. The ancient folk culture of the Ukraine, especially strong in song and dance, developed into a literary culture only during the 19th century. And while political divisions, stemming mainly from the endless partitions between Poland, Russia, Austro-Hungary and even Turkey, have always been legion, since 1596 there has also been religious division between the Orthodox church and the Uniates, the Catholics of the eastern rite.

The many ironies and paradoxes of Ukrainian history have only been compounded since the communist revolution. On the one hand, the Soviet leaders have been chronically afraid of any attempts to promote Ukrainian separatism; this has led to massive repressions of "bourgeois nationalists" and the incorporation—to Stalin's relief—of all the Ukrainian lands, except a tiny enclave in Slovakia, into the Soviet Union during the second world war.

On the other hand, the Ukraine in this period has become for the first time, in theory at least, a clearly defined political nation, a sovereign republic with a constitution, the right to secede from the Soviet Union, a vote at the United Nations, and a population similar in size to that of Britain. With its advanced industries and great expanses of fertile soil, it clearly has far more claim to be a viable national state than many an emergent "nation" of Afro-Asia. Equally clearly, however, the Soviet leaders have no intention of conceding the claim.

The policies of Ukrainianisation followed during the first ten years of Soviet rule were drastically reversed about 1930. This reversal, which with ups and downs has continued ever since, has only recently provoked a strong reaction in the

Soviet Union. The most important documentary evidence of this reaction is "The Chornovil Papers" (McGraw-Hill) and Ivan Dzyuba's "Internationalism or Russification?" (Weidenfeld). Dzyuba, a literary critic, is now 37, and Vyacheslav Chornovil, a television journalist, is 30. Both argue as liberally minded Marxist Leninists. Neither advocates

Ukrainian separation, but they insist that people should not be imprisoned for supporting something which is permitted by the constitution. Neither is against the Russians or Russian culture, but they passionately oppose the Soviet government's policy of Russification. They also oppose anti-semitism.

Both books arose out of the wave of arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals which began in August 1965 and coincided with the arrest of Sinyavsky and Daniel in Moscow. The Ukrainians had not been sending manuscripts abroad, but in various ways they had been resisting Russification policies in cultural life. After a period of relaxation these got worse in 1958, and in the early 1960s certain individuals, including some lawyers and party members led by Lev Lukiyenko, were provoked into forming political groups advocating, among other things, separation for the Ukraine. But those arrested in 1965 were less concerned with politics as such than with Ukrainian culture and history. Their careers, trials and lives in the terrifying conditions of the Potnia labour camps are the subject matter of "The Chornovil Papers." The preface is a devastating analysis of the trials, which Chornovil shows to have been travesties of justice, even in terms of a system whose particular laws often grossly infringe the constitution.

Dzyuba's book was written just before the trials began, in the latter part of 1965. It is, above all, a sustained and anguished protest against the anti-Marxist reversal by Stalin and Khrushchev of Lenin's policy of Ukrainianising all aspects of life in the Ukraine. Yet, curiously, a certain dualism runs through the book: on the one side the methods of Russification, often similar to those of the Tsars, are shown to be having all too much success in de-Ukrainianising the urban, if not so much the rural, population, through the substitution of Russians for Ukrainians in the republic; the steady reduction of Ukrainian schools and Ukrainian publica-

tions; the official neglect or distortion of Ukrainian culture and history; the persecution of those who resist this; the enasculation of the Ukrainian party at government so that they have long been merely denationalised tools of the centre in the conducting of almost all official economic and military matters in the Russian language; and so on. But on the other side Dzyuba reports, and to some extent documents, a rapid increase in Ukrainian national consciousness among students, intellectuals and other social groups in recent years. This gives him cause for hope.

Certainly a protest sent by 130 Kiev Ukrainians to the Soviet leaders in the spring of 1968 lends the hope some justification. Its text, only recently available, contains very strong attacks on the illegal and juridically illiterate character of the trials of Ukrainians and on the Galanskov-Ginzburg trial in Moscow. It also gives a warning that "in the Ukraine, where the violations of democracy are being compounded and aggravated by malpractices over the national question, the symptoms of stalinism are revealing themselves even more clearly and brutally."

This letter is important not only because it shows Ukrainians making common cause with the Moscow radicals but also because its signatories include people from almost all the main intellectual groups, such as 14 writers, including Dzyuba, a leading film director S. Paradzhanov, and 20 physicist and mathematicians, all with high degrees. Other signatories are 27 workers of varying skills. The Ukrainians have not received much direct help from the Moscow intellectuals. But mutual cooperation may yet grow out of mutual awareness, the latter being made easier by the broadcasts of western radio stations to the Soviet Union.

The real seriousness of the nationalistic problem in the Soviet Union is still hard to gauge. Is it a more or a less serious cancer than in Tsarist days? Are the Ukrainians (or to take another example the Crimean Tatars) just isolated cases? Or will long-standing Georgian, Latvian, or Volga-German national movements suddenly emerge into public view as the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar ones did in 1966 and 1968?



# The Ukraine: Questing for Pride

By Stephen S. Rosenfeld

Washington Post Staff Writer

THE QUEST for racial pride which is so striking a feature of the American black community has its counterparts in many places, and not least in the Ukraine, a "state" in the Soviet Union. There in the last four or five years a determined effort to revive local self-respect, as against submersion in a Soviet sea, has come into public view. It is led by citizens of education and privilege, many of them members of the Communist Party, and apparently has touched other groups in the population as well.

The Soviet Union is a federation containing more than 100 "national" minorities, and the Great Russians at the center (a bare majority) have always feared national disintegration at the edges. For a decade after the 1917 revolution, Moscow bought the minorities' support with a permissive nationality policy. Under Stalin, Moscow reversed field, reimposing in effect the old Tsarist policy of "Russification." In the 1950s, Khrushchev undertook to sweeten centralist rule by improving living standards and public services. But a craving for "national" pride has persisted, perhaps intensified, through all that time.

Ukrainian "nationalism" has some special aspects. With the size of France and the population of Britain, the Ukraine is the Soviet Union's largest non-Russian republic. Its culture and history offer the stuff of national identity to those who seek it: Stalin and Roosevelt, for instance, could give the Ukraine its own United Nations seat. Then—an unnerving condition for Moscow—the Ukraine faces west and its most westerly part (formerly Galicia) has a unique Catholic and Austro-Hungarian heritage which has made it somewhat vulnerable to being tugged away from the Orthodox and more traditionally Russian-oriented eastern Ukraine. The Nazi invaders found most of their Ukrainian supporters in that western quarter.

THE UKRAINE has not enjoyed a very high repute in the United States. For one thing, many Russian, Jewish and Polish immigrants brought to this country a condescending view of Ukrainians, formed on European soil. Moreover, the organized Ukrainian-American community is dominated by Americans as the western Ukraine is by Ukrainians. Lev Dobriansky, author of the "Captive Nations Resolution," is prominent

among them. They tend to favor Ukrainian statehood, which would mean the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, and in pursuit of this goal they have practiced the harshest tactics of the cold war. Hence they have set themselves apart from the mass of Americans who, unconcerned with Ukrainian affairs per se, desire better relations with the Soviet Union.

Inside the Ukraine, Ukrainian liberals have come to associate themselves with liberals elsewhere in the Soviet Union. They seek not the establishment of a separate state but the use of the rights and freedoms formally guaranteed them by Soviet law. Their special interest has been to bring life to their own culture, history, and language.

THE LIBERALS in Moscow have managed to make contact with the many foreigners who live or visit there to spread word of their activities. Liberals in Kiev are more isolated, and most reliable information about them has come through documents. In careful respect to Soviet law, these documents have been submitted openly to Soviet officials before copies are sent abroad.

One such document which recently found its way to the West, through unofficial channels, suggests that Ukrainians were quick to see the danger for themselves which was posed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is a petition to the Soviet legislature from a poet named Karavanasky, who in 1966 was returned to prison to finish a 25-year Stalin-era sentence which had earlier been suspended.

"Please," Karavanasky wrote, "investigate the instances of antisocialist subversion in the world Communist movement recently committed by anti-Marxist elements which infiltrated the leading organs of the Soviet Union . . . and gave the Soviet army a provocative order to cross the borders and occupy the territory of socialist Czechoslovakia."

"As a result," he declared, "the normal existence of a fraternal country was disturbed. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was driven underground. Hostility towards the Soviet Union and its armed forces was evoked in the Czechoslovak nation. Anti-Soviet views were instilled among youth. The Soviet army was discredited as an army of occupation. A sweeping opposition movement was created in a socialist country."

Another document came from the "creative youth" (students, young writers, etc.) of Dnepropetrovsk. Addressed in original to Ukrainian officials, it complains of the "pogrom-like, savage" action of honest Ukrainian citizens" trig-

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of The Cathedral,  
a novel by the Ukrainian  
writer Oles Hon-  
char.

At first local news-  
papers reviewed the  
novel favorably but a  
month later the Party  
ordered a press cam-  
paign mounted against  
it. Letters protesting

this campaign were turned over to the  
KGB, the security police. Public discussion  
of the move was prohibited. For an earlier  
favorable review, one writer was expelled  
from the Party and fired from his job.  
Similar treatment befell another journalist  
who had replied to a review of the novel  
written by the "KGB lieutenant in charge  
of the information section" of the local  
newspaper.

After an "ordinary evening of poetry  
reading at the Prydneprovsk palace of cul-  
ture, the participants became objects of  
keen interest for detectives from the securi-  
ty organs. Many of them were summoned to  
farfical questioning sessions where terror  
and blackmail were applied against innocent  
people."

Other youths were punished for the  
"Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" invented  
on Korolenko Street (KGB headquarters)  
whereas it is in fact punishment for any  
sort of concern about the fate of Ukrainian  
language and culture in vastly Russified  
Dnepropetrovsk."

ALL THIS "for a population of almost  
one million there is not even one Ukrainian  
kindergarten or nursery, no university or  
technical institute where the language of  
instruction is Ukrainian; where Ukrainian  
workers have almost no knowledge of their  
native language and culture because, just  
as 50 years ago, they are forced to spend  
their entire lives being ground by the mill-  
stone of Russification."

"One wonders why it is that there is only  
one path open to the Ukraine's progressive  
and creative youth—the path of 'Ukrainian  
bourgeois' nationalism', because a large  
majority sooner or later steps onto this  
path. A person with an ordinary untwisted  
mentality would see in this only the first  
seeds of basic failings of national dignity,  
ordinary human dignity.

"Is 'bourgeois propaganda' to blame? No,  
Dnepropetrovsk reality!"

The documents asks why in the Ukraine,  
monuments and books and films cele-  
brate the Russian tsars' "colonial rob-  
beries, Asiatic barbarism and despotism"  
and "no one is willing to admit they fiercely  
hated Ukrainians, Tatars, Byelorussians,  
Poles, Georgians, and so on."

"What then is behind these rumors:  
'nationalistic danger' or that marauding  
bully, Great Russian chauvinism, about  
which no mention is ever made aloud, lest,  
God forbid, we insult the Russian nation?  
What snivelling courtesy! Who gave the  
authors of such rumors the right to trample  
the national dignity of the Ukrainian na-  
tion with their dirty Russifying boots? We  
feel such campaigns achieve only one thing—  
to sow hatred between two great nations."

# Breakdown of USSR Population by Nationalities per Official Soviet Census of 1959

NATIONALITY	SHARE OF POPULATION IN USSR (Percent)
Russian	54.65
Ukrainian	17.84
Byelorussians	3.79
Uzbeks	2.88
Tatars	2.38
Kazakhs	1.73
Azerbaijdzhanians	1.41
Armenians	1.34
Georgians	1.29
Lithuanians	1.11
Jews	1.09
Moldavians	1.06
Latvians	.67
Tadzhiks	.48
Turkmenians	.48
Esthonians	.47
Kirgizians	.46

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## Moscou s'inquiète de la montée des nationalismes

La montée du nationalisme parmi les populations qui forment les dix-sept républiques de l'Union soviétique devient un sujet d'alarme pour Moscou. Le danger se manifeste dans des régions aussi distantes et dissimilaires que l'Ukraine à l'ouest, le Tadjikistan en Asie centrale, et les pays baltes, qui furent annexés par l'U.R.S.S. au début de la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

Dans le passé, le remède était simple : les vagues successives de nationalisme dans les territoires non russes étaient supprimées par le procédé des déportations massives. Les arrestations et les « purges » de fonctionnaires du Parti qui plaidaient en faveur de leurs intérêts « nationaux », faisaient le reste.

Aujourd'hui, cependant, la « Pravda », méditant la leçon de la Tchécoslovaquie, manipule avec précaution le problème du nationalisme dans les républiques soviétiques. Au moins pour le moment. Dans son langage, ganté pour l'occasion, elle convient qu'« il ne faut pas sous-estimer les symptômes de nationalisme ». Mais ajoute, à l'intention de ceux qui voudraient une action immédiate et dure : « Il serait faux d'en exagérer la portée. »

Quels sont ces symptômes ? Selon la « Pravda », le nationalisme peut exprimer un désir « d'épanouissement », et se traduire alors par un « dédain pour les contacts » avec les autres républiques soviétiques. En termes plus clairs, cela signifie qu'il y a des Ukrainiens, des Tadjiks, et d'autres membres de la « famille » soviétique qui témoignent d'une même volonté d'être maîtres chez soi.

Fringale de capitaux. Forte d'une population de 47 millions d'habitants et d'une industrie qui soutient la comparaison avec ce qu'il y a de plus avancé en Europe, l'Ukraine est, pour l'essentiel, gouvernée à partir de Moscou. Aussi n'est-il pas étonnant d'y voir un nouveau nationalisme économique se combiner avec les vestiges d'anciennes revendications culturelles et politiques, en un mélange qui demain pourra se révéler explosif. A maintes reprises, la presse des pays de l'Est s'était élevée contre les priorités imposées par le pouvoir soviétique, en particulier le développement obligatoire de l'industrie lourde au détriment de la promotion de secteurs industriels plus modernes et plus utiles.

Cette protestation se retrouve maintenant dans les journaux ukrainiens, qui mettent l'accent sur le préjudice causé aux intérêts nationaux de l'Ukraine par la persistance de cette politique. La plus importante de ces publications, « L'Economie de l'Ukraine soviétique », relève que « pendant une période de plusieurs années, d'énormes capitaux ont été consacrés au renforcement de l'industrie lourde dans des zones déjà industrialisées », alors que des projets qui auraient permis d'employer un surplus de main-d'œuvre dans d'autres parties du territoire ukrainien étaient sevrés d'investissements.

A cette fringale de capitaux, s'ajoute le besoin impérieux d'arrêter soi-même ses propres décisions, et non de subir celles des autres. Ce sentiment est à l'origine du malaise présent de l'Ukraine, où les Russes ne constituent, en moyenne, que le tiers de la population urbaine. Avant

la Révolution, les Ukrainiens ont eu à lutter pour la défense des droits de leur langue. Cette exigence « nationaliste » resurgit aujourd'hui, et M. Pierre Chelest, premier secrétaire du P.c. de l'Ukraine, a dû admettre qu'il était temps d'établir de nouveaux livres scolaires, et « surtout de les publier en ukrainien ».

Des gens du terroir. Adossé à l'Afghanistan et à la frontière chinoise, le Tadjikistan, avec ses deux millions et demi de musulmans, n'est qu'un petit maillon dans la chaîne du système soviétique. Ses autorités n'en ont pas moins été rappelées à l'ordre, le mois dernier, par le Comité central du Parti, à Moscou, pour avoir promu à des postes importants « des personnes ne possédant pas les qualifications politiques et la compétence nécessaires ».

Traduction : les Tadjiks ont préféré nommer des gens du terroir plutôt que des Russes. Il y a huit ans, la même « déviation » avait emporté les dirigeants tadjiks dans une vaste « purge ».

Récidive également en Lettonie. Le Premier ministre letton avait été, il y a dix ans, ignominieusement chassé par Moscou pour avoir voulu « détruire les liens économiques entre son pays et la Russie ». L'actuel Premier ministre reprend, d'une voix plus voilée, le même effort d'indépendance. Il se plaint discrètement des interférences soviétiques dans le développement de la Lettonie.

L'Union soviétique connaît ainsi à son tour l'inévitable méfiance des peuples assujettis à l'égard de leurs maîtres, qu'ils soient russes ou colonisateurs occidentaux. VICTOR ZORZA □

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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8

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THE SOVIET PRESS SCORES FINLAND'S INDEPENDENT THINKING

Several articles published in the Soviet press during February 1969 were designed to undermine factions in Finland which had had the audacity to criticize the Soviet Union or which had been viewed by the Soviet leadership as drifting dangerously close to independent thinking. The articles, which appeared in Pravda and Izvestiya, are a manifestation of the approach used by the USSR's present leadership to subdue or subjugate its allies and political intimates. Attacked by the Soviet press were:

-- "rightists" in the Finnish Communist Party and "reactionary forces" in the Finnish parliament who by devious means sought "to undermine Finnish-Soviet cooperation";

-- Finland's haste to join forces with the Nordic Economic Union; and, most pointedly,

-- unnamed elements of Finland's leading Social Democratic Party who were accused not only of opposing Finnish-Soviet economic cooperation, but also of seeking to curtail Finnish-Soviet trade.

The Communists

The Finnish Communist Party (FCP) was chastized by one of Pravda's leading editorialists, Korionov, in two articles published on 9 and 11 February. The articles elaborated the dangers of a whole series of "rightist" deviations, the most serious of which was criticism of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. The immediate intent of the articles was to influence delegates to the FCP Congress of 3-6 April to support the Party's "Stalinist" members who in turn could alter the Party's official stand of strong condemnation of the USSR for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The articles also were intended as a reminder that the Finnish economy and "high standard of living" depend on cooperation with the Soviet Union. Korionov wrote: Thousands of Finnish workers in machine-building, timber and other enterprises are working on orders for the USSR, and many factories depend on Soviet raw material. But it is not merely that Finnish-Soviet economic relations are a key factor in solving employment problems in this country. Trade with the USSR provides the Finnish economy with important goods without using the scarce foreign currency of western countries, thus also strengthening the trade balance. Therefore the Communists' struggle against forces opposing economic cooperation with the USSR is a struggle for the workers' vital interests."

### The Members of Parliament

The most strident allegations that Finnish right-wing forces were undermining relations with the Soviet Union appeared in a 7 February Pravda article (copy of which is attached) signed "Observer," indicative of an authoritative source. The article attacked by name three members of the Finnish parliament and two conservative newspapers. One of the members of parliament under attack had, in two recent parliamentary addresses, criticized the gullible attitude of many in Finland regarding the communist threat to Finnish independence in the light of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (summary from the Finnish press attached). He also pointed out the dire implications for Finland of the "Brezhnev Doctrine."

### Opposition to Nordec

Articles designed to slow down Finland's embrace of the Nordic Economic Union (Nordec) were carried in the 3 February editions of Pravda and Izvestiya. Pravda said "the dangers involved in the Nordec plans for expanded economic cooperation include the fact that it would make the road easier for those who would want to link the Nordic countries to the Common Market and subordinate their national interests to international monopolies (and to NATO)." Izvestiya called Nordec a variation of the EEC theme and quoted Norwegian and Danish business leaders who took a negative view of the project. The Soviet articles echoed the position of the Finnish Communists who released a statement, 27 January, to the effect that "the Communist Party of Finland is against the country's affiliation with Nordec." (Moscow, TASS, 27 January 1969). At a press conference in Stockholm on 19 January, Finnish Prime Minister Koivisto, who is also leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and head of the five-party coalition, enthusiastically advocated Finnish membership in Nordec and said his government had discussed the matter with Moscow and that Nordec would not interfere with Finnish-Soviet trade. One can speculate that the 7 February Pravda attacks against Finnish SDP leaders might be an indication that Moscow may attempt to veto Finnish participation in Nordec, or stipulate onerous conditions for Finland's entry.

### The Social Democrats and Finnish-Soviet Trade

The primary target of the previously cited 7 February Pravda article was the Social Democratic Party (SDP), partially to keep the SDP on the defensive regarding SDP-CPSU relations, but primarily to castigate those SDP leaders opposing further expansion of Finnish-Soviet trade.

Since 1958 the Soviets have regarded the SDP as their most formidable political enemy in Finland and have devoted ten years of unremitting pressuring to neutralize the party. The era can be fairly documented as a systematic campaign of neutralization (highlights are covered in the attached excerpts from Time and Newsweek articles) which culminated in a May 1968 meeting of SDP-CPSU leaders, marking the first visit to Moscow by a West European Social Democratic Party for purposes of party-to-party dis-

cussions. The final invitation to the SDP, pending ever since it was first offered in 1966, came more as a "summons" on 14 May; the SDP delegation took off for Moscow on 15 May. In February the SDP had shunted aside a candidate as successor to the out-going Prime Minister because he was "unacceptable to the Soviets." In April, the SDP ambiguously advocated recognition of "both Germanies" in a move to appease Moscow. By May, the SDP was apparently "fraternally acceptable" to Moscow.

The danger of the Soviets' acquiring a stranglehold over the SDP, the leading party in Finland's coalition government, appears to have stiffened SDP leadership efforts to resist further incursions. This resistance was the main target of Pravda which, in its first anti-SDP utterance in two years, cited the reemergence of right-wing elements in the SDP, even though the Party was pledged to advance the cause of Soviet-Finnish friendship. Pravda alledged that arguments in the Finnish press and Parliament (from SDP and other parliamentarians) against the purchase of Soviet electric locomotives and a Soviet nuclear power plant were inspired by extremists closely connected with Western monopoly capital. This attack is a good example of the Soviets' habit of coupling political with economic interests: They attacked the SDP because it had begun to cool off (as a result of Czechoslovakia) but disguised the main target of their attack as a promotion effort to sell some goods.

It is not so much the value of these two purchases that seems to disturb the Soviets. The disturbing element appears to be the possibility that the Finns might be tending toward a greater orientation toward the West. Thus, there is considerable Soviet concern about the course of negotiations now underway for a new five-year Finnish-Soviet trade agreement to replace the current one, which expires in 1970. Through the new agreement the Soviets hope to commit Finland to a 30 per cent increase in her purchases from the USSR. The current Finnish-Soviet trade balance favors Finland. Realization of the Soviet demand for a 30 per cent increase, even extended over a five-year period and considered in terms of normal growth rates, will make Finland even more deeply dependent on the Soviet Union. (The Finnish trade situation is described in the attached articles from the New York Times and Le Monde.)

PRAVDA

7 February 1969

"Against the Interests of Soviet-Finnish Friendship"

Matters concerning the development of Finnish-Soviet relations attract the attention of Finnish national circles and the entire nation, which is fully understandable because in the present difficult international situation the successful development of these relations on the basis of mutual respect, equality, and friendship gives Finland the opportunity to pursue a policy that insures its security and is in the best national interests of the Finnish people.

One may note with satisfaction that traditional Soviet-Finnish cooperation was further strengthened last year. Evidence of this was President Urho Kekkonen's friendly meetings with Soviet leaders last summer in the USSR and his discussions with Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Aleksey Kosygin in Helsinki last October. These meetings again reaffirmed the readiness of both sides to further develop fruitful cooperation in the field of politics, economics, and culture.

The usefulness of Finnish-Soviet trade relations and economic cooperation has frequently been noted in Finnish national and business circles. The Finnish press has often emphasized that trade with the USSR gives Finland the possibility of providing mass employment for Finnish workers and of developing certain branches of the economy, whose main products are exported to the Soviet Union. Based on the principle of mutual benefit, the Soviet Union for its part exports to Finland traditional export goods and always shows a readiness to consider the requirements and demands of its northern neighbor. Both sides are now working on a new long-term agreement for 1971-1975, which will undoubtedly serve to further expand economic ties between our two countries.

Another sign of Soviet good will was the recent discussions between Soviet and Finnish organizations on how to use Finnish labor and machinery in construction projects on Soviet territory near the Finnish frontier. This Soviet step means a great deal to Finland, where, it is known, the problem of unemployment is still topical.

One would think that no doubts could be entertained in Finland on the usefulness and profitability of these links between the two countries. Nevertheless, there are forces in Finland using every pretext to try to undermine Finnish-Soviet cooperation. The most recent example of their activities is the fierce campaign started against the purchase in the USSR of a small consignment of electric locomotives that are necessary for the electrification of Finland's railways. These circles have unexpectedly raised an ordinary transaction--the price of the electric locomotives does not exceed 7 percent of the Soviet-Finnish annual trade exchange--to the level of a major political problem which has become the subject of fierce disputes in the government, the diet, and the press. It has been admitted in Finland that the USSR offers the best, most economical terms.

This rightwing behavior is not accidental. It is sufficient to recall that it was these same circles that previously opposed leasing that section of the Sainaa Canal lying inside the USSR from the Soviet Union and restoring this waterway in cooperation with the Soviet Union, the participation of the Soviet Union in building the Rautaruukki ironworks, the construction of a subway in Helsinki, and so forth. They also oppose by all means the consideration of major problems of Soviet-Finnish economic cooperation such as the possibility of delivering natural gas from the USSR to Finland and Soviet participation in constructing an atomic powerstation in Finland.



In all this, one can discern a certain political line inspired by extreme rightwing circles closely bound to Western monopoly capital. Ignoring political realities and the interests of the Finnish people, these circles strive by all means to undermine Finland's present foreign political course, which has stood the test of time and is directed toward friendship with the Soviet Union, and to again drag Finland into the wake of the Western imperialist policy. One should take note that such ardent opponents of Soviet-Finnish friendship as Junnila, Ehrnrooth, and Vennamo have quite clearly been working to that end. In the diet they openly urge a change in Finland's foreign policy, striving directly to harm Finnish-Soviet relations in all spheres.

One cannot help but see that along with the candid reactionaries, who have gathered round the well-known anti-Soviet papers UUSI SUOMI and AAMULEHTI, rightwing elements are raising their heads in other political parties. For instance, a number of Social Democrat diet members were stubbornly opposed to the purchase of the above-mentioned Soviet electric locomotives, although, as we know, the leaders of this party have frequently stated that the Finnish Social Democrats will do everything they can to develop further Finnish-Soviet relations. Within the Finnish Social Democrat Party there apparently are still forces that cannot relinquish the old course that Vaeinö Tanner bequeathed to them. The question unintentionally arises: Are the Social Democrats' statements a support for the course of friendship with the Soviet Union or a unique political gesture.

Progressive democratic circles in Finland realize quite clearly what danger lies in the intensified rightwing intrigues. Apparently, all those who truly cherish Finnish-Soviet friendship and who are interested in fresh practical measures to strengthen it will make new efforts to deliver a counterblow to these intrigues.

The Soviet people, who always display great interest in developing Soviet-Finnish relations, express the certainty that the friendship and cooperation between our two countries will grow steadfastly stronger because they are not based on fluctuating circumstances, but on the vital interests of the people of both countries.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT, Helsinki

8 February 1969

Editorial on Pravda attack (excerpts)

Although clearly a competent writer, the Pravda commentator in his article on Finland arrived at conclusions that are quite surprising to most Finns. Since no decision has yet been taken to build the Helsinki Metro, it is hard to see how anyone could have engaged in "harming Fenno-Soviet cooperation" on this score. And while decisions on economic matters here are not made in the same manner as in the Soviet Union, it is only natural that Diet members, for instance, should try to see to it that a steady level of employment is maintained in their constituencies, just as the Members from the Tampere area did in connection with the question of electric engines. It is futile, however, the paper continues, to try to correct such intentional or unintentional misconceptions as those found in Pravda.

The paper understands that the Pravda article closely represents the views of the Soviet leaders and the wording of the commentary suggests that it was addressed to Finnish rather than to Soviet readers. In terms of trade policy, its message is quite clear: referring to the preparations for the next long term trade agreement; all major forthcoming economic projects in the domain of foreign policy. As for domestic policy, the message is obviously addressed to the Social-Democrats. The SDP has apparently met with difficulties in trying to win the confidence of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Pravda's comments may have an impact on the current struggle within the SDP and its forthcoming Party Convention. The unreasonable sharpness of Pravda's criticism is quite odd. Getting rid of old suspicions presumably requires more patience than was believed.

In the Giant's Shadow

Finland's major achievement in the 20th century is that it still exists. It is thus little wonder that the 4,600,000 Finns intend to mark the 50th anniversary of their country's independence this year with a series of national celebrations. The festivities began this week with a parade of Finland's modest armed forces through the capital of Helsinki, whose distinction is that it is the world's second northernmost capital (after Iceland's Reykjavik). While the navy's Russian-built destroyers rode at anchor in the harbor, the army's British tanks and French artillery rolled through the streets toward Senate Square, where officials honored the memory of Field Marshal Baron Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, who half a century ago led the force that established Finland's democratic regime.

After two decades of peace, Finland had to fight not one but three wars during World War II: first the famed Winter War of 1939-40, in which it stalemated the invading Russians; then in 1941, when it fought the Russians again as a reluctant German ally; then again in 1944, when, having sued for peace with the Allies, it had to drive the Germans from its soil in a gory cleanup operation that took seven months.

**Sub-Zero Treks.** The war took a heavy toll. Finland lost 115,000 men (nearly 3% of its population), also had to pay Russia huge reparations and cede part of its land. The losses taught Finland a lesson. President Urho Kekkonen, now serving his eleventh year in that post, realized that his country must retain the favor of its Soviet neighbor. While this has not meant alliance with the Soviets, it has led to a neutrality that slightly favors them. Kekkonen keeps up his ties with the Russians; few men can boast of having established personal relationships with Stalin, Khrushchev, Kosygin and Brezhnev.

Newsweek, December 18, 1967  
(excerpts)

## The Other Anniversary

The irony of the occasion was almost as thick as the new-fallen blanket of snow on the ground. Massed on the platform of Helsinki's pink granite railway station early last week was the entire Finnish Cabinet led by President Urho Kekkonen. Finally, the Moscow Express ground to a stop in front of them and a Russian delegation, headed by no less a

dignitary than Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny, stepped down. Podgorny's breath condensed in thin streams of vapor as he returned Kekkonen's greeting. "We're happy to share your celebration as you shared ours," he said. And with that, everyone trudged off to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Finnish inde-

pendence on Monday, Dec. 1, 194000500120001-8

Finland's 50th year of successful resistance to becoming a Soviet Republic.

For most of those 50 years, Finnish sovereignty has been a touch-and-go affair. One of Lenin's first acts after the Bolshevik revolution was to allow independence to Finland, which had been a Romanov Grand Duchy since 1809. One of his next acts, however, was to give support to Finnish Communists who sought to take over the country by force. In the bitter civil war that followed, only the military genius of Field Marshal Baron Carl Gustaf Mannerheim saved the day for Finland's "Whites."

Mannerheim's triumph, however, simply postponed Soviet designs on Finland. In two hard-fought wars—in 1939-40 and 1941-44 the small but tough Finnish Army, after a series of brilliant initial victories, was ultimately worn down by superior Russian forces. As a result, the Finns were obliged to surrender to Moscow territories equal in size to Massachusetts and New Hampshire combined. But they somehow emerged with their independence intact and in 1948 nipped in the bud a coup d'état planned by their own Communist Party.

**Neutrality:** Since then, relations between Finland and Russia have vastly improved—largely because both have scaled down their ambitions. Russia, while apparently no longer bent on total conquest of Finland, still retains an important voice in Finnish affairs. (It was pressure from Moscow, for example, that kept Finland's Social Democrats out of the government until the party had jettisoned its most outspokenly anti-Communist leaders.) The Finns, for their part, cling religiously to a neutrality that, if anything, favors the Russians. Some of his countrymen believe that President Kekkonen carries deference to the Russians too far. But he has won himself invaluable popularity in Moscow by giving three Cabinet posts to members of the Finnish Communist Party (which in the last elections won some 20 per cent of the vote).

Relations with the Russians, in fact, are now so cordial that most Finns are far more concerned with their country's economic problems than with the threat of a Soviet take-over. Despite an appearance of prosperity—the Finnish standard of liv-

ing is on a par with that of most Western European nations—Finland currently suffers from inflation, unemployment and a nagging balance-of-payments deficit. The economic situation, indeed, is serious enough that Finland was obliged to devalue even before Britain did. But it would seem improbable that a nation with the guts and ingenuity to keep the Russians at arm's length for half a century cannot win its economic battles too.

CPYRGHT

NEW YORK TIMES  
13 December 1968

## FINLAND WALKING TRADE TIGHTROPE

*Tries to Remain Friendly  
With Russians While  
Dealing With West*

By JOHN M. LEE  
Special to The New York Times 1968  
HELSINKI, Finland, Dec. 13

The Soviet Union is casting a strong shadow over the trade policy of its democratic and neutralist neighbor, Finland.

Two recent issues have spotlighted the tightrope that Helsinki officials walk as they try to maintain friendly political and commercial relations with the Russians and simultaneously strengthen the Finnish economy and develop trade with Western nations.

One issue concerned a planned 500-megawatt nuclear power plant planned for Finland. This was canceled by Helsinki in a mood of frustration and despair at being subjected to competitive pressures between Soviet and Western bidders.

The other issue, which has rocked the Popular Front coalition Government, is the preference of Premier Mauno Kivisto for giving the Russians an order for up to 90 electric locomotives rather than building them in Finland. A final decision has been postponed.

"No one knows how much actual Russian pressure there is on these things," one observer outside the Govern-

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ment said. "But I suppose Finland's can be considered a small miracle these days. And you can't ignore all the wishes, direct or implied, of the Soviet Union." A Finnish official said, "No

country, not even the United States, acts without thinking about what others will think. A small country must think even more."

Moreover, any Finnish desire to assert greater economic independence from Moscow is tempered by the fact that existing trade relations are advantageous to Finland.

Under bilateral trade agreements, under which imports and exports are balanced, Finland relies on Communist-bloc countries for about 20 per cent of her trade—and on the Soviet Union alone for something over 17 per cent. (Britain, however, is still the largest export customer.)

Some Finnish industries are oriented toward Communist or-

ders. The metals and engineering industries, for example, send 45 per cent of their exports to the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations.

It is this industrial group where one hears much of the criticism of the locomotive order. Industry leaders say expertise and facilities were developed to make the locomotives, and the industry will now suffer if the order is lost.

The order is for 32 locomotives initially at a Soviet-bid price of about \$300,000 each. Some members of the Government have criticized the Premier's stated preferences. There has been a nationalistic outcry against the prospect of Finland's losing the order.

However, the Premier's supporters have argued that it is not possible for Finland to continue to import only raw materials and semimanufactured goods from the Soviet Union, while exporting Finnish industrial products, and that the trade between the two countries must become better balanced.

It is also argued that the credits built up through the Soviet manufactured goods can then be used to finance other Finnish exports.

On the nuclear-plant issue, there was a clear East-West choice, with Britain and Sweden entering bids, along with the Soviet Union, to build the atomic power plant at Lovisa, east of Helsinki.

## Visite officielle du ministre finlandais des affaires étrangères

De notre correspondant particulier ALAIN JACOB

Moscou, 19 février. — M. Ahti Karjalainen, ministre finlandais des affaires étrangères, arrivé lundi à Moscou, a l'invitation de son homologue soviétique, M. Gromyko, s'est entretenu dès le lendemain avec M. Kossyguine. M. Karjalainen doit séjourner pendant une semaine en U.R.S.S., et, bien qu'aucun détail n'ait été donné sur l'ordre du jour de ces conversations, il est aisé de deviner sur quels sujets ses interlocuteurs soviétiques désiraient entendre ses explications, voire ses assurances.

Ces sujets sont d'ordre à la fois commercial et politique et relèvent globalement de l'inquiétude de Moscou de voir la Finlande glisser insensiblement de ses positions actuelles de neutralité et de coopération avec l'Union soviétique vers une tendance plus occidentale.

Ces craintes se sont clairement exprimées dans un article de la Pravda du 7 février — trois jours avant l'annonce de la visite de M. Karjalainen, — mais on en retrouve trace également dans d'autres commentaires et informations.

Sur le plan purement commercial, il importe de se rappeler que la Finlande est l'un des tout premiers partenaires de l'U.R.S.S., qu'elle venait en 1967 au troisième rang parmi ses clients « bourgeois », au premier rang en tant que fournisseur. Un accord de commerce de cinq ans vient à expiration en 1970 et les discussions sur un nouvel accord portant sur la période 1971-1975 ont déjà commencé. Actuellement, la situation est favorable pour la Finlande, dont les exportations vers l'U.R.S.S. se sont élevées en 1967 à 1 320 millions de F pour 1 202,8 millions d'importations. Ce dernier chiffre ne satisfait toutefois qu'à moitié les Soviétiques, puisqu'il révèle une diminution de 5 % de leurs ventes par rapport à 1966. Accident statistique, exception susceptible de se corriger d'une année sur l'autre ? On croirait plus volontiers à Moscou qu'il y a là le résultat des efforts déployés de « certains cercles » finlandais pour « saper » les relations commerciales des deux pays. Et de citer par exemple l'opposition qu'a rencontrée récemment à Helsinki la vente de locomotives électriques en provenance d'U.R.S.S., celle qui se manifeste encore à l'exportation de gaz naturel soviétique vers la Finlande ou à la construction en coopération avec l'U.R.S.S. d'une centrale nucléaire. L'amertume des Soviétiques est d'autant plus vive devant ces refus qu'ils estiment pour leur part avoir consenti des avantages uniques à leur partenaire finlandais, comme par exemple l'offre — il est vrai non encore matérialisée — d'employer sur des chantiers et dans des entreprises d'U.R.S.S. une partie de la main-d'œuvre excédentaire en Finlande.

### La perspective d'un marché commun scandinave inquiète Moscou

Il va de soi que, dans ces conditions, les projets de Marché commun scandinave — désigné sous le nom de NORDEK — inquiètent sérieusement les responsables du commerce extérieur soviétique. Exclue de ce nouvel ensemble, au cas où il prendrait corps, l'U.R.S.S. ne pourrait en effet que voir se détériorer encore ses positions commerciales vis-à-vis de la Finlande.

Mais on touche, avec le projet NORDEK, à l'aspect politique du problème. Toute la méfiance, l'hostilité des Soviétiques à l'égard d'organisations telles que la Communauté économique euro-

péenne, se retrouvent ici et se manifestent sans la moindre équivoque. Le projet NORDEK, à en croire la Pravda, est destiné « à créer les conditions d'une pénétration atlantique » en Suède et en Finlande, il répond essentiellement au désir « de certains monopoles scandinaves... de rattacher leurs pays respectifs à la C.E.E. », elle-même « soutien politique et économique de l'O.T.A.N. en Europe ». Faut-il dire que les allusions faites, au cours de la réunion ministérielle de l'OTAN en novembre dernier à Bruxelles, à un « parapluie atlantique » étendu entre autres pays au-dessus de la Finlande n'ont rien fait pour rassurer les Soviétiques ? C'est dans ce contexte que la Pravda, dans un article signé de son « Observateur », — donc particulièrement autorisé, — a lancé le 7 février ce qui ressemblait fort à un avertissement contre tout geste de la part d'Helsinki qui pourrait être jugé « contraire aux intérêts de l'amitié finno-soviétique ».

HELSINGIN SANOMAT, Helsinki  
19 December 1968

"Tuure Junnila: Socialism, Constriction of  
Our Sovereignty" (excerpts)

In a speech before Parliament on 18 December 1968, Junnila affirmed that the political doctrine being discussed in the world press under the name of the Brezhnev Doctrine means that if socialism in a country of the socialist camp or the socialist commonwealth is threatened, then other members of the commonwealth have the right to give fraternal aid for the defense of socialism, even in the event that the country in question has not expressed a desire for such aid.

"In the case of Czechoslovakia this fraternal aid was represented in concrete form by the tens of divisions, the thousands of tanks, and the hundreds of thousands of soldiers who one August night appeared in the streets and squares of Prague and other Czechoslovak cities," Junnila said. He also cited Pravda.

"As a small country whose independence is a bare half century old and has been seriously threatened even in this short time, we are naturally interested in every such new trend in international politics that may become a threat to the sovereignty of small states.

"It cannot be a matter of indifference to the Finnish people that such a new doctrine of the right to interfere in the internal affairs of small countries affects some European countries which belong, just as we do, to the family of small European nations. But this doctrine touches us Finns also in another way.

"There are relatively strong political movements in our country which seek to realize socialism also in Finland. This is the openly avowed goal and program of the Finnish Communist Party, unanimously supported by the party. The only controversy is whether it should be stated in the party program that non-parliamentary, and even violent means can be used to implement this aim.

"But the Finnish Communist Party is not the only party working for the implementation of socialism in Finland. The fellow-travelling Socialist Opposition has also adopted the realization of socialism in Finland as their aim. This party is, it is true, a small and obviously fading group. But also within the Social Democratic Party proper a group has begun to emerge recently, obviously small numerically but all the more vociferous, which also seems to have adopted the realization of socialism as its aim.

"This group which is represented by party secretary Raatikainen, member of parliament Arvo Salo and a number of minor but all the more vociferous prophets, has stated openly that the Social Democratic Party should consciously adopt the creation of a socialist Finland as its task.

"For my own part, I do not believe that these political movements will succeed in their aims. In spite of everything, I have enough confidence in the common sense of the Finnish people to believe that the Finnish people will not espouse socialism as long as it is free to determine its own affairs. In other words, Finland can be impelled along the road to socialism only by the power of foreign tanks.

"But let us assume that things might go differently, that common sense might fail and that these political movements would really succeed in implementing socialism in Finland by voluntary, legal and parliamentary expedients. Aside from countless other misfortunes, this would place at essential risk the sovereignty of Finland.

"As long as the Brezhnev Doctrine to which I have been referring is in force, Finland perhaps would not, should it become a socialist country, any longer be able in some later phase to move away from socialism and towards another social system. The doctrine I have mentioned envisages not only the right but the actual duty of other socialist countries to act to preserve socialism also in Finland.

"For the communists, at least for the Finnish Stalinists, this is obviously a completely natural state of affairs, a matter of the situation being just as it should be. But that is hardly the case for the people who still consider themselves to be social democrats but work for the realization of socialism in Finland by legal and parliamentary means," Junnila said.

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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8

April 1969

INCREASED SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

Clearly, the Soviet goal in Latin America is to eliminate U.S. influence, to promote the establishment of governments that are either pro-Communist or at least friendly to the USSR and, in effect, to wreck the inter-American system. The Soviets tried and failed to achieve this goal by direct military intervention, in the form of missile bases in Cuba. The Soviets also attempted to gain their goal by lending support to armed revolution as waged by Castro and Guevara, the Colombian FARC and the FALN in Venezuela. Having failed in this also, the Soviets are now resorting to diplomatic and economic relations as a means of trying to achieve their goal.

The Soviet Union and the East European countries have made significant progress over the past months in their drive to expand their diplomatic and economic presence in Latin America. Although there was a temporary setback following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, there have since been increasing contacts between the Communist nations of Europe and a number of Latin American countries. With the renewal of diplomatic relations between Peru and the USSR on 1 February, seven Latin countries in addition to Cuba now have diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Peru. Ecuador has announced its intention to open diplomatic relations and Venezuela is also considering such action. If this occurs, the number of Soviet diplomatic missions in Latin America will have doubled in the past four years and will be the most that the Soviets have ever had in this area.

Recent Diplomatic and Trade Agreements

The Andean countries are among those where the Soviet Union and East European Communist states have been most active in promoting diplomatic and trade relations. On 17 February Peru signed its first trade agreement with the USSR; it followed by three weeks the establishment of Soviet-Peruvian diplomatic relations. (Peru now has diplomatic relations with Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the USSR, and has concluded commercial or consular agreements with Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, the USSR and, most recently, Bulgaria.) Peru's economic agreement with the Soviet Union is reported to provide for the exchange of trade representatives, settlement of import balances in convertible currencies, and most-favored-nation treatment. The Soviet proposals to Peru apparently covered only the prospect of limited trade, and separate protocols limited the size of the commercial representation to seven. Since Peru's trade with the U.S. alone comprises 1/3 to 1/2 of its total trade, it is unlikely trade with the Bloc will become very large.

The Soviets obviously hope to establish a diplomatic presence in Ecuador in the near future. Ecuador is one of the five countries which technically has had diplomatic relations with the USSR since 1945, but



there has never been a resident mission in either country. In early March 1969 the USSR and Ecuador finally discussed an exchange of ambassadors and signed their first trade agreement. The agreement is evidently similar to that between the USSR and Peru. The Soviets indicated they might buy Ecuador's banana surplus if that country will agree to reopening full diplomatic relations within a certain time. (It was rumored the Soviets tried to make the trade agreement contingent on permission to set up a trade mission with diplomatic status in Quito, as well as on gaining a commitment from Ecuador to establish full diplomatic relations within six months.) Other Communist representatives have been active in Ecuador in recent months. A protocol establishing relations with Rumania was signed in November 1968 during Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu's visit in Quito. A Czechoslovak consul general arrived in Ecuador on 5 November and the Quito press said he would discuss the renewal of diplomatic relations, broken in 1962. There are also reports that Ecuador will soon establish diplomatic relations with East Germany and Bulgaria, and that it will open consular relations with Hungary and Poland.

The government of Venezuela has been discussing the renewal of relations with the USSR. The talks were broken off following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, but they are now resumed. President Caldera is known to favor relations with all countries, including the USSR and those of Eastern Europe. Caracas already has diplomatic ties with Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and appears to be moving toward formal relations with Hungary as well. In late January the foreign minister of the Leoni government announced the renewal of contacts with representatives of other East European Communist states, aimed at restoring trade relations first and diplomatic relations later.

The government of Bolivia is currently negotiating with the Soviet Union to obtain 120 million dollars' worth of credit to capitalize the development of the Bolivian Government's oil deposits. The successful conclusion of these negotiations could lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR.

Colombia renewed diplomatic relations with the USSR in January 1968 after a twenty-year break in relations. (The Soviets were accused in 1948 of promoting a period of violent civil strife, causing bloodshed and the death of hundreds.) During the past year Soviet representation and activities have rapidly expanded. Although Soviet goods constitute only a small percentage of Colombia's overall imports, there are now close to thirty diplomatic, staff and trade mission personnel (as compared to the three people who make up Colombian representation in Moscow) and there has been a comparable increase in Soviet cultural and propaganda activity. Relations between the two countries were strained following the arrest of two clandestine couriers bringing Soviet funds from Mexico to the Colombian guerrillas, which occurred on the day before the new Soviet Ambassador presented his credentials in January 1968,

and then again after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. But the Colombian government has tended to overlook these in its drive to expand its relations and enhance its role in world affairs. Thus the status of the Czechoslovak consulate has been raised to that of an embassy (though there has not yet been an exchange of ambassadors) and consular relations have been opened with Hungary. Although it was announced over a year ago that relations with Rumania would be re-opened, this has not yet occurred.

In early March, Uruguay and the Soviet Union signed credit and trade agreements worth 20-million dollars. Uruguayan Vice President Alberto Abdala, who headed the trade mission to Moscow, told newsmen in Late February that his government was trying to make contacts with Communist countries in an effort to avoid exclusive dependence on the United States and West European countries for its foreign trade. Since previous trade between Uruguay and the USSR was limited mainly to Soviet purchases, Moscow presumably hopes this credit will help widen the Uruguayan market for Soviet goods.

Costa Rica is another of the countries that technically has had relations with the Soviet Union since the early post-World War II period, although there has not been an exchange of Ambassadors. It has recently been negotiating for new coffee sales to the USSR. These negotiations followed the appearance of an Izvestiya article in late January which praised Costa Rica as an "oasis ... of bourgeois democratic liberties in a desert of bloody dictatorships." (One may wonder how Izvestiya reconciles this description of the Latin American scene with current Soviet dealings with the military dictatorship in Peru.) Soviet diplomatic representation in Costa Rica would be particularly significant since there is no Soviet diplomatic representation in the other Central American countries.

#### Few Significant Economic Gains

The Latin American nations have found various aspects of Soviet and East European offers of trade and aid appealing and in line with their desire to project a more independent image beyond the framework of the inter-American system. Since many of them suffer from balance of payment difficulties, they see the USSR and Eastern Europe as a potential market for their produce, although there is also a growing realization of the very limited potential of such trade, mainly because of the lack of interest in one another's products. Nevertheless, agreements with the USSR and Eastern Europe are frequently important in the domestic political context for they are viewed as a measure of the enterprise and maturity of a country's foreign policy and as a counter-balance to too great dependence on the United States.

Yet in the past there has been considerable dissatisfaction among the Latin nations with the limited variety of goods, the quality of

equipment and the scarcity of spare parts that the Soviets have offered. As a result, past Soviet aid offers have gone virtually unused, and Soviet trade with Latin America comes to less than one per cent of total Soviet foreign trade. In view of such meager returns, Soviet eagerness to negotiate new trade agreements serves to emphasize that their real objectives are political.

Diplomatic and Trade Missions: Bases for Subversion and Espionage

Since the outlook for any substantial trade relations is not particularly favorable, what the Soviets are gaining from all their recent activity is the opportunity to establish Communist missions in Latin America, which will serve as bases for subversion and espionage throughout the continent. The oversized embassy staffs in both Mexico City and Bogota, with far more people than legitimate Soviet interests could possibly require, point to other functions being performed. As an example, the Soviet Embassy in Mexico was the source of the \$100,000 in guerrilla support funds that was seized from two couriers on arrival in Colombia. A number of other incidents involving Soviet officials within the past several months provide another indication of what the Soviets are up to: In September 1968 the Uruguayan government expelled three key members of the Soviet Embassy for their involvement in outbreaks of student and labor disorders; in November the Argentine police arrested and held temporarily three visiting Soviet officials, and in January of this year the Mexican government expelled two Soviet trade union officials for meddling in local labor affairs. As evidence that such activities are endemic in Soviet missions one can cite a similar incident which occurred in mid-March on another continent, in Ethiopia, where three Soviet and three Czechoslovak officials were declared personae non gratae for meddling in Ethiopian student affairs.

Although a deep-rooted suspicion of the Soviet Union runs throughout Latin America, there is still a tendency on the part of a number of the governments to underestimate the danger of allowing the establishment of permanent Soviet missions, particularly since they have the mistaken idea that the USSR is less violent and less aggressive than Cuba. Yet Cuba's existence depends on the Soviet Union which supports Cuba at a cost of over one million dollars a day; this includes subsidizing abortive adventures in the heart of Latin America of such Cuban guerrilla fighters as Guevara and his band, the Massetti group in Argentina, etc. And the arrest of the couriers with funds destined for the Colombian guerrillas demonstrates that the Soviet Union is still willing to promote such action on its own. Even Soviet propaganda has made this clear by consistently maintaining that Soviet opposition to revolutionary action in Latin America is "neither permanent nor applicable to every country."

PARA USO SOLO COMO  
MATERIAL DE FONDO

## AUMENTA LA PRESENCIA SOVIETICA Y DE EUROPA ORIENTAL EN AMERICA LATINA

Se ha visto claramente que los objetivos soviéticos en la América Latina son eliminar la influencia norteamericana, promover el establecimiento de gobiernos que sean pro-comunistas o al menos amigos de la URSS y destruir el sistema interamericano.

La Unión Soviética intentó infructuosamente alcanzar esos propósitos por medio de la intervención militar directa bajo la forma de bases de proyectiles en Cuba. Asimismo, y con idénticos resultados los apoyaron la lucha armada al estilo de Castro y Guevara, las FARC de Colombia y las FALN de Venezuela. Habiendo también fracasado en esto, los soviéticos han recurrido a las relaciones diplomáticas y económicas como medios para alcanzar sus objetivos. En los últimos meses la Unión Soviética y los países de Europa Oriental han progresado de modo notable en su campaña por extender su presencia diplomática y económica en la América Latina. Aunque tuvieron un revés temporal tras la invasión rusa de Checoslovaquia en agosto de 1968, desde entonces han aumentado los contactos entre las naciones comunistas de Europa y una serie de países latino-americanos.

Con la reanudación de las relaciones diplomáticas entre Perú y la URSS el primero de febrero, son siete los países latinoamericanos sin contar a Cuba, que mantienen lazos diplomáticos con la Unión Soviética: Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, México, Uruguay y Perú. Ecuador ha manifestado su intención de establecer relaciones e igualmente Venezuela está considerando tal medida. Si esto ocurre, el número de misiones diplomáticas soviéticas en Latinoamérica será el doble de lo que era hace cuatro años y el mayor número de representaciones que los rusos hayan tenido jamás en esta zona.

Ultimos convenios diplomáticos y comerciales.

Es en los países andinos donde ha sido mayor la actividad de la Unión Soviética y los estados comunistas de Europa Central encaminada a impulsar el establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas y comerciales. Perú firmó su primer convenio comercial con la URSS el 17 de febrero. Tres semanas antes, se habían iniciado las relaciones soviético-peruanas.

(En la actualidad Perú mantiene relaciones con Rumania, Yugoslavia, Checoslovaquia y la URSS, y ha firmado convenios comerciales o consulares con Rumania, Checoslovaquia, Polonia, Hungría, la URSS y últimamente Bulgaria.)

Se sabe que el convenio económico entre Perú y la Unión Soviética contempla el intercambio de representantes

comerciales, el ajuste de los saldos de importación en moneda convertible y tratamiento de nación más favorecida.

Al parecer la oferta soviética al Perú cubrió tan sólo la perspectiva de un intercambio comercial limitado, y en otros protocolos por separado se limitó a siete el número de representantes comerciales. Dado que el comercio del Perú con los Estados Unidos comprende de una tercera parte a la mitad del volumen total de transacciones, no es probable que el comercio con el bloque comunista llegue a alcanzar gran escala.

Evidentemente los rusos tienen esperanzas de establecer su presencia diplomática en Ecuador en un futuro cercano. Ecuador es uno de los cinco países que técnicamente han mantenido relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS desde 1945, pero nunca ha residido una misión en ninguno de ellos.

A principios de marzo la Unión Soviética y Ecuador finalmente discutieron el intercambio de embajadores y se firmó el primer convenio. El tratado es similar al firmado entre Perú y la URSS. Los soviéticos indicaron que podrían adquirir el excedente bananero del Ecuador si se reanudaran las relaciones diplomáticas plenas de un plazo limitado. (Se rumoró que la URSS quiso condicionar la firma del tratado al establecimiento de una misión comercial con categoría diplomática en Quito; además, Ecuador debía comprometerse a reanudar las relaciones diplomáticas antes de seis meses.)

Los representantes de otras naciones comunistas han estado activos en el Ecuador en los últimos meses. El protocolo iniciando las relaciones con Rumania se firmó en noviembre de 1968 durante la visita a Quito de Mănescu, el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de ese país. El 5 de noviembre llegó al Ecuador un cónsul checo, y la prensa de Quito informó que este discutiría la reanudación de relaciones diplomáticas, que habían sido suspendidas en 1962. Asimismo hay indicios que señalan que dentro de poco Ecuador establecerá relaciones diplomáticas con Alemania Oriental y Bulgaria e iniciará relaciones consulares con Hungría y Polonia.

El gobierno de Venezuela ha estado considerando la reanudación de las relaciones con la URSS. Las conversaciones se interrumpieron a raíz de la invasión soviética de Checoslovaquia pero ya continúan de nuevo. Se sabe que el Presidente Caldera favorece las relaciones con todas las naciones, incluso la Unión Soviética y los países de Europa Oriental. Caracas ya tiene relaciones oficiales con Polonia, Rumania, Checoslovaquia y Yugoslavia, y al parecer hará lo mismo con Hungría. A fines de enero el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del gobierno de Leoni anunció que se habían reanudado los contactos con representantes de otras naciones comunistas de Europa Oriental, encaminados a restablecer primero las relaciones comerciales y más tarde

las diplomáticas.

El gobierno de Bolivia está negociando actualmente con la Unión Soviética un crédito de 120 millones de dólares para financiar el desarrollo de los yacimientos de petróleo del gobierno boliviano. El éxito de estas conversaciones con la URSS podría conducir a las relaciones diplomáticas.

Colombia reanudó sus relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS en enero de 1968, veinte años después de haberlas quebrantado. (Se acusó a los soviéticos en 1948 de estimular la lucha civil violenta que ocasionó derramamientos de sangre y cientos de muertos.) La representación rusa y sus actividades en Colombia se han incrementado aceleradamente durante el pasado año. Aunque los productos soviéticos constituyen un porcentaje pequeño del volumen total de importaciones de Colombia, hay en Bogotá en la actualidad cerca de treinta funcionarios rusos entre diplomáticos, empleados y personal de la misión comercial (por otra parte la delegación colombiana en Moscú consta de tres personas), con el correspondiente aumento de actividades culturales y propagandísticas por parte de los soviéticos. Las relaciones colombo-soviéticos se agravaron a raíz de la detención de dos correos clandestinos que llevaban fondos soviéticos de México para las guerrillas colombianas, hecho que ocurrió el día anterior a la presentación de credenciales por el nuevo embajador de la URSS en enero de 1958. Asimismo hubo tirantez a raíz de la



invasión rusa de Checoeslovaquia. Pero el gobierno colombiano ha tendido a pasar por alto esos hechos en su intento de ampliar sus relaciones y realzar su posición en el ámbito internacional. Así se ha elevado el consulado checo a la categoría de embajada (aunque todavía no ha habido intercambio de embajadores) y se han iniciado relaciones consulares con Hungría. Aunque se anunció hace ya más de un año que las relaciones con Rumania quedarían establecidas, esto no ha ocurrido aún.

A principios de marzo Uruguay y la Unión Soviética firmaron convenios comerciales y de crédito por valor de 20 millones de dólares. El vicepresidente de Uruguay, Alberto Abdala, quien encabezara la misión comercial a Moscú, declaró a los periodistas a fines de febrero que su gobierno estaba tratando de tener contactos con los países comunistas en un esfuerzo por evitar la dependencia exclusiva en su comercio con los Estados Unidos y los países de Europa Occidental. Dado que todo comercio previo entre Uruguay y la URSS estuvo limitado principalmente a compras por parte de los soviéticos, es de presumir que Moscú espera que ese crédito ayudará a ampliar el mercado uruguayo para los productos soviéticos.

Costa Rica es otra de las naciones que técnicamente han mantenido relaciones con la Unión Soviética desde la terminación de la segunda guerra mundial, aunque no se ha producido el intercambio de embajadores. Costa Rica ha estado negociando

últimamente nuevas ventas de café a la URSS. Estas conversaciones siguieron la aparición a fines de enero en Izvestiya de un artículo en que se alababa a Costa Rica calificándola como "oasis... de libertades democrático-burguesas en medio de un desierto de dictaduras sanguinarias." (Cabe preguntarse como Izvestiya reconcilia esta descripción de América Latina con las negociaciones que actualmente realizan los soviéticos con la dictadura militar peruana.) La representación diplomática soviética en Costa Rica tendría una significación especial dado que no cuentan con más ninguna en los países centroamericanos.

Mientras tanto, el Presidente Somoza de Nicaragua dijo en una conferencia de prensa a mediados de febrero que "si otros países... venden sus productos al bloque soviético, Nicaragua tiene derecho a hacer lo mismo", y anunció que su país estaba listo a venderle algodón a Polonia, con la que ya tiene relaciones diplomáticas.

Pocas ganancias económicas de importancia.

Las naciones de Latinoamérica han encontrado que varios aspectos de las ofertas de comercio y ayuda por parte de la URSS y países les resultan atractivas y acorde con sus deseos de proyectar una imagen independiente más allá del marco del sistema interamericano. Dado que muchas de esas naciones tienen dificultades con sus balanzas de pagos, ven a la URSS y a Europa Central como posible mercado para sus productos agrícolas, aunque también comienzan a darse cuenta

que las posibilidades de tal comercio son muy limitadas debido principalmente a la carencia de interés que tiene uno en los productos del otro.

Sin embargo, los convenios con la URSS y la Europa Oriental son de gran importancia dentro del contexto de la política doméstica, pues se les ve como indicadores de la naturaleza progresista y madura de la política exterior de un país y como contrapesos a una dependencia demasiado grande en los Estados Unidos.

Pero en el pasado ha habido gran descontento entre las naciones latinoamericanas a causa de la poca variedad de productos que han ofrecido los soviéticos, así como la calidad de los equipos y la escasez de piezas de repuesto. El resultado ha sido que la ayuda soviética apenas ha sido empleada; el comercio de la URSS con la América Latina viene a ser solamente el uno por ciento del volumen total del comercio exterior de ese país. En vista de tan escasos créditos, el que los soviéticos estén ansiosos por negociar nuevos convenios comerciales sirve para subrayar que sus verdaderos objetivos son políticos.

Las misiones diplomáticas y comerciales: bases para la subversión y el espionaje.

Dado que la perspectiva de desarrollar relaciones comerciales sólidas no es particularmente favorable, lo que ganan los

soviéticos de toda esa actividad reciente es la oportunidad de establecer misiones comunistas en Latinoamérica, que servirán como bases para la subversión y el espionaje a través del continente. El elevado número de funcionarios de las embajadas soviéticas de Ciudad México y en Bogotá, muchos más de lo que se necesitan para atender intereses soviéticos legítimos, indica que se están realizando otras funciones. Por ejemplo, de la embajada soviética en México salieron los \$100,000 destinados a servir como fondos de apoyo a los grupos guerrilleros y que se les ocupó a dos correos a su llegada a Colombia. Otros incidentes ocurridos en los últimos meses, en los que estuvieron implicados funcionarios soviéticos, ofrecen otro indicio de lo que pretenden los rusos: en septiembre de 1968 el gobierno uruguayo expulsó a tres funcionarios importantes de la embajada soviética por su intervención en los desórdenes estudiantiles y laborales; en noviembre la policía argentina detuvo por un tiempo a tres funcionarios de la URSS que visitaban el país; y en enero de este año el gobierno mexicano expulsó a dos funcionarios laborales soviéticos por inmiscuirse en asuntos laborales locales. Como prueba de que estas actividades son peculiares a las misiones soviéticas, puede citarse un incidente similar ocurrido a mediados de marzo en otro continente, en Etiopía, donde tres funcionarios checos fueron declarados persona non grata por haberse inmiscuido en los asuntos estudiantiles de Etiopía.

Aunque la desconfianza hacia la Unión Soviética está bien arraigada en toda Latinoamérica, existe todavía el deseo por parte de ciertos gobiernos de menospreciar el peligro que significa las misiones soviéticas permanentes, sobre todo porque se tiene la idea errónea que la URSS es menos violenta y menos agresiva que Cuba. Sin embargo la existencia de Cuba depende de la Unión Soviética, que la mantiene al costo de más de un millón diario de dólares. Esto incluye el financiamiento de aventuras de guerrilleros cubanos en el continente, luego abortadas, tales como las de Guevara y su gente, las del grupo Masetti en Argentina, etc. Y la detención de correos con fondos destinados a las guerrillas colombianas demuestra que la Unión Soviética todavía está presta a promover ese tipo de acción por su propia cuenta. Inclusive, la propaganda soviética ha dejado ver claramente que la oposición soviética a la acción revolucionaria en América Latina no es "ni permanente ni aplicable a todo país".

TIME

28 February 1969

## SOUTH AMERICA

## The Russians Have Come

Not since Czarist days has Russia bothered to foster relations with far-away Peru, or has Peru cared about Russia. Now the two are becoming the best of friends. Three weeks ago they agreed to exchange ambassadors. Last week, after twelve days divided between business negotiations and Latin hospitality, representatives of both nations gathered at Lima's graceful Torre Tagle Palace to sign a two-year trade agreement. The precise products and terms are so far uncertain; the Soviet Union, through European middlemen, is already purchasing sizable quantities of Peruvian fishmeal. But the meaning of the event was clear. Peru's Foreign Minister, Eduardo Mercado Jarrín, one of a spangle of generals who seized power last October, called the occasion "the end of an era in which our trade was channeled in only one direction."

Mercado meant his voice to carry, and it did. Washington is dismayed these days by the fact that once friendly, conservative military men like those in the Peruvian junta have become as vociferously anti-Yanqui as the left-wingers who spat at and stoned Richard Nixon a decade ago when he visited South America as Vice President. Peru's rulers have seized a U.S. oil subsidiary called International Petroleum Co., and refuse even to discuss reparations with parent Standard Oil of New Jersey. Indeed, the Peruvians claim that I.P.C. owes them another \$17 million. Two weeks ago a perennial squabble over fishing rights flared again when a Peruvian navy vessel challenged U.S. tuna boats working within the 200-mile limit that Peru claims as territorial water. On earlier occasions, tuna men were released after buying fishing licenses. This time the Peruvians pumped more than sixty shots into one trawler. After U.S. officials inspected the porous hull, Ambassador John Wesley Jones submitted

a \$50,000 damage bill to Peru. Unless the I.P.C. situation improves, U.S.-Peruvian relations will come to a bitter climax in April when President Nixon is forced by the Hickenlooper Amendment to revoke \$79 million in aid and preferential sugar purchases from Peru.

**Economic Aggression.** Peru's neighbors are scarcely happy about the I.P.C. controversy. As Argentine Economics Minister Adalberto Krieger Vasena observed last week, "Any dispute of this type affects all the countries and creates the impression that we do not favor foreign investment." Nor are they pleased by Peru's threat to charge the U.S. before the Organization of American States with "economic aggression" (the countercharge, quite properly, will be that the U.S. is willing to accept expropriation if need be but insists that Peru observe international law and make repayment). Yet, in a showdown, most would probably side with Peru because of the sad state of U.S.-Latin American relations, in spite of huge U.S. private investment. Once, other nations in the hemisphere could command U.S. attention by pointing to the threat of Castro subversion. Now, however, Cuban infiltration has failed and Castro has been muffled by the Russians as the Soviets seek peaceful expansion and influence in South America. One way for Latin politicians to make the U.S. notice is to go right ahead and parley with the Russians.

Russia's "Via Pacifica" diplomacy and the new responses of some South American countries to it have brought about a quantum increase in the Russian presence. The Soviets within the past two years have opened embassies in Colombia and Chile as well as Peru, and are now recognized by six South American nations. Even where there is no formal relationship, Moscow has been busy pushing rubles and culture. Total Russian trade with Latin America is growing and now amounts to \$260 million, compared with \$157 million in 1965.

Moreover, in pursuit of diplomatic gains, the Russians graciously let the South Americans have the long end of trade balances. The Soviets buy such commodities as bananas, coffee and cocoa on which these nations still depend and with which they too often glut Western markets.

**Arms Are Different.** Some experts doubt that this idyllic barter will last very long. Says Professor Ernst Halperin, a Latin America expert currently lecturing at Massachusetts Institute of Technology: "The Russians are not much interested in delivering economic assistance to countries they cannot control. But arms are a completely different question. They are the Russians' main instrument of expansion into an area, as they showed in Guatemala in 1954 and a year later in Egypt."

If the Russians were to begin arms shipments—they have already offered civilian aircraft—the U.S. response would be immediately hostile. But until that point is reached, the new Soviet amiability campaign seems to have the U.S. baffled. To the irritation of his southern neighbors, President Nixon neither made traditional mention of them in his Inaugural address nor has so far chosen an Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Last week the President did announce that New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who was a State Department Inter-American Affairs officer under F.D.R. and today maintains a Venezuelan ranch, would make a series of visits "to listen to the leaders" and consult on common goals. It will likely be some time before even Rockefeller can make sense and suggestions out of the situation. Meanwhile, the ubiquitous Russians keep at it. The Soviet trade delegation in Lima moved on to Quito last week to discuss an agreement covering Ecuadorian bananas. In Uruguay, Vice President Alberto Abdala packed his bags for a flight to Moscow to sign a \$20 million trade pact.

EL SOL DE MEXICO, Mexico City  
11, January 1969

CPYRGHT

## La Embajada Misteriosa

Por Bernardo Escalante

**L**OS HABITANTES de la ciudad de México la conocen muy bien. Es una mansión sombría y silenciosa. Se alza sobre la calzada de Tacubaya, casi en el corazón de un barrio alegre y populoso. Su especial arquitectura y sus elevados árboles hacen que por las noches se recorte en silueta como el castillo de Drácula.

Mucha gente se pregunta qué hay dentro de esa casona donde jamás se ve un alma viviente y donde hasta las ramas de los árboles parecen petrificadas. Si alguien llama al portón, nadie acude. Y si se abre esa puerta metálica es gracias a un mecanismo eléctrico que funciona a la perfección. Una vez que se ha identificado —y hasta

fotografiado, según cuentan— al visitante.

El lector habrá adivinado ya que se trata de la Embajada de la Unión de Repúblicas Soviéticas Socialistas. Misión alguna extranjera está rodeada de ese ambiente de misterio. Los ventanales están siempre cerrados y la mansión parece vacía y, cosa curiosa, dentro de

ella trabaja febrilmente una verdadera colmena de funcionarios, empleados, secretarias, radiooperadoras, contadores, operadores de telex, etcétera.

Lo extraño está en que la Embajada de la URSS es una de las que cuentan con personal más numeroso que menor. Las dependencias contadas

CPYRGHT

que tienen trato con el público —sección consular, sección cultural, agencia turística— laboran sólo cuatro horas a la semana. Con los dedos de la mano se podrán contar los mexicanos que en un año van a solicitar una visa. El comercio entre México y la URSS es casi nulo. Las "relaciones culturales", como todos lo saben, consisten sólo en hacer propaganda "de allá para acá", ya que en los dominios de Brezhnev y de Kosygin ni idea tienen de lo que es México.

¿A qué se dedica, pues, ese enjambre de personal ruso —en esa Embajada no trabaja un solo mexicano y hasta la servidumbre es soviética— en esa enorme mansión que

podría ser guarida de vampiros? El misterio sube de punto si se toma en cuenta que la Embajada de México en Moscú apenas si está integrada por unas seis o siete personas, y en cambio la URSS mantiene aquí más de un centenar. ¿Por qué la URSS tiene una Embajada tan numerosa en nuestro país si hace lo mismo que la nuestra en Moscú?

Aquí está el "quid" de la cuestión. La Embajada Soviética en México seguramente que no se dedica a menesteres puramente diplomáticos o consulares. Por algo al senador norteamericano Armisted I. Selden le entraron algunas dudas y con abundancia de datos presentó una denuncia

en el Congreso de su país.

"La única forma en que puede explicarse el volumen de personal 'diplomático' en México son las operaciones de inteligencia y secretas; las funciones normales y legítimas de dicha Embajada se calcula que requieren la décima parte del personal que tiene actualmente". Con estas palabras el senador Selden planteó lo que todo México sabe: que las Embajadas de los países llamados socialistas tienen tareas de espionaje, subversión, o conspiración y sabotaje.

La denuncia de Selden fue difundida ampliamente por las agencias internacionales de noticias y

publicada en la mayor parte de los diarios del Continente. "Resulta irrefutable —decía el senador— que el gran aparato soviético en México está llevando a cabo otras misiones —misiones relacionadas con el apoyo y patrocinio proclamado públicamente por los soviéticos a la causa de la revolución mundial. Los comentaristas de observadores bien informados a través de Centroamérica y de la zona del Caribe le dieron sustento a esa suposición. Los mismos observadores sugieren que la misión principal de la Embajada de Cuba en México tiene el mismo propósito". En México nadie lo duda. Sólo falta saber qué opina nuestra cancillería.

EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO

24 January 1969

## Mas Sobre los Agitadores que Fueron Expulsados

Por CARLOS MONTIEL

CPYRGHT

La expulsión de los "turistas" rusos Victor Manikoff y Vladimir Sergev, ha puesto coto en México a las actividades subversivas impunes y de largo historial de estos dos agentes del Kremlin en los países de América Latina.

En mayo de 1962, Sergev fue arrestado en Asunción haciendo propaganda a un intento rojo descaradamente dirigido a lograr la rebelión de los sindicalistas en aquella ciudad. Tal cosa no fue obstáculo para que fuera sorprendido en Buenos Aires, sin documentación adecuada, cuando se disponía a realizar actividades semejantes. De Buenos Aires fue rápidamente expulsado.

Existen constancias de que durante 1964, Sergev de nuevo hizo presencia, con los mismos propósitos, en varios países del Continente. En julio de 1966 se introdujo en terri-

torio brasileño sin permiso, ya que la embajada carioca en Moscú le había negado la visa, por órdenes expresas de la Cancillería en Río.

En Canadá también hay rastros de la estadia en ese país de Sergev, figurando como "jefe de la sección internacional del Consejo Central de la Unión Sindicalista", aunque tal título en realidad correspondía al de "jefe de la agitación y el espionaje rusos en América".

Finalmente, como lo informé el martes 21 en el artículo publicado aquí, bajo el rubro "Dos Agitadores Rusos Expulsados del País", después de promover desde Ecuador los disturbios de Cali, Colombia, en compensación por su fracaso para montar en esos dos países desórdenes estudiantiles semejantes a los que agitaron simultáneamente a Mé-

xico, Brasil, Argentina y Uruguay, llegaron a México Sergev y Manikoff, usando visas de turistas, para presentarse el 15 de enero en el Congreso del Trabajo, acompañados por funcionarios de la embajada de la URSS. La visita no pudo efectuarse, porque obrando con acierto y oportunidad, la Secretaría de Gobernación los expulsó del país.

La presencia en México de una embajada soviética significa la amistad de buena fe que el gobierno mexicano, con el apoyo de su pueblo, quiere mantener con el ruso, igual que con todos los pueblos de la Tierra. Pero esa amistad se funda en el respeto mutuo y en los principios de la no ingerencia en los asuntos internos de nuestro país, igual que nosotros no nos inmiscuimos en los que corresponden a la vida interior de la URSS.

EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO  
24 January 1969

More About the Agitators Who Were Expelled  
by Carlos Montiel

The expulsion of the Russian "tourists," Victor Manikoff and Vladimir Sergev, has put a stop in Mexico to the unpunished subversive activities and the long history of these two Kremlin agents in the countries of Latin America.

In May of 1962, Sergev was arrested in Asuncion making revolutionary propaganda impudently directed at inciting rebellion among the trade unions of that city. This was no deterrent, however, because he was apprehended in Buenos Aires, without proper documentation, while preparing to carry out similar activities. He was quickly expelled from Buenos Aires.

Exhibiting perserverance, during 1964 Sergev again appeared, with the same objectives, in several countries of the Continent. In July 1966 he entered Brazilian territory without permission, although the Brazilian Embassy in Moscow had denied him a visa on the express orders of the Chancillery in Rio.

In Canada, also, there are reminders of Sergev's stay in that country, where he was "Chief of the International Section of the Central Council of Trade Unions," although such a title in reality corresponds to "Chief of Russian Agitation and Espionage in America."

Finally, as I reported in the article published here on Tuesday the 21st, under the heading, "Two Russian Agitators Expelled from the Country," after promoting, from Ecuador, the disturbances in Cali, Colombia, to compensate for the failure to incite student disorders in those two countries similar to those which were simultaneously occurring in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, Sergev and Manikoff arrived in Mexico, using tourist visas, to attend the Labor Congress on the 15th of January, accompanied by officials of the Embassy of the USSR. The purpose of their visit was not fulfilled, because, working effectively and opportunely, the Secretary of the Government expelled them from the country. The presence in Mexico of a Soviet Embassy shows the friendship and good faith that the Mexican Government, with the support of its people, wishes to maintain with Russia, as with all peoples of the globe. But that friendship is founded on mutual respect and on the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of our country, just as we do not meddle in the internal affairs of the USSR.



# Ordenó el Gobierno la Expulsión de Tres Funcionarios Soviéticos

Imprevistamente, ya que ninguna actuación oficial había trascendido a este respecto, el gobierno dispuso ayer la expulsión del país de tres ciudadanos de nacionalidad rusa pertenecientes a la representación diplomática de la URSS en nuestro país. La trascendente medida pudo conocerse en forma extraoficial en la sede del Her central hacia el mediodía de ayer, pero el decreto respectivo recién fue entregado a la prensa, pasada la hora 20.

El mismo expresa textualmente: "Montevideo, 24 de setiembre de 1968. VISTO lo informado, el Presidente de la República resuelve: 1º Declarar persona no grata al señor Consejero de la Embajada de la Unión de las Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas, Victor Glotov.

2º Declarar personas no aceptables a los señores funcionarios administrativo-técnicos de la referida Embajada, Anatoli Ladyguine y Georgui Matioukhine. 3º Concederse un plazo de 48 horas para que las referidas personas hagan abandono del territorio nacional. 4º Comuníquese, etc. Firman el decreto el titular del Ejecutivo, Sr. Jorge Pacheco Areco y los ministros de RREE., Venancio Flores y del Interior, Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga.

Cuantos intentos hicieron los cronistas destacados en la sede gubernativa para poder conocer las causas de las expulsiones, se estrellaron contra el persistente hermetismo de los ministros actuantes en la importante decisión. Tanto el Secretario del Interior, cartera ésta donde se originó el decreto, como el Canciller de la República, coincidieron en sus respuestas al requerimiento periodístico, que el gobierno no estaba obligado, según el derecho internacional, a dar a conocer los mo-

tivos de medidas de este tipo. "Si esto rige incluso para el país de donde provienen los expulsados, y a quien no se dan explicaciones, tampoco corresponde publicitar las causas en el orden interno", dijo el Dr. Jiménez de Aréchaga. Por su parte, el Prof. Venancio Flores, ante el asedio de preguntas, contestó: "La razón de la medida es fácilmente deducible".

La notificación del decreto fue hecha a los conminados a abandonar el territorio nacional, poco después del mediodía anterior, por conducto del Ministerio de RREE. Por extraña coincidencia, el expulsado Anatoli Ladyguine, que actuaba como encargado de prensa en la embajada soviética desde hace un año, concurrió ayer de mañana por primera vez a la Casa de Gobierno, a objeto de invitar a los jefes de las Oficinas de Informaciones y de Prensa, a la inauguración de la nueva sede de sus funciones en esta capital. Ladyguine, antes de venir al Uruguay, estuvo tres años actuando en Cuba.

La anterior medida similar adoptada por las autoridades uruguayas, también en las personas de funcionarios de la embajada soviética, ocurrió el 4 de octubre de 1966. En esa oportunidad, el Consejo Nacional de Gobierno, por moción de su presidente, Alberto Heber y luego de un extenso debate, dispuso la expulsión de los diplomáticos rusos, Sergey Alekseyevich Yankarkin, Nikolay Iosifovich Ivanov, Aleksey Alekseyevich Zudin y Vladimir P. Shvetz. Tampoco entonces se informó oficialmente sobre las causas, pero de la discusión habida en el plenario gubernativo, surgió que los acusados habían intervenido activamente en la agitación gremial y estudiantil.

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